Optimism for the future of the Quad
Despite U.S.-India trade strains and China’s assertiveness, strengthened bilateral ties fuel optimism for the Quad’s revival and deeper cooperation.
In a nutshell
- Revitalized bilateral ties among members drive Quad optimism
- The Quad must reassure ASEAN while boosting economic and defense ties
- China’s wolf warrior diplomacy and maritime aggression on the rise
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The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly referred to as the Quad, is a coalition of four democratic nations in (or with interests in) the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, India, Japan and the United States. This partnership is dedicated to upholding the principles of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” China has long been deeply critical of the Quad, consistently seeking to discredit, deride or dilute the initiative.
However, in 2025 tensions emerged among the Quad members, most notably between Washington and New Delhi over trade negotiations and India’s oil imports from Russia. Countries in the Indo-Pacific region have voiced concerns about the growing militarization of great-power competition. They feel pressured to choose between engaging and trading with China on the one hand and aligning with U.S. partners and allies on the other.
The 2025 Quad Leaders’ Summit, which was expected to take place in late 2025 with India as the host and U.S. President Donald Trump in attendance, ultimately did not happen. This was primarily due to heightened tensions between the U.S. and India and reports that Mr. Trump canceled his planned trip to New Delhi amid these rising strains.
The possibility of expanding to a “Quad-Plus” format, which would include other regional partners, seems increasingly likely, though analysts have described the current momentum as entering a period of “strategic pause” following delays in high-level engagements.
Nevertheless, the potential to strengthen cooperation among Quad members and enhance its role as a crucial framework for security, economic and diplomatic collaboration remains promising.
The Quad rebound
Optimism about the future of Quad cooperation is driven by three core factors: revitalized bilateral relations among the members, Beijing’s escalating assertive actions throughout the region and the powerful historical legacy underpinning the initiative.
Bilateral relations. The U.S. has strengthened its bilateral relationships with all its Quad partners.
U.S.-India. Despite occasional contentious disagreements – over trade, Washington’s role in mediating the May 2025 Pakistan-India ceasefire and New Delhi’s Russian oil imports – both nations have made strong efforts to get their partnership back on track. Each government has sent trusted ambassadors to their respective capitals to foster stronger ties. This development was anticipated, as both countries have too many shared interests to allow their partnership to falter.
On February 2, President Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that a bilateral trade agreement has been finalized between the two countries. On February 7, India and the U.S. announced an “interim trade deal framework.” Under this deal, the U.S. agreed to lower its tariffs on Indian goods from 25 percent to 18 percent, effectively reversing the additional punitive duties previously linked to Russian oil imports. In return, India pledged to reduce its purchases of Russian oil, increase its imports of U.S. products and lower its own trade barriers.
U.S.-Australia. The visit of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to Washington in October 2025 reaffirmed the strong commitment of both countries to their strategic partnership, which has been a cornerstone of U.S.-Australian relations since World War II. Concerns about the future of AUKUS, a crucial multinational defense cooperation program integral to Australia’s national security strategy, have significantly faded. Furthermore, a strategic agreement on mining and processing of critical minerals emerged as a key outcome of Prime Minister Albanese’s visit.
U.S.-Japan. The election of Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, marks a significant shift in policy. Her hawkish stance on China, commitment to Taiwan, efforts to foster cooperative relations with South Korea, and the strengthening of security and economic ties with Washington have reinforced the U.S.-Japanese alliance. She continues to endorse the free and open Indo-Pacific vision and Quad engagement, despite domestic political pressure.
President Trump has reaffirmed his support for regional cooperation, bolstered by his late 2025 visits to various East Asian countries, which were largely seen as successful and highly valuable by the governments of those countries.
The China factor
China has reengaged in a vigorous round of “wolf warrior diplomacy.” In particular, Beijing has focused its efforts on Japan, launching a rapid series of aggressive actions. These include assertive maritime maneuvers, strong verbal attacks and measures such as halting tourism to Tokyo and banning Japanese artists from performing in China. Throughout the region, its maritime activities have been on the rise. As Beijing’s actions become more assertive, the likelihood that the Quad members will increase their public cooperation also grows.
