Hungary’s uncertain future in the Turkic world
With a new government in place, Budapest must decide how far to unwind Viktor Orban’s Turkic push while preserving valuable economic ties with Turkiye and Central Asia.
In a nutshell
- Hungary built close ties with the Turkic states under Viktor Orban
- The new government is likely to focus on commercial ties
- Energy and investments give Budapest incentives to remain engaged
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After taking office as prime minister in 2010, Viktor Orban announced a policy of eastern and global opening. Its aim was to balance Hungary’s heavy dependence on Western, and particularly German, economic ties. The plan was to expand regional and eastern trade so that the country’s economic and energy relationships would become more balanced.
He identified three capitals as especially important to Hungary: Berlin for the economy, Moscow for energy supplies and Ankara for migration control and energy transit. Beijing could be added to this list because of its importance to Budapest in trade and strategic industries.
As part of this policy, Hungary became an observer in the Ankara-dominated Turkic Council in 2018. Turkiye is an important energy transit country through which Hungary can receive not only Russian gas, but also supplies from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Following the development of natural gas reserves in the Levantine Basin and the construction of new pipelines through Turkiye, Israeli and Cypriot gas could eventually be added to these supplies.
One early result of this closer relationship with Turkiye was greater access to regional markets for Hungarian aviation and pharmaceutical companies, while Hungarian energy companies made investments in West and Central Asia. Turkish companies, meanwhile, emerged as investors in Hungary’s construction and defense sectors. According to critics, cooperation gradually expanded from the economic sphere into the symbolic and political spheres, facilitated by the participating governments’ and politicians’ attraction to the illiberal political model.
By April 2026, the Hungarian government had developed good relations with all the major powers interested in Central Asia, with the exception of the European Union. Unlike the Orban government, the new government led by Prime Minister Peter Magyar is liberal and Western-oriented. It is reviewing Mr. Orban’s policies and will set its own course.
Organization of Turkic States
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, six Turkic-speaking countries began summit-level cooperation, holding their first meeting in 1992. Eight further summits followed. At the ninth meeting in 2009, the governments of Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan established the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, commonly known as the Turkic Council, as a voluntary framework for intergovernmental cooperation. Uzbekistan became a full member in 2019. The organization was renamed the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2021.
Meanwhile, Hungary received observer status in 2018, becoming the organization’s first such state and its first participant from outside the Turkic-speaking world. The Turkic Council opened its European representation office in Budapest in 2019. Mr. Orban regularly attended its summits and received the honorary title of Supreme Order of the Turkic World in November 2024 for his contribution to cooperation between Hungary and the member states.
Hungary formally joined the Turkic Investment Fund in June 2024 and contributed $100 million, and the country’s government representatives participate in the fund’s governing bodies. The OTS held an informal summit in Budapest in May 2025, the first such summit hosted by an observer state.
Facts & figures
Hungary’s historical ties to the Turkic world
- The Magyar tribal confederation entered the Carpathian Basin around 895-896.
- The Ottoman victory at Mohacs in 1526 and capture of Buda in 1541 led to roughly 150 years of Ottoman rule in central Hungary. Buda was retaken in 1686, the Ottomans were decisively defeated at Zenta in 1697, and the Treaty of Karlowitz ended most Ottoman rule in Hungary in 1699.
- The Ottoman Empire supported some anti-Habsburg Hungarian forces and later provided refuge to political exiles. Ferenc Rakoczi settled in Rodosto, now Tekirdag, in 1720, while Polish-Hungarian revolutionary commander Jozef Bem entered Ottoman service after the defeat of the 1848-1849 revolutions.
- Odon Szechenyi, son of Hungarian reformer Istvan Szechenyi, reorganized Istanbul’s firefighting service from 1874 and remained its commander until his death in 1922.
- Mr. Orban revived the symbolic narrative of eastern kinship, describing Hungary as standing on foundations of “Hun-Turkic origins” and Hungarians as the late descendants of Attila.
- Since 2008, Hungary has hosted the biennial Kurultaj, a gathering celebrating Hungarian and Hun-Turkic traditions.
