A year of heavy political turbulence in Hungary

What seemed like a temporary clouding has since changed Hungary’s entire political climate, posing a new challenge to the long-ruling Fidesz Party.

Peter Magyar
Peter Magyar holds the Hungarian flag at a campaign rally at the Heroes’ Square on June 8, 2024, in Budapest, Hungary. © GIS
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In a nutshell

  • A new political force has rallied disaffected voters
  • Fidesz has maintained its position thanks to a weak opposition
  • Economic problems pose long-term challenges for the ruling party

Hungary’s current political tremors began on February 2, when an article about a presidential pardon appeared in “444.hu,” a left-wing online magazine. The previous April, then President Katalin Novak – a member of Fidesz, the conservative party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orban – pardoned a man who had helped to cover up the crimes of a child molester.

The pardon case had a complex religious and political background which is still partly unclear. It was countersigned by Judit Varga, Fidesz’s top candidate at the time for the upcoming European Parliament elections. At the time of the pardon, she was still serving as minister of justice, a post she subsequently gave up to represent Fidesz in the elections.

Fierce public reactions followed the story’s publication. The government faced a barrage of criticism from leading media outlets and the left-wing and green opposition. Fears seemed to spread over the safety of Hungarian children everywhere. This was grossly exaggerated; still, mass demonstrations to “protect our children” took place for several weeks. The agitated atmosphere showed that a great deal of discontent and anger had built up within the Hungarian public. This dissatisfaction needed an outlet and found one in this peculiar episode.

Fidesz pulled the emergency brake within days, offering the resignations of President Novak and EU candidate Ms. Varga. The party paid a high price to restore the peace: It lost two young, popular and talented politicians who played important roles in its strategic planning. At first, it looked as if the attempt to calm things down was successful. But that lasted only for a short time.

The new Tisza party emerges

On February 11, Judit Varga’s ex-husband, Peter Magyar, appeared out of nowhere on the left-wing, anti-government channel “Partizan” and gave an hourlong interview. Mr. Magyar had been a beneficiary of Fidesz rule over the past decade, receiving at least 10,000 euros per month through plum board positions secured via the party. In the interview, he claimed that he had evidence of serious government malfeasance he would soon release that would lead to the resignation of the government.

The 43-year-old Mr. Magyar is a descendant of the old communist elite of Budapest. A trained lawyer, he had previously performed rather minor tasks as a member of the ruling party. After his former wife’s resignation from office, within days he lost all of his profitable positions. The ambitious Mr. Magyar seems to have felt hurt by this, though he appears to have been preparing his entry into political life for some time.

About a year ago he made secret cellphone recordings of conversations with Ms. Varga, which were supposed to prove that Fidesz officials had interfered in the investigation in a major corruption trial to obstruct it. Although the recording would have been inadmissible in court, a new investigation was launched, which did not confirm Mr. Magyar’s claims. That was the end of the supposed big reveal, although he stressed that he had many more revelations ready. These are still yet to come.

Meanwhile, allegations emerged that Mr. Magyar had been violent toward his wife, with details described in a police report. Evidence has since gathered of his difficult character, including outbursts of anger, a propensity to violence and inappropriate drunken behavior. Yet this has had little influence on his sudden popularity. His first, spontaneously announced rally on the national holiday of March 15 attracted around 10,000 people, and his final rally before the European elections was attended by some 50,000 Hungarians.

Read more by Krisztina Koenen

Mr. Magyar claims that Fidesz “stole the country” and that he will lead the “reconquest.” This refers to corruption and cronyism in the party that has raised much public anger and criticism. He promises to restore people’s trust in politics and initiate a system change. In contrast to the pro-EU, left-green opposition, Mr. Magyar presents himself as a representative of “Hungarian interests.” How he defines these remains unclear.

The lack of a detailed political program for Mr. Magyar’s Respect and Freedom Party, known as the Tisza Party, does not deter his supporters. On the contrary; they can follow him unconditionally, precisely because he has no other political program than system change and the overthrow of the Orban government. Within months, Mr. Magyar has used these promises to take on the status of a savior.

Tisza wipes out the opposition

Given all this, it was unsurprising that Mr. Magyar’s Tisza party achieved about 30 percent support in the European Parliament elections, with more than 1.3 million citizens voting for his faction. However, the winner in Hungary was once again Fidesz, with some 45 percent. (In the municipal elections, held at the same time, Fidesz remained the strongest party except in the capital Budapest, where the Green Party mayor retained his position.)