President Trump has indicated a serious commitment to reaching a deal with China, with Washington aiming to finalize an agreement this spring. At the same time, it is evident that the U.S. is reinforcing its military commitments in the region, supporting Taiwan, competing with China in advanced technologies and space, and working to break Chinese monopolies on critical supply chains and production.
The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy prioritize deterring China through strength while emphasizing homeland defense and burden-sharing with allies. Furthermore, they underscore that America’s security and prosperity are intrinsically linked to its capacity for assertive engagement and equitable trade in the Indo-Pacific, aiming to prevent regional dominance by any adversary while fostering stable economic ties.
Regardless of any agreements reached, the rivalry between the U.S. and China is here to stay, and the Quad will continue to play a vital role in this complex landscape.
The enduring Indo-Pacific vision
Japan’s position in the Quad – and its stance toward China – has received a considerable boost following its snap election on February 8. Prime Minister Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party secured a historic two-thirds supermajority in the lower house, the first time a single party has achieved this since World War II. The result strongly endorses Ms. Takaichi’s hawkish security outlook, which echoes the approach of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and aligns closely with President Trump.
Abe’s legacy continues to shape the region’s strategic architecture. He championed the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which provided both a rationale and a framework for the Quad to operate and justify its initiatives. Abe was arguably the first foreign leader to embrace President Trump’s global leadership, with the revival of the Quad representing one of Mr. Trump’s earliest and most substantial international accomplishments.
In his second term, President Trump has presented himself as a peacebuilder and unifier. The Quad offers valuable opportunities to support these aims, particularly by providing a framework to bolster economic security, which remains a key priority for President Trump.
As U.S. presidents approach the end of their second terms, shaping their legacies becomes increasingly important to them. President Trump views “peace through strength” and the economic prosperity of Americans as the cornerstones of his legacy. The Quad provides a chance to both showcase his own accomplishments and pay tribute to Abe’s legacy.
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The Quad’s Southeast Asia challenge
One of the key goals of the Quad, as it strengthens its presence in the region, is to expand economic and physical security while maintaining the trust of other regional partners. In the past, the Quad has made it clear that its goal is not to counter China directly, but to promote stability through a free and open framework. For this reason, Quad activities typically involve a variety of innocuous initiatives. This approach allowed the partners to present themselves as not being a group set on opposing China. However, while this strategy helped build trust and confidence within the partnership, it did less to address Beijing’s malicious and aggressive destabilizing actions in the region.
The challenge now for the Quad is to implement stronger economic security and defense measures, but to do so in a way that reassures other regional partners that the goal and effect will be to enhance regional stability.
Scenarios
Most likely: U.S.-India trade pact seals momentum for the Quad’s next phase
Most likely, the next major step for the Quad will come after the rescheduled Quad Leaders’ Summit in New Delhi. This gathering is now projected for later in the year and hinges on the U.S. and India finalizing a bilateral trade agreement to address ongoing issues such as tariffs, market access and India’s imports of Russian oil.
Once a U.S.-India trade agreement is finalized, it is likely to restore high-level trust and generate significant momentum for the development of the Quad. Specifically, partners will look for initiatives related to economic security, such as cooperation on investment and coordination in mining and processing of strategic ores and minerals, as well as defense collaboration, including expanded operational cooperation.
Likely: Evolution of the Quad-Plus model
The Quad will likely aim to include new partners. The approach will not force countries to choose sides between Beijing and the Quad nations, but rather to create a framework that allows them to boost their own economy and security through voluntary cooperation.
A rapid or formal expansion of the Quad-Plus model to include permanent new members seems unlikely in the near future. This is largely due to regional sensitivities, especially worries about perceived militarization and pressure to take sides.
Least likely: The Quad’s momentum stalls
A prolonged stall or further erosion of Quad momentum could occur if the U.S.-India trade agreement falters significantly beyond early 2026, exacerbating bilateral strains and delaying (or canceling) the New Delhi summit. In this scenario, the grouping might remain at a functional but low-profile level, focusing on working-group deliverables (such as counterterrorism) without major breakthroughs at the leader level or expanded formats.
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