Center-right politics caught between two revolutions
A heterogeneous new-right counterrevolution is rising against postmodern-green elites, reshaping politics toward nationalism and protectionism.
In a nutshell
- New right rejects migration, climate and DEI consensus across nations
- Pandemic and media shifts turned free speech into a right-wing issue
- Globalization backlash fuels right-wing appeal among affected workers
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The 2020s are witnessing a threefold revolution: the emergence of a new geopolitical order, an artificial intelligence-driven stage of digitalization and a new-right counterrevolution against the postmodern-green hegemony of the 2010s. This cultural revolution also challenges the liberal democracy that emerged victorious from the Cold War more than 35 years ago.
The liberal order of 1990 was built on democracy, checks and balances, the rule of law and human rights, individual freedom and pluralism as guiding principles domestically. Internationally, it was founded on territorial integrity, the right to self-determination and the freedom to form alliances of sovereign states. Economically, it was based on the “Washington Consensus” on free-market economy, deregulation and privatization, sound public finances and the reduction of subsidies, as well as free trade and globalization.
However, the West’s certainty that it had thereby reached the “end of history” overlooked not only the fact that this liberal order met with rejection in Russia and China. Even within the Western world itself, a postmodern revolution called into question the victorious West, its modes of thought, and its conceptions of order: from the universal rationalism of the Enlightenment to gender and the nation.
Postcolonial theory no longer identified the West with civilization and freedom, prosperity and democracy, but with racism, oppression and exploitation. Together with the climate movement, a new narrative emerged portraying Western societies as structurally discriminatory and destructive. The focus shifted from meritocracy among individuals to the “community of the vulnerable,” emphasizing underprivileged groups and their claims for compensation through diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI, as it is known in the United States).
The postmodern French theory that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s gradually seeped into society beyond academic circles. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, it gained what the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci termed “cultural hegemony”: dominance over public opinion, particularly on topics of migration and integration, climate and energy, as well as gender, queerness and diversity.
Germany’s traffic-light coalition (2021-2024) became the political embodiment of this postmodern green hegemony – and simultaneously marked its tipping point. The failure of the heating law in 2023 exposed the limits of what was politically feasible in energy and climate policy. After October 7, 2023 (when Hamas attacked Israel), the topic of antisemitism linked to migration became one that could be discussed publicly. And the traffic-light coalition symbolically collapsed on the day that embodied the “vibe shift,” the new-right counterrevolution of the 2020s: Donald Trump’s reelection as U.S. president.
A new movement
This new-right counterrevolution is more heterogeneous than the postmodern-green revolution: in its origins, its national manifestations and its content.
The various movements differ on fundamental ideological issues, including their stances toward the European Union, Russia and the rule of law, as well as in their degree of radicalism and willingness to cooperate with the political center.
They are united by a core principle: the rejection of the ideological foundations of postmodern-green dominance, including issues like migration, climate and DEI. They also oppose the policies of the established parties in the political center that had adapted to the postmodern hegemony. Paradigmatic examples are the governments of former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, with their phase-out of nuclear power and the energy transition, and the migration policy of 2015-2016, which former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban rejected as “humanitarian imperialism,” and which the Trump administration sees as a danger of “civilizational extinction.”
This new-right counterrevolution is more heterogeneous than the postmodern-green revolution: in its origins, its national manifestations and its content.
This rejection has a European as well as an institutional aspect. The shift toward a more unified European approach to many issues – migration, currencies, the Green Deal, environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations and data – transfers entire policy areas of governance to European institutions and courts, thereby reducing the force of national decision-making. The juridification of politics (or its legal formalization) leads to the politicization of law and a de-democratization of politics. It also bolsters the arguments of those who present themselves as representatives of democracy against the established parties.
Furthermore, political developments during the Covid-19 pandemic helped turn freedom of speech into a right-wing issue pitted against “wokeness” and the establishment, revealing a reversal of roles: Power has shifted to the left, and criticism to the right. There is a deeper logic to the Trump administration’s response to the culture war from the left with a culture war of its own.