The big loser of the EU elections was not Fidesz, the party Mr. Magyar intended to destroy, but the opposition, which was literally wiped out. Only an alliance led by the Democratic Coalition of the former socialist prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsany was able to hold on, with 8 percent, alongside the rightist, anti-globalization party Our Homeland, with 6 percent.

Mr. Magyar chose the right time to enter Hungarian politics. A general fatigue with politics prevails in the country after 14 years of Fidesz rule. Voters have serious grievances. After the Covid-19 years and, especially since the sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, Fidesz was no longer able to fulfill its promise that everyone would always be a little better off under its rule. Inflation in Hungary has been among the highest in the EU, reaching over 25 percent in 2023, and has seriously hurt the middle class and poorer citizens. Economic growth has remained weak or non-existent, with gross domestic product contracting by 0.9 percent in 2023, year over year.

Viktor Orban in Kyiv
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister (left) and Volodymyr Zelenskiy, Ukraine’s president, attend a news conference in Kyiv, Ukraine, on July 2, 2024. © GIS

Waning enthusiasm for Fidesz

Fidesz has little idea of how to overcome these economic problems. It has made severe mistakes, such as one-sided reliance on the electromobility decisions of the German automotive industry and investments from China in the allegedly poisonous production of batteries for electrical vehicles. And Budapest has no control over many important factors, such as Russia’s war in neighboring Ukraine or ongoing sanctions.

The youthful enthusiasm of the early Fidesz years has disappeared. Within the party, politicians with clear conservative convictions were replaced by technocrats and careerists. Fidesz became complacent, settling comfortably into power and resting on its laurels.

This is also due to the fact that Fidesz lacked a strong challenger. The opposition was in an even worse state than the ruling party. During the entire 14-year span of Fidesz power to date, the opposition has done the same thing repeatedly: criticize the government from green and globalist perspectives, criticize a popular migration policy and support unpopular left-wing ideas on climate, cultural and social issues.

Finally, due to ideological and financial support from the United States and the EU, the opposition parties have not been able to shake off the stigma of being representatives of foreign powers. As a result, they lost one election after another and paved the way for Tisza’s warm welcome.

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Scenarios

Less likely: Major electoral success for Tisza

Could Mr. Magyar actually achieve his ambitions – defeating Fidesz in the 2026 elections, winning a majority of his own and bringing on the touted systemic change? This is unlikely for several reasons. Mr. Magyar has no real domestic policy program and certainly none on foreign policy. With his rhetoric of change, he plays on emotions. But this level of excitement cannot be maintained for two years – unless Fidesz makes a serious mistake.

Tisza is a one-man party. Until now, no competent personalities have emerged to join its leadership. It lacks the personnel to build a nationwide network. In two years, with a lot of local work, the party could certainly develop roots and gain regional majorities. But so far there are no signs of this happening. Mr. Magyar’s difficult character does not make things easier.

More likely: Fidesz loses its supermajority

Fidesz, on the other hand, is anchored in the country right down to the level of small villages – partly because it uses nepotism to maintain and consolidate its power.

It is conceivable that, if Tisza raises its profile and strengthens its personnel, Fidesz will lose its current two-thirds majority in 2026. But it is unlikely to lose its absolute majority, barring unpredictable coincidences like the sudden death or disability of Viktor Orban.

Prime Minister Orban is Fidesz’s greatest asset. His self-titled “peace mission” to end the Ukraine war, while facing criticism from elsewhere in the EU, has impressed many citizens, proud of the global political positioning he has achieved for Hungary. Currently, there is no other Hungarian national politician who enjoys comparable domestic prestige, and even affection. And at the same time, of course, no one who is so intensely disliked by his opponents.

It will strengthen Fidesz’s home position if Mr. Orban is successful with his efforts at a ceasefire in Ukraine, with the formation of a conservative faction in the European Parliament and with changes sought for EU policy.

Fidesz will not want to change anything about low-level nepotism in its ranks because that is an important factor in the party’s power dynamics. But the party could act on the highest and most visible level, keeping its leaders and their relatives clean and removing the most well-known black sheep from positions of influence. This, however, has not yet happened.

The country urgently needs economic growth for Fidesz and Mr. Orban to keep their promises of prosperity. Otherwise, opposition to the government’s so-called System of National Cooperation could spread to the loyal supporters of Fidesz itself.

So far, the ruling party has hardly reacted to Mr. Magyar’s rise, while watching the collapse of the left-green opposition with glee. It seems to believe that the Magyar issue will resolve itself over time. That is certainly possible – but it will not solve Fidesz’s problems.

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