The uncertain future of Gaza
President Trump’s Gaza vision is contentious but disrupted a dangerous stalemate, forcing regional powers to confront postwar realities and responsibilities.
In a nutshell
- Trump’s vision for Gaza disrupted the status quo, seeks to relocate Gazans
- No country accepted more than a token few of Gaza’s 2.2 million inhabitants
- Egypt has proposed a postwar plan, but the U.S. and Israel are opposed
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The first foreign visitor of United States President Donald Trump’s second term was Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israeli prime minister seemed a bit surprised when Mr. Trump, during their Oval Office presser on February 4, proclaimed that the U.S. would “take over the Gaza Strip … We’ll own it and be responsible for dismantling all of the dangerous unexploded bombs and other weapons on the site.”
President Trump envisioned turning the Gaza Strip − a 40 kilometer-long, 10 kilometer-wide coastal enclave on the Eastern Mediterranean − into a futuristic real estate and resort development, with at least some of its Arab population (about 2.2 million) relocated to neighboring countries. He later explained that the relocations would be on a voluntary and perhaps also temporary basis during the strip’s 15-year reconstruction. Yet the president’s Gaza “Riviera” vision sparked international condemnation.
Nevertheless, it also served the potentially useful purpose of disrupting a dangerous status quo that had existed in Gaza since the Hamas coup of July 2007. The ensuing 16-year period saw many repeats of this cycle: Hamas launches missile, rocket and also ground attacks on Israel; Israel retaliates with air and sometimes ground attacks; Egyptian mediation establishes a ceasefire in which Hamas remains in power; and Hamas rearms in preparation for the next round of attacks. This cycle culminated in the Hamas invasion of Israeli towns and villages on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s massive, ongoing retaliation.
The world’s response
In February, U.S. National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, in response to the international condemnations of Gaza Riviera, said “the entire region should come up with their own solutions.” Egypt then issued a five-year, $53 billion reconstruction plan for Gaza that was adopted by the Arab League (but later criticized by Saudi Arabia), which would place Gaza under a temporary technocratic government leading to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah regaining control.
But the last time the population of Gaza had a chance to vote, in 2005, they voted against the Palestinian Authority government then in control of Gaza and gave Hamas a plurality of the seats in the Palestinian parliament. The Palestinian Authority has not demonstrated effective governance in the West Bank, let alone a capacity to resume control and manage the reconstruction of war-ravaged Gaza. Both Israel and the U.S. rejected the Egyptian plan.
In a follow-up Trump-Netanyahu meeting on April 8, no further details of postwar Gaza emerged. Meanwhile, Israeli military operations have steadily increased the areas in Gaza under direct control of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), while Hamas, greatly weakened but as yet unbroken, tries to avoid direct warfare. There have been brief ceasefires but they have fallen by the wayside and fresh efforts for a cessation of conflict have yet to gain traction.
Who is Hamas?
Often lost in the Gaza debate is an understanding of Hamas and its aims. Founded in Gaza in 1988 by leaders of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas is an Arabic acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement.” Its charter and frequently invoked political goal is an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine, as a step toward reconstituting an Islamic caliphate throughout the Middle East and, eventually, throughout the world.
Chapter 22 of its charter echoes antisemitic tropes about global Jewish conspiracies. Hamas leaders expressly reject both a two-state solution and even a focus on Palestinian national identity, in favor of a vision of Islamic unity. In seeking to achieve its political aims, Hamas adopts and celebrates attacks on civilians (despite the clear prohibition in the Islamic law of war on targeting civilians), with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood’s International Union of Muslim Scholars hosted and funded by Qatar.
Hamas leaders expressly reject both a two-state solution and even a focus on Palestinian national identity, in favor of a vision of Islamic unity.
Hamas is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S., the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Australia and other countries. Nevertheless, after Hamas took control of Gaza’s government in 2007 (forcibly expelling and in some cases murdering Palestinian Authority officials), the international community was forced to work with Hamas to deliver humanitarian and economic aid to Gaza.
Israel, too, managed a modus vivendi with Hamas in between the cycles of armed conflict. Israeli political, security and military leaders believed that Hamas over time would moderate as it managed the governance of the Strip. That belief was shattered by the surprise attack of October 7, 2023, leaving 1,200 Israelis dead, over 250 hostages taken and over a dozen Israeli communities overrun.
Israel resumes offense
Israel has two overriding aims in the war against Hamas, as articulated by Prime Minister Netanyahu: destroy Hamas’s military capacity while dismantling its control over Gaza’s civilian government; and return all of the remaining hostages in Hamas hands (59, of which 24 are believed to be alive).
