Belarus and the limits of Western outreach
Belarus remains closely tied to Russia despite limited U.S. engagement, with modest prospects for strategic realignment in the near term.
In a nutshell
- Belarus remains tightly aligned with Russia in all aspects
- U.S. engagement has been limited and easily reversible
- Europe’s lack of strategy reinforces Minsk’s dependence on Moscow
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There is no consensus in the West on how to deal with the regime in Belarus. There is, however, widespread skepticism that any strategy could meaningfully change the country’s deep alignment with Moscow. Even a ceasefire or peace deal following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is unlikely to significantly change the relationship of Belarus with Russia or the West in the near term.
The potential for engagement with the West was frozen even before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, after an extremely controversial national election in 2020. Long-time President Alexander Lukashenko declared victory, triggering serious claims of electoral fraud and mass demonstrations against the regime. Before then, both Europeans and Americans were considering increasing their presence in Belarus, particularly attracted by a growing tech sector. Plans were on the table to establish an American Chamber of Commerce in Minsk.
The furor over the election controversy, however, brought both rebukes and sanctions from Europe, Canada and the United States. Belarus’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, along with its deliberate facilitation of illegal migration from Africa and the Middle East into Europe, intensified concerns about the regime’s human rights abuses and repression of political opposition. The economy fell under the influence of Russia and China while the regime’s security forces tightened domestic controls.
Nevertheless, President Lukashenko eventually resumed some engagement with the West, though after the invasion of Ukraine there were few takers. Over time, the Baltic states and Poland grew increasingly concerned about Belarus as a potential launchpad for Russian attacks on NATO, a tool of hybrid warfare and a source of cross-border migration pressure.
The challenge of dealing with a restive country chafing under an authoritarian regime with a government firmly in the orbit of an imperialist power is very similar to relations with the captive nations in Eastern Europe under the iron fist of the Soviet Union. From “rollback” under American President Dwight David Eisenhower to the “Ostpolitik” of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Western powers failed to meaningfully penetrate the Iron Curtain until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The situation today is very similar. The West is unwilling to provide the support required to bring about regime change or to shield a pro-Western government from Moscow’s pressure. At the same time, it is not prepared to concede defeat by offering concessions. As a result, relations have remained frozen for years.
The approach of the Trump administration
President Donald Trump’s administration initially intended to try a new strategy, arguing that simply ceding the Belarusian space to Russian and Chinese interests unopposed did nothing to help the people of Belarus, and made life easier for Moscow and Beijing.
Engagement began last summer when Mr. Trump dispatched a presidential envoy to Minsk for talks with President Lukashenko. Later, the regime freed dozens of political prisoners. This precipitated additional negotiations in September when a U.S. special envoy met Mr. Lukashenko in Minsk, ultimately resulting in the release of more political prisoners, including foreign nationals.
The American government then announced an easing of sanctions on Belavia – the Belarusian national airline – allowing it to service and procure spare parts for its Boeing aircraft fleet. In December, the regime released another 123 political prisoners, including opposition leaders Viktar Babaryka, Maria Kalesnikava and Maxim Znak as well as the human rights advocate Ales Bialiatski. In turn, there was a partial lifting of American sanctions on Belarusian potash, one of the country’s major commodity exports.
In recent months, there have been signs of modest progress, but not enough to predict a genuine thaw. On the one hand, in March, the Belarus government released 250 prisoners. In turn, Washington announced the removal of U.S. sanctions on three major Belarusian fertilizer producers. On the other hand, President Lukashenko recently raised the possibility of entering the war with Ukraine and reaffirmed friendship with North Korea. Moreover, White House concessions have been transactional and conditional, and all of these measures remain easily reversible. Washington can reimpose sanctions, and Minsk can re-arrest political prisoners at will.
U.S. engagement has so far appeared as baby steps, their purpose and chances of success still up for debate. One interpretation sees it as a strategic signal – a warning to Moscow that Belarus could be pried from its orbit unless Russian President Vladimir Putin agrees to end the war in Ukraine.
Several sources familiar with the Trump administration argue that, by outlining a path toward normalization for Belarus, Washington sought to demonstrate that a similar pathway could be available to Russia if Mr. Putin agreed to reach a settlement.
The U.S. engagement has not had a strategic impact, but Washington’s efforts have rattled the Baltic States and Poland, who view Russian control of Belarus as a direct threat. This has been exacerbated by the crisis over Greenland, as well as concerns that the U.S. will further withdraw forces from NATO or that Washington might compromise Ukrainian security to reach a peace deal with President Putin.
That said, there is scant evidence that engaging Belarus has weakened the Baltic and Polish governments’ commitments to bilateral relations with the U.S. or their belief that Washington will retain its commitments to NATO. American military power remains foundational to their security strategies, not respective of recent controversies over NATO support for U.S. military operations against Iran.
