EU bans all Russian gas for good
Cuts in both direct and indirect Russian gas supplies expose the EU to a complex set of energy security risks, especially from the volatile Middle East.
In a nutshell
- The era of European-Russian energy interdependence has collapsed
- EU energy policy cohesion is at risk from rising price pressures
- Energy dependence can only shift to other unstable regions
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In January 2026, the European Union’s 27 member states officially adopted a regulation to phase out all remaining imports of Russian pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG), whether shipped directly or indirectly through third countries. The REPowerEU regulation builds on previous sanctions and emergency measures implemented following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It also signifies a wider strategic shift, treating energy dependence as a clear security risk.
By 2025, Russian oil imports to the EU had dropped to less than 3 percent of total imports. Meanwhile, Russian gas still makes up about 13 percent of the EU’s gas imports, amounting to over 15 billion euros annually. These import levels are well below those before 2022, when Russia supplied around 45 percent of the bloc’s pipeline gas and LNG imports, and will be phased out gradually during 2026.
A complete ban on LNG imports of Russian gas will take effect from the beginning of 2027, with pipeline gas imports banned from autumn 2027. The EU legislation establishing the phaseout and ban is permanent, unlike other sanctions packages, which require unanimous member-state renewal every six months.
EU countries still importing significant amounts of Russian gas via TurkStream, namely Hungary and Slovakia, were required to submit diversification plans by March 2026 under the new regulation.
A full import ban on Russian oil has yet to be implemented, due to the European Commission’s removal of a planned legal proposal on April 15 effecting the permanent oil ban following Iran’s blockage of Middle Eastern oil around the Strait of Hormuz. However, separate legislation is expected to be introduced to phase out Russian oil imports by the end of 2027.
Geopolitical implications
The REPowerEU regulation completes the dismantling of the remaining elements of EU-Russia economic interdependence. For decades, energy trade served as both a stabilizing force and a source of leverage in relations between Moscow and European capitals.
The long-term gas contracts created a mutual dependence that led many, especially in Western Europe, to believe that commercial integration would help reduce political conflict. However, Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, four years of war and anti-European rhetoric, leading to the gradual, now legally mandated end of Russian gas imports marks a definitive end to that belief.
This shift carries geopolitical risks for both sides. Russia loses a major revenue stream and its most effective tool for exerting pressure over European capitals. By the same token, EU influence over Moscow is reduced. As Russia shifts its energy focus to Asian markets like China and India, it may become less responsive to European pressure.
But at the same time, as Moscow pivots toward Asian markets, it often sells at discounts and incurs higher transport costs, constraining its overall economic capacity. While Russia is developing alternative export routes, this reorientation does not restore its previous influence over the EU and may leave it more dependent on a narrower set of buyers.
The development of Russia’s alternative export infrastructures, such as expanded pipeline capacity to Asia and increased use of shadow shipping networks for LNG, could reduce Russia’s long-term vulnerability to European sanctions. Moreover, the elimination of energy interdependence may encourage Russia to seek alternative means of exerting pressure on the EU. These could include an intensification of cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public support for energy transition policies, or destabilizing actions in neighboring regions such as the Western Balkans, the South Caucasus or the Arctic.
The regulation, therefore, decreases one type of strategic risk while possibly increasing others, prompting the EU to adopt a more comprehensive view of security that goes beyond energy markets alone.
The bans have put stress on the bloc’s internal cohesion. Although the decision was officially approved by all member states, it faced opposition, especially from countries like Hungary and Slovakia, which have historically depended more than other EU member states on Russian gas and claimed fewer immediate options (neighboring Croatia has offered to provide alternative supplies). That factor, however, may be mitigated by a new government in Budapest being more pro-European and a subsequent softening of Bratislava’s position.
Beyond that, legal challenges, requests for exemptions or uneven implementation could undermine the credibility of the EU’s common energy policy and expose internal divisions that external actors may seek to exploit. Should energy prices rise sharply or supply disruptions occur during the transition period – both having already occurred as a result of the United States-Israel war with Iran – then political pressure within more vulnerable member states could intensify.
The regulation also reshapes the EU’s relationships beyond Russia by redefining its energy partnerships with other global suppliers. As Russian gas is phased out, the EU becomes increasingly reliant on LNG imports from the U.S., and other producers, as well as pipeline gas from North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. One major producer, Qatar, has already declared force majeure on long-term supplies to several European customers due to the Iran war causing European gas prices to spike by over 50 percent at one point.
