Armenians vote for Europe
Armenia’s pro-European turn depends on whether the public accepts the price of peace with Azerbaijan and Turkiye, and whether Moscow can play spoiler.
In a nutshell
- Pashinyan’s victory gives mandate for Armenia’s turn to Europe
- Russia keeps leverage through gas pricing and the EAEU
- Ties with Baku and Ankara will matter more than Brussels
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On June 7, Armenians went to the polls in an election billed as a referendum on the country’s onward course. Would it veer toward Europe or remain within the Russian orbit?
The outcome was a victory for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, whose pro-European Civil Contract party won 49.8 percent of the vote, giving it 64 of 105 seats. Given that his personal support had been in steady decline, dropping from 54 percent in 2021 to around 30 percent by the time of the election, the outcome can be viewed as a significant success for the pro-European choice.
Indeed, following through on that mandate, Mr. Pashinyan told parliament in an August 24 speech that Armenia would formally apply for European Union membership “in the near future.” A national referendum on accession will be held once Brussels has answered and a negotiating roadmap exists.
Both Russian and European observers followed the run-up to the vote closely because this was the first general election since the conclusion of the long war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Created as an Armenian enclave within the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan, in the post-Soviet era it enjoyed self-proclaimed independence under Russian protection. That ended in September 2023, when Azerbaijani forces launched a lightning campaign to rout the Armenian defenders. The defeat was especially significant in that it was enabled by Russian peacekeepers standing aside.
Election interference
That Russian betrayal handed the Pashinyan government a strategic opening. Downgrading relations with Moscow made room for peace negotiations with Baku, which produced a declaration signed in Washington in August 2025. Because the settlement also entailed warmer relations with Turkiye and an opening for increased European and American influence in the region, it was no surprise that Russia responded with harsh condemnation.
Noting that Armenian society had become “extremely polarized,” Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed there had been interference from the West and that opposition parties had been subjected to “unprecedented pressure.” The charge sat oddly beside widespread reports of Russian interference, including threats that tens of thousands of Armenians living in Russia would be transported home to vote against the government.
Western leaders, in contrast, were delighted. United States President Donald Trump gave his endorsement to Mr. Pashinyan for reelection, calling him “a great friend and leader.” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen congratulated him on the result, saying the European Union deeply valued its partnership with a democratic Armenia that was “drawing ever closer to Europe.” Most importantly, she added that “Armenia can count on us.”
It is significant that even after his election victory, Mr. Pashinyan has stopped short of a clean break with Russia.
The key question looking forward is how much substance lies behind that promise. Ukraine has ample experience of a serious disconnect between Western rhetoric and its actual readiness to offer support against Russian aggression. Although Russian election interference failed to swing the Armenian vote, it would be foolhardy to believe that the Kremlin has given up its ambition to retain a grip on the South Caucasus.
Partisan dynamics
In the immediate aftermath of the election, Mr. Pashinyan’s government has enjoyed a window of opportunity with momentum and significant political capital. As the country remains deeply divided in its sympathies between Europe and Russia, the deciding factor will be how well it lives up to expectations. Support from the West will be important but not decisive. What will matter most is how well Armenia builds bridges to its new friends in the region. As the results firmed up, Mr. Pashinyan summed up the essence of the challenge he faces: “The people of Armenia voted for peace, regional prosperity and regional cooperation, and I hope this will be met with a positive response from Turkiye and Azerbaijan.”
Russia will do whatever it can to prevent this, and the strongly pro-Russian stance of Armenia’s largest opposition parties will help. The main contender for power is the Strong Armenia Alliance, which came second with 23.3 percent, giving it 29 seats. It is led by the Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who is presumed to have close ties to the Kremlin (and who fought the campaign from house arrest, having been detained in June 2025 on charges of calling for the overthrow of the government). The pro-Russian camp also includes the Armenia Alliance, led by former President Robert Kocharyan, which won 9.9 percent of the vote and 12 seats. A third pro-Russian party, Gagik Tsarukyan’s conservative Prosperous Armenia party, just barely failed to reach the 4 percent threshold and therefore won no seats. Had it cleared the bar, Mr. Pashinyan’s majority would have been in doubt.
Domestic constraints
The core of the challenge to the Pashinyan government is the outcome of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The Azerbaijani victory produced a mass exodus of 100,000 Armenians. In a country of 3 million, that is significant. Many find it hard to forgive Mr. Pashinyan for allowing it to happen, and for subsequently making peace with the enemy. According to a recent opinion poll, only 44 percent of the public support the peace deal with Azerbaijan, with 41 percent opposed. Many also have reservations about the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, which gives Azerbaijan access across sovereign Armenian territory to its Nakhchivan exclave, wedged between Armenia and Turkiye.
