SECURITYMarch 27, 2026

Who holds the cards in Arctic security?

Stefan Hedlund

Reading time: 10 min

Trump’s Greenland gambit exposes U.S. Arctic weaknesses, spurring Russian-Chinese gains, straining NATO ties and forcing a rush for ice-capable fleet routes.

The deeply divisive issue of who should control Greenland is often cited as a Black Swan event. When it most recently erupted, the most striking aspect was how little it had to do with Arctic security, the problem the Trump administration claimed the United States needed to address.

The Arctic region had been under scrutiny long before Greenland was weaponized. The rapid melting of the northern ice cap has been opening new possibilities, from hydrocarbon exploration to shipping routes, as well as presenting new security challenges. Great powers have long operated nuclear-powered submarines beneath the ice, but the growing need to project military power on the surface is a relatively new development.

Reshaping Arctic power games

Despite its current high stakes in global politics, Greenland has long been largely overlooked. The island has no easily accessible hydrocarbons. It is situated between the sea routes connecting the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. It has been gradually integrated into American defense strategies over the past 75 years. Although the tensions sparked by U.S. President Donald Trump did not escalate into immediate military conflict, they highlighted that Arctic security has become a crucial aspect of global geopolitics. As the Black Swan analogy suggests, the consequences of such disruptions are likely to be both substantial and widespread.

The Trump administration’s accusations that Russia and China were attempting to take over Greenland were met with widespread disapproval and sparked serious political backlash. These claims may yet prompt the Kremlin to strengthen its position as an Arctic power, while they could incentivize China to invest further in its aspirations to become a key player in the region. As the U.S. continues to alienate its allies within NATO, it may discover that it has overstepped its bounds.

Key questions are still open. How will the payoffs from different approaches be transformed into an advantage? How will various players adjust their strategies? And – to paraphrase President Trump – who holds the cards? Because the fallout from the Greenland gambit is likely to have an unpredictable impact on ongoing strategic games, it is essential to examine how those games are played, who the major players are and who has the advantage.

Russia’s dominance in the Arctic before Ukraine

The exploration of hydrocarbon resources was influenced by a 2009 U.S. Geological Survey. This survey indicated that 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its undiscovered gas lie north of the Arctic Circle, with 84 percent of these resources located offshore. Most of the gas reserves, estimated to be three times as plentiful as oil, are found in the Russian sector.

At the height of the scramble for exploration, Russia was booming. Moscow was forging relationships with tech-savvy Norway to explore offshore gas reserves and permitted the Russian state-controlled energy giant Rosneft to enter into a substantial long-term agreement with ExxonMobil. The key aspect of these deals, as well as others, was the overwhelming eagerness of foreign partners to get involved, often leading them to accept less favorable terms imposed by the Russian side. In short, it was Russia that had all the cards.

The melting of the Arctic ice cap has created three potential sea routes connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The first is the Northwest Passage, along the Canadian coastline. The second is the Northeast Passage, following Russia’s Siberian coast. The third, albeit the most unlikely to manifest, is the Transpolar route. The potential savings in transportation costs has generated interest among several of Asia’s export-oriented countries, particularly China.

At its peak, Russia found itself in a dominant position. It had extensive experience operating in Arctic conditions and had developed a strong partnership with China. As cargo traffic along what became known as the Northern Sea Route increased, participation expanded beyond Asia to include European countries. Much of the trade halted at the Yamal Peninsula, the halfway point of the Northern Sea Route and the center of the Russian gas industry. Equipment was transported in and liquefied natural gas was transported out. Russia was enjoying a decisive victory in this arena.

Read more by Professor Stefan Hedlund

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Eager to protect the gains from sustained control of these activities, Moscow embarked on a parallel militarization of the Arctic. It revitalized old military bases along the Siberian shoreline and created special-purpose Arctic brigades. In tandem, it accelerated the construction of ships capable of operating in Arctic conditions, ranging from cargo vessels to heavy-duty icebreakers. Caught off guard, the U.S. suddenly realized that its navy lacked serious ice-breaking capability and that its army had no forces capable of operating in severe Arctic conditions. Moscow again held all the cards.

The situation changed drastically with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although the sanctions imposed subsequently have not significantly hindered the war efforts, they have severely affected Russia’s position as a power in the Arctic. The lack of technological capability to independently explore the Arctic for hydrocarbons, ExxonMobil’s withdrawal from its partnership with Rosneft and Norway’s decision to end further cooperation were major blows.

The drop in traffic along the Northern Sea Route was compounded by China’s retreat from its support for Russian liquefied natural gas from Yamal. Most importantly, the military dynamics in the region were fundamentally altered. As Russian Arctic brigades were deployed to the front lines in Ukraine, NATO’s northern members ramped up efforts to bolster their own Arctic forces.

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Facts & figures

NATO and Russia’s military bases in the Arctic

The U.S. playing catch-up

The pressing question now is what comes next for the polar region, which holds vast mineral resources beyond hydrocarbons. The Northern Sea Route significantly reduces travel time between Asia and Europe − to approximately two weeks, about half the time required via the Suez Canal. However, the Arctic’s extreme cold necessitates specialized equipment and expertise for operating under such harsh conditions. Considering these opportunities and challenges, the question of who holds the advantage is once again paramount.

When the Trump administration projected confidence in its position as a superpower capable of acting with impunity, this assertion might have resonated in other regions. However, in the Arctic, that confidence was misplaced, and meeting such projections will be an uphill battle.

In 2022, a significant step was taken toward establishing dedicated Arctic land forces with the activation of the 11th Airborne Division in Alaska. However, as evidenced by recent NATO exercises, U.S. troops still seem unprepared for the challenges. During the Joint Viking exercise in northern Norway in 2025, U.S. troops performed so badly that “Exercise commanders had to ask Finnish reservists, the most formidable Arctic warriors, who were playing the role of invaders in the war games, to go easy on the Americans.” Similar accounts emerged from the 2023 Aurora war games in Sweden.

While training may mitigate these shortcomings, the problem of operating in Arctic waters is more complex. If the U.S. is determined to assert its power in the Arctic, it must learn to navigate and manage icy conditions. Even though ice cover is diminishing, it does not create completely open water; instead, it results in large areas of floating ice that pose significant obstacles. Cargo ships will need reinforced hulls and specialized expertise in Arctic navigation, even with the assistance of icebreakers.

The U.S. is working to catch up with European navies, such as those of Finland and Norway, which operate ice-capable fleets and have decades of ice-breaking experience. To enhance its capabilities, the U.S. has ordered six icebreakers from Finland, the recognized global leader in such technology. Of these, two will be built in Finland and four will be constructed under license in Louisiana. The vessels will be delivered to the U.S. Coast Guard as “ice-breaking cutters.” This expansion marks a big leap from the current U.S. fleet of just three icebreakers. But it still falls short of Russia, which operates around 40 icebreakers, including eight nuclear-powered ones.

The Russian challenge is amplified by its partnership with China. Beijing has referred to the Northern Sea Route as a “polar silk road” and has positioned itself as a “near-Arctic state.” As part of this strategy, China is developing its own ice-capable ships. While none of the five ships it currently operates qualify as true icebreakers, the fleet is being expanded, and the technology is being improved. Demonstrating their growing collaboration, China and Russia launched a joint patrol in the Arctic in 2024, a move that was not well received by the U.S.

The question of who holds the cards depends largely on how Washington chooses to treat its NATO allies.

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