The EU gets about 30 percent of its gas from Norway, now the bloc’s key baseline supplier. Europe is also eyeing increased gas supplies from Central Asia and may contribute guarantees to allow the construction of a Trans-Caspian Pipeline. As Russia’s share of the European energy mix has precipitously declined, the U.S. share has grown, accounting for 57 percent of the EU’s LNG imports last year.
While diversification reduces the risks of dependence on a single supplier, it also introduces new strategic vulnerabilities. Reliance on U.S. LNG, for example, increases Europe’s exposure to transatlantic political dynamics, including U.S. domestic energy policy and export controls. Similarly, greater dependence on suppliers in politically unstable regions, such as Africa and Latin America, could expose the EU to disruptions stemming from regional conflicts or domestic unrest.
Still, diversification across multiple suppliers eliminates the single-point risk that defined Europe’s pre-2022 dependence on Russia. Although it creates new sensitivities, these risks are more diffuse and, on balance, more manageable than the previous concentrated reliance on a single adversarial supplier.
Geoeconomic challenges
The transition away from Russian gas is happening in a global energy market marked by increased volatility and rising competition for LNG supplies. Unlike pipeline gas supplied through long-term contracts, LNG prices are more directly affected by global demand swings, especially from Asia. During periods of high demand or supply disruptions, European buyers may compete with Asian markets that are willing to pay higher spot prices, raising costs across the EU.
This volatility poses risks not only to consumers but also to industrial sectors that depend heavily on natural gas for energy and feedstocks. Higher and more volatile energy prices threaten the competitiveness of European industry, particularly in energy-intensive sectors such as chemicals, steel, fertilizers, glass and ceramics.
Some companies have already adjusted by improving efficiency or partially relocating, but ongoing cost pressures could speed up deindustrialization in certain regions, worsening economic disparities within the EU. Smaller economies or those with less diverse industrial bases may be especially vulnerable, potentially leading to increased political resistance to both the energy transition and broader efforts for European integration.
Looking at the upsides of the regulation, it opens the door to major new investments and strategic opportunities, strengthening Europe’s long-term energy security. Replacing Russian gas necessitates rapid expansion of LNG import capacity, pipeline interconnections, storage facilities and grid infrastructure.
EU policymakers are now supporting increased domestic energy production rather than relying on imports. While some member states have rapidly implemented floating storage and regasification units and improved cross-border connections, others are encountering longer timelines and higher costs.
Financing these investments amid fiscal constraints and competing priorities (defense spending, climate adaptation) may strain national budgets and solidarity mechanisms.
There is also a risk of capital misallocation. The EU’s long-term climate objectives require a sharp reduction in fossil fuel consumption over the coming decades, raising concerns that large-scale investments in gas infrastructure could become stranded assets. Overinvestment in LNG capacity could therefore lock in higher gas consumption than is compatible with climate targets, while underinvestment could leave the EU exposed to supply shocks during the transition period.
Inflationary pressures also represent a key geoeconomic factor. Rising energy prices directly contribute to consumer inflation and indirectly increase food and manufacturing costs. Eurozone inflation has sharply risen to 2.5 percent this March, well above the European Central Bank’s 2 percent target, as the U.S.-Israel war on Iran has stoked concerns over sustained price rises across the single currency bloc. This has made monetary policy more challenging and is possibly reducing public support for sanctions and climate initiatives.
Social impacts, particularly on lower-income households facing higher heating and electricity bills, could further amplify political tensions.
Energy security considerations
Energy security risks are central to the regulation’s reasoning but also represent its biggest immediate challenge. While the EU has made significant strides in diversifying supplies and boosting storage levels, removing Russian gas entirely eliminates a major and historically dependable baseload source.
The replacement system relies more heavily on LNG, renewable energy, flexible demand management and new infrastructure projects, all of which introduce new forms of vulnerability. LNG supply chains are exposed to global shipping risks, chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Suez Canal, and technical disruptions at liquefaction or regasification facilities. Renewable energy, while essential for long-term security, remains dependent on weather conditions and requires substantial storage and grid flexibility to ensure reliability.
