Angola at 50: Resources, unrest and a political crossroads
Post-independence Angola has been defined by inequality, unrest and contested power. That may change.
In a nutshell
- The MPLA’s political hegemony may be coming to an end
- Subsidy cuts worsen inflation and lead to unrest
- Angola will reform or face more repression ahead of 2027 elections
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As Angola marks half a century of independence, the occasion exposes both the opportunities and the paradoxes of post-colonial Africa. On the one hand, it is a country rich in valuable and strategic resources including a vibrant, young population and extensive mineral and hydrocarbon deposits. On the other, there is persistent, widespread poverty and a perpetual political situation some describe as “liberation without democracy.”
On November 11, 1975, Angola was formally declared an independent nation. For Portugal, still reeling from the political upheaval of its 1974 Carnation Revolution, decolonization became the European nation’s most urgent priority. Yet in former colony Angola, the question over who was or would be the legitimate representative of the people was far from settled. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberal of Angola, each based in different regions, all proclaimed independence simultaneously.
The result was the devastating Angolan civil war (intermittently between 1975-2002), which was one of the Cold War’s most prominent proxy conflicts. The war ended definitively with the death of the controversial and charismatic leader of UNITA, Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, in 2002. In the years that followed, a combination of demilitarization and the ruling MPLA’s integration of and cooperation with UNITA elites created the conditions for peace.
Facts & figures
Key developments in Angola’s oil and minerals investments
2002: End of Angola’s civil war
2004: China’s EXIM Bank pledges $2 billion in oil-backed loans for reconstruction
2004: China’s Sinopec begins acquiring stakes in Angola’s offshore oil blocks
2015: China’s Sinochem signs a 10-year oil supply deal with Angola’s Sonangol
2018: TotalEnergies launches the $16 billion Kaombo project, Angola’s largest deepwater offshore oil development to date
2023: Lobito Corridor rail export project launched, linking Angola, Zambia and the DRC, backed by the U.S. and EU
2023: Angola leaves OPEC due to its inability to meet production quotas
2024: Rio Tinto signs a mining investment contract securing 35 years of exploration and production rights
July 2025: ExxonMobil, Azule Energy and Sonagol E&P extend production sharing contract until 2037
September 2025: Angola’s National Oil, Gas & Biofuels Agency, Sonangol, Shell and Chevron sign a new exploration and production deal
November 2025: Shell signs exploration agreement with the Ministry of Mineral Resources
November 2025: India expresses interest in future oil cooperation with Angola
November 2025: Angola and Botswana mining ministers discuss efforts to gain control over diamond producer De Beers
The late Angolese President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who ruled for 38 years (1979-2017) becoming one of Africa’s “presidents for life,” oversaw this transition. Yet, despite his role in securing stabilization, which earned him the epithet of “the architect of peace,” his legacy was tainted by decades of corruption and the failure to transform Angola’s oil-fueled boom into broad prosperity. By the time he left office in 2017, he was deeply unpopular.
His successor Joao Lourenco was elected president in August of the same year and remains in office. He faced the challenge of renewing the still dominant but fatigued MPLA within a system of competitive authoritarianism – where political competition exists but the playing field remains tilted in the ruling party’s favor. His promises to clamp down on corruption were received with enthusiasm, as was his decision to remove those closer to Dos Santos from positions of influence, even from within the MPLA political bureau.
This momentum, however, soon dissipated. The MPLA is still in power, but its political dominance is eroding, particularly among urban youth. At the same time, the Angolan economy remains hostage to excessive oil dependency and public officials using state resources to maintain patronage networks.
Popular unrest in Angola met with crackdowns
The recent protests, which started in Angola’s capital Luanda and have spread to other cities, have resulted in at least 30 deaths, hundreds of injuries and 1,500 arrests. Sparked by the government’s decision to gradually remove fuel subsidies, the demonstrations mirror a broader pattern of civic unrest observed in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, as seen in Sudan (leading to the fall of Omar al-Bashir), Nigeria, Mozambique, Zambia and Kenya.
At roughly $0.33 per liter, Angola’s fuel prices are among the lowest on the continent. However, it has become evident that maintaining artificially low prices is unsustainable, as the government grapples with deteriorating public finances, rising debt and volatile commodity markets. In Angola, fuel subsidies cost nearly $3 billion in 2023 alone. The war in Ukraine has further strained oil-producing countries such as Nigeria and Angola, which, despite their crude oil wealth, import refined petroleum at high global market prices due to a lack of domestic processing and refining capacity.
Facts & figures
Angola’s place in Africa
The withdrawal of subsidies directly affects urban populations who rely on public transportation (namely the system of collective taxis via minibus known as candonga) and pushes up the costs of food production, transport and storage. Households that spend the bulk of their disposable income on food and transport are then under even greater pressure.
