Europe without America
The U.S.-backed postwar security order is fraying, forcing Europe to reconcile decades of social spending and free riding with the urgent need to rearm.
In a nutshell
- The Pax Americana enabled European peace and post-war prosperity
- Trump-era U.S. retrenchment ended the old transatlantic bargain
- Europe now faces a world of raw power politics and rising threats
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Madame du Barry, the publicly acknowledged mistress of Louis XV, famously begged the executioner for “one more moment” as she was led to the scaffold. She wanted to prolong her life of luxury, even if only briefly. Across much of today’s Europe, the mourning over the fading era of global security and rules-based order bears a striking resemblance. Those rules were often devised and, with varying degrees of success (and sometimes not at all), enforced in practice by the “world policeman,” the United States of America.
The Pax Americana emerged as the cornerstone of stability in Western Europe after World War II. It later attracted much of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, which joined willingly and enthusiastically after the Americans’ decisive triumph in the Cold War. This era of stability created conditions for extraordinary economic prosperity.
Those who dwell on U.S. failures, particularly in several Asian missions (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan), seem to have forgotten that America’s extraordinarily successful efforts also produced the postwar successes of Japan and South Korea. Even China’s rise from the poverty of Mao’s reign of terror bears indelible traces of Washington’s influence. American successes on the Old Continent are no less significant: first West Germany, then all of Germany, and finally all of Europe, where, after centuries, the former Western imperial powers ceased to be each other’s greatest rivals.
The combination of American-backed prosperity and deepening economic interdependence produced a Europe in which, for the first time in a long while, most nations no longer posed a threat to one another. However, it also meant that this same part of Europe was no longer a threat to anyone else either. Its global military and geopolitical influence have been declining proportionally over the long term.
One important caveat remains: At least one country within Europe – Russia – still feels humiliated and degraded by its defeat in the Cold War. It has never forgiven the world, and Europe in particular, for that humiliation and the U.S.’s long-standing absolute dominance in its security affairs. The Kremlin has also brutally demonstrated its desire for retribution over the past two decades, most recently through a war waged directly against a neighboring country, Ukraine, since 2022.
Pensions and hospitals, not weapons
Former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt famously defined his foreign policy approach as, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” In recent decades, the European Union has done the opposite. Its politicians speak loudly at global forums but carry no stick with which to back up their words.
According to an Ifo Institute study, on average, none of the countries that were NATO members at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall had reached their 1990 real defense spending levels by 2022. Meanwhile, real spending on social policy and healthcare in those countries doubled during that period, and spending on education increased by 1.5 times. The picture changed substantially in 2025. European NATO members and Canada increased defense spending by nearly 20 percent in real terms over 2024. All allies finally met (or exceeded) the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) target, even though some just barely. Germany, in particular, surpassed it for the first time since the 1990s, reaching around 2.3 percent of GDP.
Yet despite this sharp rise, many countries still fall well short of the new, more ambitious targets (3.5 percent and eventually 5 percent of GDP) discussed at the 2025 NATO Summit. Americans continue building warships at scale; Europeans are building hospitals, repairing pension systems – and only gradually increasing their arsenals.
We must admit that as Europeans, we were like the scrawny, bespectacled kid in class who, though he has the best-ironed shirt, the most expensive cell phone, and the most extensive collection of classics, needs the strongman’s constant protection so he can focus on self-improvement. Fortunately, the strongman is still on his side. It is he who always deters the vile school bullies and hooligans – whom even the principal fears – from attacking. In exchange for protection, the weaker student typically offers only occasional moral lectures on how the strong should treat the weak.
This dynamic characterized much of Europe within NATO, particularly until the rise of Donald Trump. European nations were willing to rely on America’s power, acting as free riders, while also eager to lecture others on their responsibilities. It was a clear example of hypocrisy at its finest.
With U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term now well underway, Europeans have gradually begun to confront the reality that the old transatlantic bargain is over. They recognize that the “price of serving as the world’s policeman,” in terms of funding for defense and self-protection, will increase sharply. However, before Europe had fully accepted this harsh reality, an even more dramatic change occurred.
The former sheriff declares that there will be no police in town, letting the law of the strongest prevail. He begins to act like a villain, demanding protection money from others, promising greater peace to those who pay more. This is, with a hint of exaggeration, how one could interpret the establishment of the so-called Board of Peace earlier this year (an initiative chaired by President Trump himself). There is no pretense here – just a play of power and money.
It is understandable that, despite certain signs, no one in Europe was truly prepared for such a sudden shift in Washington’s behavior. Moreover, unexpected moves from an opponent catch complacent actors far more off guard than those who stay vigilant.
More on transatlantic relations
- A transatlantic reset
- Who holds the cards in Arctic security?
- Why Europe does not understand the U.S.
