Australia’s role in the emerging geostrategic order
Canberra faces fresh geopolitical challenges, and must balance alliances, economics and security in an era of new rising powers.

In a nutshell
- Australia has rejected right-wing populism, reelecting the Labor Party
- Canberra’s relations with China have soured amid sanctions, provocations
- Australia is boosting Pacific alliances and Commonwealth ties in Trump era
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Australia is the only nation that does not share borders with others while itself covering an entire continent. Like the United States, Australia was built on immigration, though it has a much more cohesive society. And while historical injustice has been committed against the aboriginal population, Australia does not carry the gigantic burden of slavery and still-virulent racism toward a substantial part of its population, as is the case with the black communities in the U.S.
Nevertheless, Australia is not immune to right-wing extremism, as has been evident on occasion in violent attacks mostly against Indian students. Like many developed societies, Australia faces problems with the spread of racism mostly through social media. However, the most recent national election, which was held on May 3, saw a clear rebuke against the opposition that had been riding on right-wing populism.
The Labor Party, led by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, won its second consecutive outright majority (94 of 150 seats), a smashing defeat for the coalition of Liberals and Nationals (together 43 seats). The latter had bet on a campaign emulating Trump-style values and attitudes. And after the 2024 electoral success of right-wing parties in many continental European countries ahead of Donald Trump’s election, some had speculated that Australia might follow the trend.
Yet following Canada, which kept the incumbent Liberal Party in power earlier this spring, and the United Kingdom, which last year elected its own Labour Party and voted out the Conservatives after 14 years, Australia became the next major Commonwealth country to rebuke right-wing populism. This happened even though Australia had no dark cloud of an American takeover as threatened by President Trump against Canada.
Australia’s place in the world
Distance and remoteness overshadow everything in the mentality and perception of Australia: Not only geographical isolation, but also the vast internal emptiness of a continent that is populated almost exclusively along its coastlines. Distance has to do with the state of mind. We know that the origin of Australia – first as a British penal colony and later as an independent state within the Commonwealth – is tied with what can be called the challenge and shock of distance.
Originally, most of the people arriving on the shores of Australia were convicts sent by the colonial masters in London. There is no “Mayflower” lore in Australia. Then, in 1901 it was designated as a Dominion, and subsequently Australia participated in World War I, followed by involvement in World War II, when Australia was directly threatened by the Japanese Empire.
Both global wars led to many Australians losing their lives in foreign lands, while at the same time their service helped to incorporate Australia within a clear geopolitical framework. Australia fought on the side of liberal democracies and mostly of the Anglo-Saxon world, both of which put Australia within a well-defined and sound security architecture. A major blow to Australia’s position in the world came with the accession of the UK to the European Economic Community in 1973. Prior to that, Australia had largely defined itself through its relations with the UK. Though London is more than 15,000 kilometers from Canberra, Australia had considerably more engagement with Britain, both politically and economically, than, for example, with neighboring Indonesia.

Most certainly, Australia, like New Zealand, felt “betrayed” by the European direction of the UK, whose monarch after all was still their head of state. In time, with the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall and a rising China that looks set to play an ever more prominent role, the geopolitical focus of Australia was destined to change.
Demographic fears
Australia’s remoteness has, from early on, been a concern. After all, distance and emptiness could rightfully be seen as a vulnerability. Like in physics, empty geostrategic spaces tend to be filled in from outside. At first, it was London’s fear that rival European colonial powers could whet their appetite for a slice of the new continent. The Netherlands, France and, most dangerously, Germany – which under Emperor Wilhelm II sought its “place in the sun” – all had their sights on Australia at one time or another.
Initially, the much more obvious demographic pressure from populous Asia did not seem to matter. This was to change during World War II, which Asians call the Pacific War. Suddenly, a fear of Asians emerged in Australia. First it was the Japanese Empire. While there was no occupation of Australian territory, the Japanese Air Force did conduct raids on towns in northern Australia. And bearing in mind Tokyo’s strong desire for Australia’s rich natural resources, had the Allies not defeated the Japanese, there very well might have been a Japanese invasion.
Asia, most notably China and India, since the late 18th century, went through two centuries of internal weakness, allowing for the relentless expansion of European colonies in Asia. This exceptional decline of formerly major powers came to an end with the rise of China and, later on, the reemergence of India. Most recently, Indonesia is increasingly in the regional spotlight, as demographic concerns mix with the worries of Islamic fundamentalism growing and possibly spreading beyond the boundaries of the archipelago.
Australian attitudes toward China
Australia’s relationship with China is highly ambiguous. During the time of Mao Zedong, Australians’ concerns morphed into the “red danger.” Then China aimed for revolution, for the “war of the huts against the palaces.” An invasion of Australia by the Chinese was seen by many as a real future scenario, bearing in mind the massive demographic imbalances.
Then came the reform period of Deng Xiaoping, with an unprecedented opening of China to foreign companies and investors during which Australia entered a phase of engagement. Kevin Rudd, prime minister of Australia from 2007 till 2010, promoted the economic exchange and political interaction between the two countries. Earlier on, Paul Keating, prime minister from 1991 till 1996, had told his compatriots to take into account the geographic and geopolitical realities that placed Australia in Asia’s and not Europe’s neighborhood.
The two countries, Australia and China, seemed to be an ideal match. While China provided Australian consumers with cheap products that gave them more purchasing power and allowed for an inflation-free consumer boom, Australia provided raw materials, for which China had and has an insatiable demand.
Facts & figures
Australia’s current and future trade agreements