President Trump’s tariff policy is directed against the free-trade orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus. The assessment that globalization has led to deindustrialization, already recognized in the U.S. Rust Belt, has yet to dawn on Germany. It will become apparent only once the full extent is felt of how deeply German industry – through exports of machinery and equipment, large-scale direct investment, and local production of German-branded goods – helped build a Chinese industrial base that now poses a life-threatening competitive challenge to German manufacturers. The new right-wing movements are finding resonance among a working class that is suffering from globalization.
More on the rightward shift and political realignment
- Germany’s long industrial decline
- Latin America continues its rightward shift
- Gen Z’s political alienation fuels rise in extremism
The pendulum swings right
The term “post-liberalism” describes the new right’s offensive against the liberal order. The pendulum is swinging to the right, and the crucial question is: Can it be caught in the center-right, or will it swing all the way to the far right? The central political debate of the coming years will be fought over dominance on the right side of the political spectrum. It is also the decisive challenge for the center-right, for which British political scientist Mark Leonard has outlined three guiding principles.
First, the center-right cannot ignore or deny the challenge posed by the new right; instead, it should recognize and accept it – not with contempt and exclusion, but with openness and respect.
Second, the center-right would have to abandon a status quo policy that merely manages the existing order and instead counter it with an ambitious agenda of its own. This means a proactive policy of change and reform driven by its own initiative, including policies that benefit those left behind by globalization.
This requires, thirdly, a distinct, positive narrative in contrast to a “woke” self-image of society as destructive and discriminatory, as well as to a right-wing verdict of decadence. Western society possesses all the prerequisites to increase freedom, security and prosperity for all to create a future worth living for our children and grandchildren. This could be the guiding principle of a sustainable conservative agenda, ranging from fiscal policy and social security systems to education and the environment. Promoting and thoughtfully applying new technologies will have to be a central focus of center-right politics, fostering a culture of diligence and fair opportunities, individual freedom and personal responsibility that encourages a willingness to take risks and innovate.
But what does this mean for center-right parties, namely in Europe, dealing with a new right that is steadily gaining votes? There are four options which differ in their applicability and likelihood throughout Western societies.
Scenarios
Most likely: Germany’s “firewall” continues refusing the new right
In Germany, the consequence for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is a vicious cycle of dependence on left-wing parties: It must continually make concessions to the left that weaken it on the right, increasing its dependence on left-wing parties and requiring further concessions, while the electorate becomes increasingly polarized. The hope lies in achieving at least moderate reforms; the danger lies in centrist blockades of the political system.
Somewhat likely: Implosions, splits, new formations, realignments
Further fragmentation and the emergence of a new political order is conceivable, and most likely if the center-right sticks to the first scenario. Italy has seen this with the collapse of the Democrazia Cristiana, and the U.S. with the Tea Party and the MAGA movement. No one in politics or history has a guarantee of permanence, not even the most meritorious ruling party.
Less likely: Cooperation between center- and far-right parties
The centrists and new right may focus on areas of common interest, which is more sustainable than the first scenario. Political science theories argue that this amounts to accommodation to the new right and leads to the downfall of center-right parties. Political reality, however, is more nuanced; the Netherlands, Finland and Spain offer very different experiences. In Austria, the center-right Austrian People’s Party (OVP) has found that excluding the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) strengthened the euroskeptic and populist party, whereas including the FPO in political discussions weakened its more extreme tendencies.
Least likely: Center-right parties cooperate with both the left and right
Although the least likely, this scenario is the most sustainable. It has been practiced by center-right parties in Sweden, Finland and Spain. They have positioned themselves as the central power in the political system and, within a framework of “red lines,” have been prepared to form minority governments and cooperate with parties on both the left and the right.
Such conditional willingness to engage in dialogue forces new right-wing elements to choose between radicalization and moderation. This strategy relies on the integrative power of liberal democracy and provides strategic room for maneuver for center-right parties, contrasting entrenched blockades that will likely result in failure and implosion.
As a wide variety of national contexts and developments indicate, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for how the center-right should deal with new-right parties. Yet there are objective needs for reform and change, as well as mounting political tensions within Western political systems. Center-right parties are pivotal for coping with these challenges. As former Chancellor of the German Empire Otto von Bismarck said in 1866: “If there is to be a revolution, we should rather make it than suffer it.”
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