The free rider’s dilemma
This situation contributes to political paralysis. European countries struggle not only to defend themselves collectively but also to adopt clear positions. Using the schoolyard analogy, the weaker students face an awkward dilemma. It is risky to criticize the bully they have long relied on for protection, especially amid his unpredictable outbursts. Supporting him risks retaliation from others without guaranteed backing. Opposing him risks losing his favor altogether.
This is aptly illustrated by the ongoing 2026 crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian actions have severely disrupted global energy flows. What Europeans have desired most from the beginning of the conflict is simple: Let it end soon, without major consequences and without requiring our direct involvement. As Europeans, we were not adequately trained to assist effectively.
Europeans feel confused. The classroom strongman had urged us to train harder so we could one day support him against growing threats. He never warned us he would start picking fights himself, or that he might step away entirely. Yet a sobering realization remains: It is still better if our former protector prevails, because if he does not, genuine predators may dominate the playground.
But it is also clear that this radical change in U.S. behavior will have severe consequences, even though it largely addresses America’s internal problems. The U.S. is cleaning house, but the dust is swirling all over the world. That is the nature of a hegemon. Some consequences may be intended and desirable; others may be entirely unintended.
If Europe begins to arm itself while witnessing the rise of crude and destructive nationalism, it may become far less safe than before. In Europe, which has historically been more of a tribal community of nations, there is always a border nearby and a neighbor beyond it. Europe’s most reliable enemy has always been the neighbor next door.
It is difficult to predict whether the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will hold up in a rapidly changing world, especially as countries that have either not ratified it or have withdrawn, like India, North Korea, Israel and Pakistan, continue to gain power. Might this lead others to believe they have a valid claim to nuclear deterrence? If the treaty is no longer seen as a “public good” upheld by the U.S., how will that reshape the global landscape? Will such a scenario be more favorable for America than the current situation?
Are we not likely to see more intractable generational conflicts building up in European societies, especially as the need to support an aging population grows? In Germany, the approval of the 2025 pension package last December – changes that will effectively raise contribution rates for the working population from 18.6 percent to over 20 percent – prompted a rebellion among a group of younger lawmakers in Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s coalition. They are increasingly aware that their generation is expected to support not only a larger population of parents and grandparents but also their own families, all while shouldering the responsibility of defending the country against potential external threats.
It is not surprising that the older generation is not particularly bothered by the idea of mandatory military service – it will not affect them. The younger generation, however, may be fundamentally opposed to it. If Europe has been a free rider for so long, how can we prevent everyone from wanting to become one themselves?
In Europe, we are often unable to address military spending without increasing our national debt. No one is willing to reduce existing benefits or the welfare state, and we are reluctant to raise taxes. In many countries, raising taxes is not even an option due to an already overwhelming tax burden. As a result, we end up with higher levels of debt, prompting serious discussions about how to manage this issue more creatively in the future.
In 2025, military spending led to the establishment of a new pan-European debt instrument, SAFE (Security Action for Europe), valued at 150 billion euros. Member states may use loans from this fund to enhance their defense and combat capabilities. Notably, deficits and debts arising in this way at the national level are exempt from European fiscal rules, and the European Commission does not punish or sanction member states for such debts. GIS has previously addressed this growing trend of borrowing for new priorities.
However, borrowing is merely freeloading at the expense of the future. In aging populations, this behavior is unfortunate but understandable. While it may be necessary to support defense spending, it should not compromise current well-being. It is important to recognize that potential rivals or adversaries of Europe can easily see through any insincerity regarding the commitment to genuinely invest in military capabilities and resilience. It is just too obvious to be ignored any longer.
Scenarios
Most likely: Europe finances defense by borrowing
The first scenario assumes that European countries will continue to finance this new, costly defense priority primarily through new debt rather than by reallocating existing spending priorities or raising taxes. In addition to national-level debt, pan-European debt will also rise, as it did after the Covid-19 pandemic.
The gradually increasing debt burden will eventually have to be addressed either through central bank instruments (monetary financing) or by restructuring part of it at the expense of creditors. It will be difficult to return to models of mandating citizens to participate in defending their own countries.
There will be no sincere will to build joint defense capabilities as one of the key public goods the state is supposed to provide for its citizens. Even within NATO, some states will continue to attempt to free ride at the expense of others. The probability of this scenario is 70 percent.
Less likely: From U.S. dependence to European self-reliance
This scenario anticipates that increasing global security risks, combined with the declining role of the U.S. as a security shield for Europe, will weaken deterrence against external attacks within NATO. Individual European countries may prioritize defense spending over other expenditures or seek additional resources to finance their military budgets.
Debt will no longer grow unsustainably as a result. At the same time, there will be increased cooperation among European countries in the defense industry, along with the sharing of capacities and military capabilities. The likelihood of this scenario occurring is 30 percent.
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