China’s military expansion: A global power shift in the making
Beijing’s accelerating military buildup and strategic technological advancements raise urgent concerns for the U.S. and its allies worldwide.
In a nutshell
- China seeks dominance through technology, naval and nuclear capabilities
- U.S. and European defense industries lag, risking their prosperity
- The developed world mulls responses to deter Beijing’s military ambitions
In October, General Charles A. Flynn, head of the United States Army in the Pacific, warned about China’s intensifying military expansion, describing it as an urgent threat to the region’s stability. His remarks followed China’s Joint Sword-2024B military exercises, a tightly choreographed show of strength that involved the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ground, naval, air, coast guard and rocket forces – a likely rehearsal for an eventual blockade or invasion of Taiwan. Soon after, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged the country’s military to prepare for war.
Despite current economic headwinds, China’s military is on a wartime footing, underpinned by a defense industrial base rapidly developing and producing weapons systems intended to deter the U.S. – or, should deterrence fail, to position Beijing for victory in a great-power conflict. Defense spending has surged this year, with official Chinese data indicating a 7.2 percent increase, the third consecutive year of growth exceeding 7 percent. China has become the world’s largest shipbuilder, with a capacity 230 times greater than that of the U.S. Its navy is the largest globally, and its arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles is expanding at an unprecedented rate, with its nuclear stockpile growing faster than any other nation. The PLA, too, is pursuing innovative technologies and warfare tactics, like the self-splitting swarming drones unveiled in March.
So far, developed countries have shown themselves unable or, in some instances, seemingly unwilling to keep pace. U.S. defense production stalled following the end of the Cold War, leaving behind a system that cannot credibly deter China, much less sustain a two- or possibly three-front war across the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East if fresh conflicts break out. Meanwhile, years of neglect have left Europe’s defenses dilapidated, barely able to check Russian aggression in Ukraine. Despite European politicians’ occasional murmurs of concern over China in addition to threats from the Kremlin, the conversion of talk into action remains elusive. And what Japan, a critical U.S. ally, does have in will, it lacks in ability, still largely reliant on Washington for support.
If the aim is to genuinely deter China, the U.S. and its allies will have to invest considerable resources and focus into military readiness. This goes beyond simply keeping pace. A robust military posture is needed to compel Beijing to reconsider any military action. Without this, the balance of power risks shifting further in its favor.
A ‘world-class military’
President Xi has made clear that a “world-class military” is essential to his vision of China’s national rejuvenation by 2049, a goal that has defined his agenda since he assumed control of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. In 2015, he initiated the most sweeping overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army since the 1950s, introducing a streamlined joint command structure closely modeled on the U.S. military.
The reforms reorganized the previous seven military regions into five theater commands and created a Joint Staff Department to coordinate integrated, multi-domain operations. They also introduced the PLA Rocket Force, now responsible for China’s nuclear and conventional missiles, and the Strategic Support Force (SSF), tasked with space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.
Among the army, navy, air force and rocket force, President Xi has prioritized the navy.
The SSF was disbanded in April this year, which marked the most significant reorganization of China’s military since 2015. It reemerged as the Information Support Force. Yet beyond a mere rebranding, the move signaled a deliberate shift in the PLA’s strategic orientation, aimed at enhancing its capabilities in information warfare and cyber operations – regarded by the CCP as the “largest variable[s]” in contemporary conflict. For Beijing, these capabilities are not isolated functions but are instead tightly integrated across the “four services”: the army, navy, air force and rocket force. Among these, President Xi has prioritized the navy.
A ‘great maritime power’
China’s emergence as a “great maritime power,” ideally by 2035, is essential to President Xi’s vision of a “world-class military” paving the way for national rejuvenation. Drawing lessons from centuries of sea mastery by the U.S., the United Kingdom and their allies – an achievement that secured their global influence, leadership and control of shipping lanes – Beijing is intent on realizing the same.
As of August, the PLA Navy (PLAN) boasted 370 platforms, including major surface combatants, ocean-going amphibious ships, submarines, aircraft carriers, mine warfare ships and fleet auxiliaries. This number is expected to rise to 395 ships next year and reach 435 by 2030. By comparison, the U.S. Navy has 296 battle force ships, which it expects will decline to 294 by 2030, leaving Washington with far fewer ships than the anticipated Chinese number. The UK’s Royal Navy, Europe’s largest after Russia, has just 45 ships.
Under Beijing’s strategy of military-civil fusion, in which ostensibly civilian assets are repurposed by the central government for military ends, China’s maritime ambitions further benefit from the world’s largest fishing fleet, with an estimated 500,000 vessels, of which up to 3,000 operate as the “distant-water fleet.” Civilian shipping vessels, too, are often used to mask PLA troops’ movements and provide logistical support to China’s South China Sea outposts, as are cruise ships.
Once dismissed as military platforms with the advent of amphibious attack ships in the 1950s, cruise ships are again being considered as potential assault platforms. For instance, China’s first domestically produced liner, Adora Magic City, launched in December 2023, could deploy more than 6,000 troops in a single wave. Assessing China’s military capacity is challenging because virtually any asset in the communist country can be directed toward this end.
China’s maritime expansion is underpinned by a vast and increasingly sophisticated defense-industrial base. Today, five of the world’s top 12 defense companies are Chinese – an impressive leap from none a decade ago. These firms produce diverse technologies, including diesel engines, advanced electronic systems, submarines and unmanned systems such as autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) and drones. In 2019, China introduced its first large-displacement AUV, the HSU-001, intended for missions such as intelligence preparation of the environment and anti-submarine warfare. While it is thought to be operational within the PLAN, details on its capabilities have remained elusive. Since then, Beijing has unveiled additional extra-large AUVs, which are larger than the HSU-001.