Seasonal and weather-related risks are especially significant. Cold winters or periods of low wind or extended droughts that affect hydropower could put stress on energy systems and lead to increased reliance on gas-fired power generation.
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Although the regulation includes emergency provisions that permit the temporary suspension of the ban in extreme situations, such measures are inherently reactive and may not fully mitigate the economic and political impacts of supply shortages.
Infrastructure disparities across the EU further complicate the energy security landscape. While Western and Northern European countries generally have better access to LNG terminals and diverse supply routes, parts of Central and Eastern Europe have less flexibility.
Limited interconnectivity and storage capacity could cause uneven impacts during supply disruptions, testing the effectiveness of cross-border solidarity arrangements. To be sure, countries in Central Europe have significantly boosted their gas pipeline infrastructure over the past two decades and have access to both Mediterranean and Baltic LNG supplies. Ensuring that all member states can access alternative supplies during stress conditions remains an important consideration.
Timing and implementation risks are also substantial. The regulation’s phased approach seeks to balance security concerns with market realities, but the transition period is tight given the scale of structural change needed.
Delays in infrastructure projects, permitting bottlenecks or slower-than-expected deployment of renewable energy, and energy-efficiency measures could create supply gaps. Overreliance on short-term market solutions risks exposing the EU to price spikes and emergency procurement at unfavorable terms.
Pathways to greater European resilience
Despite these risks, the regulation also presents strategic opportunities that, if managed effectively, could improve the EU’s long-term resilience. Accelerating the deployment of renewable energy, electrification, energy efficiency and alternative fuels like hydrogen can eliminate dependence on imported fossil fuels.
Greater integration of the internal energy market, along with digitalization and demand-response technologies, can enhance system flexibility and lessen vulnerability to external shocks. In this way, the risks associated with the Russian gas phaseout are closely linked to the overall success or failure of the EU’s energy transition.
Ultimately, the success of this policy will depend on the EU’s ability to maintain internal unity, balance energy security with climate goals and turn short-term disruptions into long-term resilience in an increasingly contested global energy system.
Scenarios
Most likely: The EU relies on other foreign gas suppliers
As the EU completes its phaseout of Russian gas in 2027, it will rely on increased supplies of U.S. LNG, pipeline gas from Central Asia, greater intra-EU gas sharing and faster deployment of renewables.
Qatar is also likely to remain a major supplier of LNG to the EU, despite near total supply disruption arising from military conflict damaging the Gulf state’s infrastructure and blocking traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. However, even with full resumption of its LNG production, supplies will be contingent on navigational access through that chokepoint and an early end to the war. This outcome is likely to remain a complex and volatile issue over the short to medium term.
Energy-intensive industries will face higher, more volatile prices, deepening deindustrialization pressures, most notably in Central and Eastern Europe.
Geopolitically, the ban deepens the EU-Russia divide and accelerates European rearmament and strategic autonomy initiatives, while also increasing the bloc’s investment in domestic renewables, hydrogen, nuclear energy and pipeline connectivity with Central Asia to reduce long-term dependence on any single supplier.
Less likely: Limited Russian gas supply derogations introduced
A prolonged cold winter or major disruption in global LNG shipping, especially via the Strait of Hormuz, strains storage capacities and infrastructure, prompting the European Commission to invoke emergency derogations that temporarily permit limited imports of Russian gas to certain landlocked member states.
This triggers political fractures within the bloc, with some members accusing others of backsliding on sanctions and energy commitments, while Russia exploits the situation to demand political concessions or higher prices for any “tolerated” flows.
The EU’s energy security coordination weakens and non-EU suppliers, especially the U.S., and to a lesser extent Qatar, Central Asia and Australia, gain stronger pricing power. This increases the risk of energy blackmail via contract renegotiations rather than pipeline shutoffs.
Least likely: Complete shutdown of Russian gas supply
Over the coming months, Russia responds to the regulation’s full ban by abruptly cutting remaining transit flows through third-country routes, for example, via TurkStream-linked infrastructure.
The Kremlin launches cyber or hybrid tactics against EU-bound LNG terminals, storage hubs or pipeline interconnectors, creating a short-term supply crisis.
This prompts the EU to activate solidarity mechanisms and release emergency storage, but some member states still face rolling blackouts and industrial curtailments, especially in energy-poor, landlocked regions.
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