China’s military and private security inroads in Africa
Beijing has expanded its economic and political footprint in Africa, relying on its own security solutions to safeguard China’s interests in unstable countries.
In a nutshell
- Chinese security personnel are growing in the Maghreb and Sahel
- Beijing deployed its navy to evacuate citizens from war-torn Libya
- Leaving security matters to private firms is alluring to governments
China closely aligns its global security expansion with its economic strategy, particularly in Africa’s Maghreb and Sahel regions. This relationship has historical roots, with China beginning engagement there as early as the 1950s by supporting national movements and decolonization efforts. In the new millennium, China’s economic and political investment in the area has intensified.
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, first organized in 2000, and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, established in 2004, laid the groundwork for China’s engagement in Africa and the Arab world. The Belt and Road Initiative, implemented in 2013, has delivered the most explicit message of Beijing’s strategy. The areas of business are multifaceted, ranging from acquiring infrastructure contracts (that mostly employ Chinese labor) to trading in various kinds of goods. Beijing’s overarching goal is to open up strategically relevant locations in terms of geography and the wealth of raw materials that China’s oversized manufacturing industry requires.
China’s advantage in the Maghreb and Sahel
The two North African regions import significantly more from China than China imports from individual countries such as Algeria ($6.7 billion versus $1 billion in 2021) and Tunisia ($1.8 billion versus $282 million in the same year). This trade imbalance has strained local labor markets, contributing to increased unemployment. According to the Arab Barometer, China has an advantage in the Middle East and North Africa over the United States, which has gained favor primarily in Morocco. At the same time, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and Sudan have established solid trading relationships with China.
China’s navy intervened in Libya, marking its first operational deployment in Africa and executing its largest noncombatant evacuation operation.
Beijing has long been active in the oil sector within Sudan, becoming its leading investor. However, conditions on the ground have worsened due to civil wars, coups and rebellions, which have surged alongside challenges from climate change. This volatility poses a significant problem for Beijing and is likely to have an even greater impact in the coming years if not addressed pragmatically. For instance, while the number of Chinese workers in Africa reached a record 263,696 in 2015, it dropped to just 88,371 by 2022. Although Covid-19 contributed to this decline, it cannot fully explain the collapse; increasing insecurity and political instability also play crucial roles.
The risk to Chinese nationals
China’s expanding presence in Africa has brought significant challenges. For instance, over 35,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated from Libya between January and February 2011 due to a civil war. In January 2012, 29 Chinese workers were rescued in Sudan after being taken hostage by a rebel group. In July 2016, nearly 350 persons, 191 of them employees of the China National Petroleum Corporation, were airlifted from Juba, South Sudan, because of escalating conflict in the region. Around 20 Chinese private security companies had emerged at that time, employing approximately 3,200 operators to protect Chinese investments and personnel across the continent.
China’s navy intervened in Libya, marking its first operational deployment in Africa and executing its largest noncombatant evacuation operation. In contrast, it has hired private security companies to manage the situation in Sudan and South Sudan.
Beijing aims for a stable Africa that fosters significant medium- to long-term investments.
The issue resurfaced in the spring of 2023 when over a thousand Chinese workers were evacuated from Port Sudan due to a precarious situation. In this instance, the Chinese navy also intervened. However, China’s interests in Sudan extend beyond oil; a project has been signed to construct a 3,200 kilometer-long railway linking Port Sudan to N’Djamena, the capital of Chad. Additionally, China is involved in Sudan’s urban construction and mining projects.
The stakes for China are substantial, particularly compared to Russia, which primarily focuses on arms trade, military support for local governments and resource exploitation – activities that have contributed to instability in the region. In contrast, Beijing aims for a stable Africa that fosters significant medium- to long-term investments.
Why private security and military companies?
How can one protect its citizens overseas amid increasing security risks and political turmoil overseas, all without resorting to interference or intervention in host countries?
The Italian scholar Alessandro Arduino has dwelt extensively on this issue, stating that these types of private companies “fill the vacuum of power where weak states are unable to provide proper security with their police and military forces.” Reinforcing this idea is a 2022 policy brief from the Center for Strategic and International Studies that points out the differences between private military companies (more oriented to actual military operations) and private security companies. In China, the latter group of firms is heavily controlled by the government and became legal only in 2009, multiplying exponentially in number and now operating in the thousands abroad.
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It is a reality that the Chinese ministries of foreign affairs, defense and trade will increasingly have to deal with a growing and more widespread presence of expatriate citizens living and operating on insecure chessboards. It should be noted that countries in the Maghreb and Sahel areas lack laws regulating the operations of foreign private military or security companies. Companies such as the VSS Security Group or the China Security and Protection Group are extraordinary tools to protect Chinese investments abroad, as well as to counter U.S. influence in the continent.
According to a 2022 Rand study, Chinese security companies operate in several countries, including Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Ethiopia, South Africa and Tanzania. In many of these nations, where poaching is a significant issue and the clients are predominantly Chinese, it raises questions about the role of these private companies.
One legitimate question concerns the large number of soldiers who have been laid off, and how they have transitioned to other forms of employment.
Another point should not be overlooked: In recent decades, China has initiated a series of reforms to its armed forces, resulting in a decline from 3 million soldiers during the Cold War. The People’s Liberation Army was reduced by 1 million in 1985, by 500,000 in 1997, by 200,000 in 2003 and by 300,000 in 2015. In 2024, President Xi Jinping initiated further restructuring aimed at aligning the armed forces with the ongoing technological revolution necessary to win modern wars, where troop numbers are less relevant than modernization.
One legitimate question concerns the large number of soldiers who have been laid off, and how they have transitioned to other forms of employment. Former professionals from regular military ranks often find positions within American or Russian private military companies. While the Chinese may not necessarily follow the same path, this situation warrants attention.
Scenarios
Highly unlikely: The presence of Chinese military and security contractors in Africa recedes
Since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, private security companies have proven highly useful to governments due to their flexibility, lower costs compared to regular military contingents and the deniability they provide regarding potential war crimes. Additionally, these companies are more expendable, incurring a much lower political cost than casualties among official armed forces personnel. Dr. Arduino noted that “the evolution and expansion of the Chinese private security sector, especially from the Middle East to Africa, indicates China’s proactive stance in mitigating risks without the necessity to deploy its armed forces overseas.”
Very likely: Beijing ramps up its use of private contractors in Africa
China’s policy of non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of developing countries is increasingly clashing with the rising volatility on the African continent. Assuming that Beijing remains reluctant to bear the political costs of deploying its armed forces, the use of private contractors will likely remain the preferred and most effective solution for protecting its citizens and interests in Africa. It is foreseeable that these contractors will be deployed more frequently in the coming years, particularly in countries with fragile monopolies on force, which may come at the expense of internal stability. It is very likely that Western companies operating in these regions will have to contend not only with Russian and Turkish groups but also with Chinese contractors.
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