In an ecosystem where just one Chinese shipyard – Jiangnan, on Changxing Island along China’s eastern coast – is believed to possess a capacity greater than all U.S. shipyards combined, such a rapid churn should not be surprising.
Future wars and mystery drones
Beijing is also modernizing its strategic missile arsenal. By 2030, it is expected to have more than 1,000 nuclear warheads, many of which are likely to have the range to strike the continental U.S. While this stockpile still trails behind those of the U.S. and Russia, the pace of Beijing’s nuclear buildup is unmatched by any nation.
So, too, is the expansion of its space capabilities. In November, the head of the U.S. Space Force warned that China is deploying military capabilities into space at a “mind-boggling” rate, increasing the risk of warfare in orbit. In both 2022 and 2023, China led in defense-related satellite launches. Last December, it launched Yaogan-41, a remote-sensing satellite capable of identifying and tracking car-sized objects in the Indo-Pacific – a move that threatens the U.S. and allied assets in the region.
China is deploying military capabilities into space at a ‘mind-boggling’ rate, increasing the risk of warfare in orbit.
Beijing’s space efforts are a key pillar of its broader “intelligentized” warfare strategy. First introduced by the CCP in 2019, intelligentized warfare prioritizes advanced technologies, namely autonomous systems and Artificial Intelligence, to improve battlefield efficiency and sway the decision-making processes of adversaries.
Chinese military strategists assert that such an approach hinges on superior information-processing capabilities, AI-driven analysis and drone swarms. The threat is real: Mystery drones were observed over Langley Air Force Base in Virginia in October, and more recently above military bases in the UK housing American forces, and in New Jersey above Donald Trump’s properties and a U.S. military research and manufacturing facility. Critically, intelligentized warfare marks a shift toward the cognitive domain as a critical battlefield alongside the physical and information spheres. The recent establishment of the Information Support Force seems to support this view.
A question of deterrence
The erstwhile leaders of the developed world have formidable capabilities in the information age. However, they have yet to articulate, let alone operationalize, a comparable cognitive warfare concept aligned with security objectives.
The aim of Washington and its allies, too, should be not merely defensive but offensive. The current lack of urgency is puzzling.
The U.S. and its allies also have yet to effectively mobilize their defense industrial base to deter, much less surpass, Beijing’s military capabilities, which are increasingly geared toward conflict with the U.S.-based order. The aim of Washington and its allies, too, should be not merely defensive but offensive. The current lack of urgency is puzzling.
Europe, for its part, released its inaugural Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) in March. The non-binding strategy is ostensibly designed to make the bloc “ready for war.” It proposes reducing regulatory barriers, increasing defense investment and revitalizing small and medium-sized defense firms. Yet the funding is extremely modest: A mere 1.5 billion euros is earmarked for 2025 to 2027. The initiative also adds fresh layers of bureaucracy, a feature Europe might prefer to pare down.
Read more by Chinese policy expert Dr. Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu
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The EDIS additionally faces the familiar challenge of unifying a fragmented continent, notably on matters of security and China. It is, for instance, hardly credible to think that France or the UK would permit any other state – let alone an unelected European Union official – to dictate their nuclear postures. And while Germany continues to deepen its dependency on China, countries like Lithuania instead raise the alarm.
It will take years, if not decades, to restore Europe’s defense capabilities. Even if these efforts are accelerated, the current geopolitical landscape suggests that the continent’s forces would be more suitably deployed within Europe itself, focused on countering Russian aggression rather than diverting resources on a pivot to the Pacific. The task of countering China remains largely with the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, its Indo-Pacific allies such as Australia, India and Japan, through groupings like the Quad and AUKUS.
American defense shortfalls
Yet, while not as severely impaired as Europe’s, America’s defense industrial base is also weakened. The U.S. military lacks the munitions and equipment needed for a prolonged conflict with China and the information warfare capabilities to counter Beijing’s cognitive warfare efforts. War games simulating a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, for instance, suggest the U.S. would likely run out of long-range, precision-guided missiles in under a week.
America’s defense industrial base currently lacks the surge capacity to make up for this and other shortfalls. Its supply chains, too, are fragile, relying on foreign sources – notably China – for critical minerals such as iron, ferroalloy metals and nonferrous metals – all key to defense production.
In an ominous sign, Beijing announced in early December it was cutting off exports of gallium, germanium and antimony to the U.S. in response to Washington further restricting semiconductor deliveries to China. The Chinese move aiming to cripple U.S. production of vital military equipment was, however, not unexpected. Washington is developing alternate sources of critical minerals, including in Africa, while in Europe there is a modest effort to develop resources in Sweden.
Scenarios
Possible: U.S. takes the initiative and counters Chinese capabilities
The incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump appears to grasp the urgency of the matter. His platform advocates for a revitalized U.S. industrial base, a reshoring of critical supply chains and heightened investment in advanced military technologies, including an Iron Dome-style defense system.
Should his administration succeed in implementing these and other defense-critical reforms – such as more flexible defense contracting and weapons acquisition processes, for instance – China’s apparent military advantage could eventually be blunted. With strengthened and well-supported American alliances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, China’s appetite for conflict could be not eliminated but at least tempered.
Likely: China to maintain pace of military buildup regardless of U.S. posture
The pressing question, however, is how swiftly American measures and defense buildup could be brought to bear. President Xi, steadfast in his pursuit of China’s national rejuvenation, is unlikely to ease his expansion of China’s military capabilities.
Aware that the U.S. and Europe might soon shift to their own wartime footing, Mr. Xi could yet seek to act before American capabilities begin to match – or potentially exceed – China’s. Conflict, then, might be closer than anticipated, with a U.S. ill-prepared to counter Chinese aggression. It might be time for Washington to prepare itself with what it has – and quickly.
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