The most recent subsidy cut translated into a 33 percent increase in fuel prices. This, combined with the September minimum wage increase to 100,000 kwanzas (around $110) per month after it was already lifted to 70,000 kwanzas in 2024, is expected to fuel further inflationary pressures.
The protests and ensuing crackdowns exposed how police resort to excessive force and arbitrary arrests, and how authorities swiftly label protests as rebellions. These actions in part characterize competitive-authoritarian regimes. Demonstrations in Angola, as in other parts of Africa, reflect the growing frustration of a largely young population. Sixty-three percent of Angolans are under 24. Many see no economic prospects, with unemployment among those aged 15-24 estimated at over 50 percent. For them, the liberation credentials of the MPLA are no longer legitimate.
Angola’s deferred promises have consequences
The Lourenco administration has unleashed some important measures, such as judicial reforms or the more symbolic Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, which both appear to have yielded some results. The government has also somewhat reduced corruption. In 2014 Angola ranked 161st out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index; a decade later it had climbed to the 121st spot. Another important step was the 2018 private investment law, which made both international and domestic investment easier by simplifying procedures, eliminating local partnership requirements in several sectors and removing the minimum investment threshold for accessing tax incentives.
These changes, while positive, are proving too little, too late, as Angolans continue to face the double pressure of political authoritarianism and material scarcity. Structural obstacles continue to constrain economic growth: heavy dependency on oil (crude still accounts for 95 percent of exports and 60 percent of budget revenues), infrastructure gaps, excessive bureaucracy and an incipient private sector.
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The fluctuation of oil prices on global markets is a challenge for the government: If Brent crude prices fall below the $70 per barrel benchmark used in the national budget, government activities must be restricted. Lower prices also impact offshore operations, many of which may cease to be profitable. Meanwhile, the era of easy financing has ended, as the oil-backed loan model that long defined Angola’s economic relationship with China appears exhausted.
As a result, the removal of subsidies has become an imperative, necessary to prop up government finances and allow continued public services. However, the cuts will have political consequences, likely to shape the preelectoral period and further damage the prospects for the MPLA in the 2027 presidential and general elections.
Like ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe or FRELIMO in Mozambique, the MPLA became the dominant party in post-independence Angola. Despite Jose Eduardo dos Santos eventually coming to the end of his leadership era in 2017, the regime continues to operate within a framework of competitive authoritarianism. But the MPLA’s growing unease with facing the electorate is evident, for example, in the repeated postponement of municipal elections. As seen in other African countries, the greatest challenge to these hegemonic, post-independence parties that control state resources and the security apparatus comes from an urban, connected and increasingly discontent youth.
Scenarios
The political and economic trajectory of Angola will be strongly influenced by the 2027 elections. Considering this, two scenarios must be considered.
Most likely: The MPLA prepares for a new era
Under a first, most likely, scenario, Angola will enter a period of economic adjustment and gradual political opening. Several factors make this outcome more probable.
First, Angola’s economic ties with China, while still significant, have become less dominant as the provision of oil-backed loans declines. Second, the country’s abundant resources − oil, gas, diamonds and over 35 million hectares of arable land, combined with its strategic position in the South Atlantic − make it an attractive partner for a wide range of actors, including Western powers such as the United States. This is reflected in the ambitious Lobito Corridor project, which, already, is generating interest from the U.S. that counters China’s previous position as the dominant foreign power in Angola.
As Luanda expands its network of bilateral and multilateral partnerships, stability will remain in the shared interest of both domestic elites and international allies. Many within the MPLA are already preparing for more political and economic competition, as the party has been gradually losing ground in urban centers.
A key indicator of this trend was the 2022 election results, when UNITA, the main opposition party, won in Luanda and in the oil-rich exclave of Cabinda, despite the constraints of the competitive-authoritarian system. This suggests that the erosion of MPLA dominance in urban areas may be irreversible. A more pluralistic political environment and developing roster of foreign partners will in the mid-term lead toward stability and a slow transition to normalcy.
Less likely: MPLA forcibly clings to power, snuffs out the opposition
Under a less likely but more disruptive scenario, Angola will enter a period of instability and repression, echoing dynamics observed in Mozambique or Sudan. This scenario would become more likely if levels of dissatisfaction among voters remain high, and the MPLA refuses to relinquish power.
Two dynamics heighten this risk. First, there are high levels of frustration among segments of the population that feel they have little to lose. Second, Angola’s political system is highly centralized, and the presidency has far more power than the National Assembly.
The ruling party will be faced with the question of succession ahead of elections expected in 2027, something that may trigger internal tensions. Though unlikely, there is even a possibility that President Lourenco may try to circumvent term limits and run again.
Another potential source of tension and destabilization is the exclave of Cabinda, where the independentist Front for the Liberation for the Exclave of Cabinda (FLEC) has clashed with the Angolan army.
Taken together, the elements of this scenario would lead to domestic political instability and further civic strife, making foreign investment less attractive.
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