SECURITYJuly 1, 2025

The implications of Al-Qaeda’s return for U.S. policy

Reading time: 7 min

The Islamist terrorists’ quiet yet expansive resurgence threatens global stability, reshaping U.S. counterterrorism priorities.

Flowers seen at a memorial in New York City on September 11, 2024, honoring victims of the al-Qaeda attacks of 2001 that killed nearly 3,000 people in New York, Pennsylvania and the Pentagon. © Getty Images

In a nutshell

Al-Qaeda is expanding across the Middle East, Central Asia and the Sahel
The U.S. plans precision counterterrorism and strategic regional alliances
A strategic focus prioritizes containing threats and deepening ties with India
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Among the many global challenges facing the United States, the one receiving scant public attention is the resurgence of al-Qaeda through Central Asia and the Middle East. Today, there is an active network as extensive as the one before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

That said, al-Qaeda has not promoted its global presence and ambition as Osama bin Laden did with his famous 1998 declaration that the U.S. was a “paper tiger,” waiting to be toppled. Contemporary al-Qaeda is lower key on the international stage and not as outspoken about taking the fight to the West; nor do they appear to have the capability to operationalize globally. But the Islamist terrorists have the same goal of building a caliphate and they could, if left unchecked, become a threat to regional stability from South and Central Asia to Africa.

The U.S. is calibrating a response to the threat, pairing limited directed action via counterterrorism programs and measures integrated into regional strategies.

Terrorist resurgence to face the Trump administration

Several recent developments highlight the emergence of al-Qaeda’s growing footprint clashing with expanding global initiatives of the new U.S. administration under President Donald Trump.

Syria

Recently on a trip to Saudi Arabia, President Trump agreed to lift sanctions on Syria at the behest of U.S. regional partners. Washington is shifting to a smaller counterterrorism footprint in northern Syria. Meanwhile, the president asked the new government in Damascus to normalize relations with Israel and potentially join the Abraham Accords.

Part of the forces that brought militant Islamist-turned president of Syria’s interim government, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, to power, however, are extremists with links to al-Qaeda who oppose the Abraham Accords and still seek the destruction of Israel. They could rebel, or Mr. Jolani could give in to their demands. For the U.S., these developments bear watching because al-Qaeda has a foothold in the country.

Iraq

The Iraqi government is increasingly nervous about Sunni extremists linked to al-Qaeda and has reversed course – rather than seeking the U.S. to reduce its forces in the country, they now view the Americans as a stabilizing presence and insurance against getting drawn into a regional conflict.

For its part, the U.S. has made demands on the government in Baghdad such as combating corruption, promoting economic development and addressing the influence of armed militias, which the Iraqi regime seems reluctant to accept. The situation is dynamic, complicated by growing Israeli and American pressure on Iran and the increasingly unlikely prospects for a new U.S.-Iran deal.

Iran

Iran allows al-Qaeda to transit the country with little oversight. The regime in Tehran, which has openly declared its intent to annihilate Israel and is the largest state sponsor of terrorism, continues a policy of tolerating al-Qaeda. The mullahs see the group as a possible hedge against Iran’s adversaries, a policy unlikely to change in the near term, barring regime change.

Afghanistan

Al-Qaeda and Haqqani – a Sunni Islamist militant organization primarily based in Pakistan − are embedded in the Taliban-led government. Al-Qaeda has safe houses for transit at the Iran and Pakistan borders and active training camps around the country. There is no way the Taliban would ever cut off either al-Qaeda or Haqqani.

Since his inauguration, President Trump has publicly toyed with the idea of U.S. forces returning to the Bagram military base. In addition, Central Asian nations that border Afghanistan and want to have closer ties with the U.S., as well as more north-south trade, would like to see Washington engage with the Taliban.

There is also a segment of the human rights community that believes engagement would lead to more access to the country. While the Taliban would like U.S. recognition, there is no chance they would ever make compromises on al-Qaeda or human rights. Furthermore, they will not allow oversight of aid money coming into the country. The likelihood of normalization between Washington and the Taliban is near zero.

Pakistan

Pakistan’s foreign and security policy has always been deeply influenced by its military and Inter-Services Intelligence. There are competing factions within the security and military services; some are linked to extremist groups that seek to threaten India, while others aim to placate domestic extremists and act as a tool for influence in Afghanistan. This has not changed in 40 years and likely will not in the near future, particularly after the recent Pakistan-India crisis.

China is a complicating factor in Pakistan; Beijing’s influence in Islamabad runs deep. The Chinese likely distrust the Pakistanis, but find them useful for distracting India and holding extremist elements at bay from threatening China. Since Beijing props up the Pakistani economy and provides military support, there is little incentive for Islamabad to change its behavior – ever. China does not want Pakistan and India to have a full-blown war – that would be bad for China – but Beijing does want to keep them at each other’s throats. The Chinese are more than willing to tolerate flirting with al-Qaeda because they believe they are insulated.

Scenarios

This all points to al-Qaeda having an unbroken operating space from South and Central Asia across to the Middle East. There is also an active Islamist extremist threat in Africa, most notably in the Sahel. They do not directly connect geographically, but the Sahel is the second-most active theater of Islamist extremism.

This is, in American parlance, “a whole new ballgame.” Make no mistake: Virtually every dollar and life spent from 9/11 until President Joe Biden withdrew from Afghanistan was wasted. At least, that is certainly what the current administration in Washington believes. This is a new competition with a new generation of al-Qaeda that, just like the last one, dreams of a caliphate.

Most likely: Washington to routinely address the threat as needed

Expect the U.S. counterterrorism approach to global threats to be highly centralized with the National Security Council in control; counterterrorism activities will be the equivalent of routinely “mowing the grass.” Washington’s focus is on the global Islamist terrorist threat, and it is a calibrated effort. While the Trump team is not indifferent to the situation, they have no interest in addressing the roots of extremism, conducting another Global War on Terror, getting deeply engaged in these regions, or carpet-bombing countries with foreign aid.

Expect active global operations for both kinetic action (decapitating impending threats) and situational awareness with a string of active partnerships across the Sahel and North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. The U.S. footprint on the ground will be limited to strategic, essential places with regional reach.

The U.S. goal will not be to eliminate global extremism but to protect the homeland, build firebreaks and tamp down threats before they go global or risk regional stability in places important to American interests.

Likely: Washington to encourage rapprochement among regional powers

Washington will press the Abraham Accords as a constructive way to contain the threat. Over time, the U.S. is also likely to deepen engagement in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, while laying out specific asks and accountability in all the regional bilateral relationships.

The U.S. will take a tougher line with recalcitrant partners like Iraq. Normalization with Iran is unlikely barring major concessions from Tehran or a change of government. Any deal − if one were to emerge − would have to include not just the surrogates but al-Qaeda itself.