Missing from Israel’s war aims is a plan for postwar Gaza and its 2.2 million residents. When asked about this lack of a postwar plan, Mr. Netanyahu says he wants to end the war first and then deal with the postwar reality. But the war has continued for over 18 months, and the Israeli public is increasingly demanding either a postwar scenario or an end to the war – which Hamas demands as a condition for releasing the remaining hostages.
Israel has periodically halted air strikes and ground attacks in Gaza when mediators reach ceasefire agreements with Hamas that allow for release of civilian hostages and female soldiers (in return for the release of large numbers of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons).
The last such ceasefire ended on March 18, when Israel resumed air strikes. Under a new chief of staff, the IDF now targets not only Hamas military commanders but also Hamas politicians who controlled civilian agencies in Gaza. The IDF have also expanded their zones of control on Gaza borders, both along the Gaza-Egypt border in the south around the city of Rafah, and the Gaza-Israel border to the north.
In addition, the IDF resumed control of a central corridor that divides Gaza in two (called “Netzarim”) and established a new corridor of control in the southern part of the Strip (called “Morag”).
The IDF currently occupies about 30 percent of the territory of the Gaza Strip. Its plan seems to concentrate the Gazan population into two separate enclaves, one around Gaza City in the north and another around the city of Khan Yunis in the south. The declared aim is to pressure Hamas into further hostage releases by expanding buffer zones and – at least until Jerusalem’s war aims are met – to make these expanded buffer zones permanent.
A multinational force in postwar Gaza?
Israel was not alone in failing to put forward a postwar Gaza plan in the first 18 months of war. Israel’s main ally, the U.S., also failed to do so under the Biden administration. On January 14, 2025, in his last week in office, then Secretary of State Antony Blinken did address some principles of a postwar plan for Gaza (though no written plan was released).
Several private groups have stepped in to publish their own plans for Gaza. The most detailed plan was published in May 2024 and calls for a non-United Nations multinational mission to replace the IDF in Gaza. This would include both a security force and a civilian governance team, organized and led by the U.S. and including its European, Asian and Middle Eastern allies (disclosure: I was one of the drafters of this plan). This multinational mission would complete the task of replacing the Hamas elements in Gaza’s government, while providing security, humanitarian supply and, eventually, economic reconstruction. The model for this plan was the U.S.-led mission to stabilize and provide interim governance in Bosnia and Kosovo.
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Will President Trump’s expressed interest in postwar Gaza eventually lead to such a multinational effort? There seems to be no interest – either in the Middle East or elsewhere – in absorbing large numbers of forcibly relocated Gazan Palestinians, even on a temporary basis. U.S. ally Jordan, for example, is already stretched; it is home to 3 million Palestinians who now comprise roughly half of the country’s entire population. Additionally, U.S. involvement in another Middle Eastern war zone – even if others supply ground troops while the U.S. provides logistics and intelligence support – remains widely unpopular in the U.S., after the failures in Iraq, Libya and especially Afghanistan.
Furthermore, it is not clear that Israel would agree to a multinational mission to replace the IDF In Gaza. The one similar effort to date – American security contractors backed by Egyptian troops who replaced Israeli forces in the central Netzarim corridor during the last ceasefire – failed to prevent Hamas re-infiltration. Israel may have good reason to doubt that any multinational mission will have the stomach to take on residual Hamas forces left in the Strip.
Scenarios
A note of humility is required in making predictions about Israel and Gaza. No one predicted the Hamas invasion of Israel in October 2023 – apparently not even Hamas backers in Iran. Regional trends are highly dynamic. Both Israel and Gaza are still recovering from the trauma of October 7 and the resulting war. Nevertheless, two possible scenarios, one likely and the other less so, seem clear.
More likely: Israel to provide security and governance in Gaza with U.S. backing
Israel continues to occupy large parts of the Gaza Strip. In a return to the period of 1967-1994, prior to the Oslo Accords, Israel resumes authority for both security and governance in the Gaza Strip, with the mission of fighting residual Hamas insurgent elements and with the help of some Gazans (including those currently protesting against Hamas) who join a de-Hamasified civilian governance. This may be done in close cooperation with the U.S. Some thousands of the 2.2 million Gaza population will manage to relocate to other countries – consistent with a recent poll showing over half of Gazans would like to leave the Strip − though without a mass relocation in the absence of a foreign country’s agreement to do so.
Less likely: Multinational force replaces the IDF to secure Gaza
It is possible that a multinational mission replaces the IDF inside Gaza. The international community comes together to provide forces and funding for a mission that is acceptable to Israel and which has some approval of the Palestinian Authority, to govern Gaza for a transitional period. This remains the best of all bad options, but is less likely because it will not emerge without American leadership.
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