The warming of relations with Turkiye causes added resentment among those who refuse to either forgive or forget the mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during 1915 and 1916. What is recognized by many countries (including the U.S.) as the Armenian Genocide led to the deaths of an estimated 600,000 to 1.5 million Armenians. With Turkiye refusing to accept the label of “genocide” for these events, building bridges between Ankara and Yerevan will require both diplomatic dexterity and a strong sense of common purpose.
These are the main points where Russia will seek to undermine the Pashinyan government. It will fan the flames of resentment against the peace agreement with Azerbaijan, and it will drive home the narrative that Russia has been the sole protector of Armenians against Turkiye. Further fuel will be added by pointing out the fickleness of support from Europe, emphasizing that Armenia is not even a candidate for membership in the EU and that both Georgia and Turkiye have been kept waiting so long that they have given up.
Energy supply and trade
It is significant that even after his election victory, Mr. Pashinyan has stopped short of a clean break with Russia. Although he is bent on forging closer ties with Europe, he has also made it clear that Armenia will remain within the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Similarly, while Russian border guards have been told to leave, the Russian military base at Gyumri, its last significant presence in the South Caucasus, will be allowed to continue operating.
These facts sustain Moscow’s hopes of continued influence. Yet if Ankara and Baku really do step up their ambitions to provide meaningful support, Armenia will stand a good chance of remaining on course, even if Europe and America should waver.
One obvious area where politically significant help may be offered lies in energy security. As in its relations with many other countries in its neighborhood, Russia’s relationship with Armenia is grounded in cheap energy. Yerevan depends on Moscow for some 80 percent of its natural gas imports. At their Kremlin meeting in April, Russian President Vladimir Putin pointedly reminded Mr. Pashinyan that while European prices exceeded $600 per 1,000 cubic meters, Russia was supplying Armenia at $177.50. Moscow has since threatened to withdraw the discount should Armenia leave the EAEU.
An Azerbaijani decision to replace Russia as energy supplier could form part of a broader move to reorient Armenian trade away from Russia and the EAEU. Signals are already visible: Azerbaijani petrol began reaching the Armenian market in December 2025, and Mr. Pashinyan credits it with cutting pump prices by as much as 15 percent. An opening of the border between Armenia and Turkiye would help further in boosting non-Russian trade, and a cautious handling of the Zangezur Corridor would relieve Armenian concerns about a threat to national sovereignty.
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Regional precedents
The means by which Russia will attempt to prevent this are likely to follow its well-rehearsed playbook of betting on a Russia-friendly candidate for prime minister. The case of Mr. Karapetyan and Strong Armenia recalls how the Russian-affiliated Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili blocked his country’s ambition to join Europe.
When Mr. Ivanishvili returned home from Russia, where he had made his fortune, Georgia was, like Armenia today, deeply divided in its sympathies between Russia and Europe. He founded his Georgian Dream party, which won the 2012 election and has since squeezed out organized opposition. Following the 2024 election, which was generally believed to have been rigged, mass street protests were met with escalating violence. The likelihood of the regime collapsing anytime soon is remote.
The case of Georgia, however, has not been repeated elsewhere. In October 2024, when Moldova held presidential elections, Russia orchestrated massive election interference. When this failed, President Maia Sandu said there was evidence that some 300,000 votes had been bought through foreign interference, calling it a “fraud of unprecedented scale” and an “unprecedented assault on democracy.” In May 2025, Russia tried hard to swing the presidential election in Romania in favor of its preferred candidate but again failed, and in September 2025 the pivotal Moldovan parliamentary elections were won by the pro-European camp. Overall, Mr. Pashinyan’s victory in Armenia follows a regional trajectory of weakening Russian influence.
Scenarios
Most likely: Armenia grows closer to Europe
The most likely scenario is that commonality of purpose between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkiye will suffice for the Pashinyan government to continue on its pro-European path. With more than a third of Armenian exports still going to Russia, phasing out Russian dominance will take time. Yet if early results are positive, they will help build confidence in business circles. Addressing energy security will make a major difference in reducing Russian influence, and if the Zangezur Corridor can be developed in a manner that relieves concerns about sovereignty, that will support the government. Positive early steps may also attract U.S. investment.
Europe’s role will be limited because both sides favor slow forward movement. Brussels will not be keen on further expansion and Yerevan will not want to antagonize the anti-European camp too much. Mr. Pashinyan’s promise of a complete dismantling of the country’s “criminal-oligarchic system” may also be a problem. As this is likely to entail criminal prosecution of leading members of the opposition, it may be hard for Europe to stomach. The government will in consequence place more emphasis on good relations with Azerbaijan and Turkiye.
Less likely: Russia successfully destabilizes the government
The alternative scenario is that Russia manages to undermine the government, such that it may repeat its destabilization of Georgia. If support for Strong Armenia can be built to the point where it wins the next parliamentary election, or if sufficient chaos can be orchestrated to force new elections, then Armenia may face a repetition of what has happened in Georgia. While this cannot be excluded, mounting Russian weakness makes it an increasingly unlikely scenario.
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