The notion that President Trump would deliberately weaken Western conventional deterrence for the sake of making Minsk or Moscow happy, after having invested so much effort in pressing for increased conventional deterrence in Europe to ensure continued peace and stability, is nonsensical. Allied governments know this – even if assertions fly fast and furious among the press, social media and chattering politicians and pundits.
Human rights advocates in Europe and the U.S., both liberal and conservative, however, are also troubled. Belarus has been actively involved in the persecution of Christians, including arresting Catholic and Protestant priests, and confiscating the property of evangelical churches. The Trump administration has made protection of Christian communities and religious liberties a hallmark of its foreign policy agenda. Ignoring what is taking place in Belarus would compromise the U.S. government’s credibility on a signature issue. To date, the matter has not yet emerged as a significant concern for Washington.
In addition, whether on human rights, economic issues or security concerns, recent U.S. actions – from Panama to Greenland to Venezuela, Cuba, Gaza and Iran – suggest that President Trump has pursued deals with the aim of advancing gradual, long-term shifts toward greater autonomy and more sustainable outcomes, rather than securing narrow gains or simply expanding U.S. influence. What defines this approach is a rejection of costly, high-risk attempts at sweeping transformation. This is also the logic at play in Belarus.
At present, American dabbling in the country seems more akin to the administration’s flirtations with Pakistan even as Washington intentionally deepens ties with India to counter China. Though President Trump’s claim to have settled the recent India-Pakistan crisis and Washington’s overtures to Islamabad ruffled feathers in New Delhi, this did not prevent India from sealing a major trade deal with the U.S. and continuing to deepen security and economic ties.
In the end, this could just as well reflect President Trump’s improvisational and innovative tactics, willingness to try new things, and his penchant to keep friends and adversaries guessing.
European actions and perspectives
Most European governments have no proactive plan for Belarus and only criticize President Trump for allegedly trying to please dictators and undermine democracy and Western values by engaging President Lukashenko. They argue that “playing ball” with Belarus emboldens President Putin, and that U.S. “ad hoc transactionalism” reinforces Russian confidence that eventually President Trump will yield, make concessions and force the Europeans to follow.
Treating President Lukashenko as nothing more than President Putin’s proxy has reduced the leverage and influence of the European Union to near zero, fostering Belarusian dependence on Russia and China. Yet, at the same time, there is no longer any real scope for President Alexander Lukashenko to pursue his familiar tactic of balancing between East and West to extract concessions and gain access or influence.
The Baltic countries and Poland, believing that neither the U.S. nor the EU approaches to Belarus will yield any tangible results, focus on increasing security, including stronger border defenses, air security, capabilities to deal with hybrid threats, and conventional defense plans.
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In contrast to most of the continent, some Europeans, particularly in Central and Southern Europe, favor the U.S. strategy of engagement. One view is that Presidents Putin and Trump could reach a reasonable agreement and normalize Russian relations with the West if they were not hamstrung by Ukrainian obstinance, feckless EU policies, and opponents in the U.S. government and Congress. This is wishful thinking. The Trump strategy is to end the war and secure a free and independent Ukraine that can defend itself. He is unlikely to compromise one goal for the other. In the end, President Trump needs both goals to secure the long-term stability on the continent to reduce strategic risk to the U.S.
Scenarios
As long as President Putin is in power, present government or not, Belarus will remain a flank of concern for conventional and hybrid threats as well as strategic attacks against Europe.
Most likely: Moderate U.S. engagement with Belarus
The most likely scenario is that the U.S. will continue with modest steps toward Belarus that are concrete, mostly symbolic, gradual, reciprocal and reversible. Meanwhile, Washington will support NATO and the strengthening of the northern flank. There is little likelihood of a European strategy of engagement with Minsk in the near term and poor prospects that the U.S. and Europe will harmonize strategies.
Uncertain: End of war allows for reassessment of Belarus
If there is a conclusion to the end of Russia’s war on Ukraine that appears stable, there might well be greater coordination and mutual policies between the U.S. and Europe on next steps for engaging Belarus.
In the long term, the U.S. could seek to set conditions for verifiable limits to Russian military presence and infrastructure in Belarus, possibly by agreeing with Moscow in other areas, such as economic affairs. Any measure that would enhance Europe’s conventional deterrence and lessen the need for U.S. forces would be attractive to this administration.
Less likely: End of U.S. engagement with Belarus
The U.S. may abandon engagement entirely if it looks fruitless. Washington currently sees dialogue as a low-risk effort. Only if Belarus initiated some serious malicious action would Washington likely stop engaging with Minsk.
In the improbable event of regime collapse without subsequent Russian intervention, it is unlikely the U.S. would invest significant effort in preparing for a power transition, such as supporting the government in exile based between Warsaw and Vilnius. It is more likely that Washington would seek greater situational awareness of conditions in Belarus to identify the basis for a transitional government.
In the unlikely event the Russian government collapses, the U.S. might seek to rapidly expand engagement with Belarus.
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