Relations between the two countries began to sour in 2018, with Canberra becoming more critical of human rights violations in China, to which Beijing retorted with anger and economic sanctions against Australian goods, namely coal and steel, but also wines. For China, a major irritant was the unvarnished Australian criticism of its handling of the Covid-19 crisis. The pro-Chinese attitude that had been promoted by politicians such as Kevin Rudd suffered a serious setback and has not recovered since.
Many Australians were shocked by Chinese officials’ pointed reaction to their criticism, which did not hide their contempt for what they considered a second-rate country. Suddenly, the specter of an expansionist Asian power returned, and so has the need for Australia to strengthen its security.
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The threat became manifest in spring 2025, when Chinese warships appeared in the waters off Australia and without prior notification conducted live-fire exercises, a signal of China’s massively enhanced naval power and an indication that Beijing’s aspirations stretch far from its own shores and immediate neighborhood.
The Chinese message entailed a warning to Australia to not stretch its ambitions too far, such as in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and AUKUS, the nuclear submarine partnership between Australia, the UK and U.S. After all, China already has three aircraft carriers, while the Royal Australian Navy’s largest vessel is an amphibious assault ship. Obviously, there is a large asymmetry in the many fields of relations between China and Australia, in economic, demographic, political and military fields. Public perception varies significantly between the two countries, with Australia seeing China as a security threat, while Beijing sees Canberra as in alignment with Washington’s efforts to contain China.
Scenarios
Amid the geopolitical changes currently shaping the world, Australia will strive for a new security architecture. Two realistic scenarios reflect major concern in Canberra.
Most likely: Australia to cooperate multilaterally to counter China risks
Australia is fully engaged in the containment of China, at the center of which stand the U.S., India, Japan and a handful of Southeast Asian countries. Even considering the vacillations of Washington’s China policy, this is the most likely scenario.
Canberra will be watching to see whether the U.S.’s Asian allies will be able to build up the necessary military capacities, bearing in mind not only fiscal constraints but also the sheer technological challenge of effective training and arms production.
Recently, and most obviously as a result of the sobering effects of Chinese provocations, Australian politicians have begun discussing rearmament, though it is unclear whether Canberra has the economic and political means to achieve a credible deterrence. The vulnerabilities created by Australia’s enormous size and distance from allies leave room for doubt. The question is all the more relevant because in the unfolding security environment Australia must not only protect its own territorial waters, but also needs to help cover the cost and manpower of a larger security presence in the wider Pacific region. Australia’s Asian partners would also need to increase their contribution to contain China effectively, which in many cases is far from certain.
Equally likely: Commonwealth countries grow closer amid Trump uncertainties
The second scenario, which is equally likely and could come in parallel with the first, is a renewed and enhanced security pact of the UK and Commonwealth members such as New Zealand, Canada and Australia. This grouping may be hampered by distance, but it comes with strong political commonalities that are increasingly important in an age when one of the superpowers, the People’s Republic of China, is committed to an ideology that is inimical to liberty, democracy and pluralism.
This set of common values may get a renewed boost once the U.S. moves beyond the Trump era. The upcoming political environment may not constitute a full return to the pre-Trump era, but it is nevertheless a change on the horizon that is already worth considering.
For Australia’s security, it is relevant that geopolitics is once again moving the common values of the West into the center of cooperation. A major challenge is how to overcome the current intermediate period of transactionalism promoted by President Trump.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s administration has shown considerable skill in engaging with President Trump. The tensions and antagonism that plague U.S.-Canadian relations are not present in the U.S.-Australia case – but Canberra, too, has to be wary of the solidity of American support and reliability.
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