Economic pivot to the east
Mr. Orban’s government argued that the country’s economy was disproportionately dependent on Western Europe, particularly Germany. To diversify its economic relationships, it sought to strengthen regional cooperation through the Visegrad Group while launching its Eastern Opening policy.
The aim was not to reduce trade with Western countries, but to counterbalance this by expanding regional, particularly north-south, and eastern trade. Germany remains Hungary’s most important export market, accounting for around one quarter of its exports, with automotive manufacturing forming a particularly important link between the two countries.
Germany’s prolonged economic stagnation and the eurozone’s relatively weak growth have reinforced the case in Budapest to diversify relations with other centers of economic growth.
In countries where political relations often shape commercial access, Budapest used diplomacy to support the entry and expansion of Hungarian companies. As a member of the EU and NATO, Hungary initially pursued closer relations with these countries alongside broader Western efforts to develop economic and political cooperation with them. Western policy subsequently placed greater emphasis on human rights and geopolitical considerations. European relations with Turkiye deteriorated following the 2016 coup attempt and the government’s subsequent democratic backsliding. The EU and the United States also increased scrutiny of economic relations with China because of concerns about strategic dependencies, technology and national security. Cooperation with Russia was sharply restricted after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Hungary ultimately approved successive EU sanctions packages against Russia though sought to extract concessions from other European partners in each case and sought exemptions from measures that it considered particularly damaging to its economy, including restrictions on pipeline oil. Where sanctions allowed, Budapest continued economic cooperation with eastern partners and presented Hungary as a bridge between the economies of East and West.
Bloc building
One of the processes shaping the current phase of globalization is the formation of competing geopolitical and economic blocs. Russia has sought to preserve its influence in the post-Soviet region through the concept of the “Russian World” and organizations supporting economic and military integration. The EU has pursued closer political and economic relations with the Eastern Partnership countries.
The U.S. has sought to extend the Abraham Accords beyond the Middle East. Kazakhstan announced that it would join the framework in 2025, while Uzbekistan supported the associated Abraham Fund. Washington has also promoted the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which would connect India with Europe through the Gulf and Israel, bypassing Turkiye.
China has expanded its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, while Turkiye has used the Organization of Turkic States to deepen political, economic and cultural cooperation with the Turkic countries of Central Asia.
Because these initiatives overlap in Central Asia, competition among the major powers is likely to intensify. Under the Orban governments from 2010 to April 2026, Hungary maintained good relations with most of the influential powers active in the region. Hungarian companies remained concentrated in a limited number of sectors, however, and the emergence of competing blocs did not initially create a major obstacle to Hungary’s regional economic activity.
Hungarian-Turkish cooperation
During the Orban governments, Budapest regarded Turkiye as an important regional power and a key partner in migration management, energy, trade and defense. Its position between Europe and Asia and its role in controlling migration routes made it strategically important. Economic cooperation deepened from the mid-2010s, particularly in real estate, construction and energy. Adnan Polat, the former president of football club Galatasaray and chairman of the Turkiye-Hungary Business Council, served as a prominent intermediary in developing commercial relations.
Defense cooperation grew and by 2025, the Hungarian Armed Forces had received 106 Turkish-built Gidran 4×4 armored vehicles. In March 2026, the two countries concluded an agreement covering the manufacture, assembly and commissioning of up to 800 Gidran vehicles in Hungary.
Russian gas reaches Hungary via Turkiye through the TurkStream European line and its continuation through Bulgaria and Serbia, often referred to as Balkan Stream. Blue Stream, by contrast, supplies the Turkish market and does not carry gas onward to Hungary. Azerbaijani gas can reach Europe via Turkiye through the Southern Gas Corridor and regional interconnectors. TurkStream’s European line has an annual capacity of 15.75 billion cubic meters, but it serves several markets and does not by itself make Hungary a major energy hub.
Political relations remained close despite occasional differences. Turkiye completed its ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024, after which the U.S. approved the sale of F-16 aircraft to Ankara. Hungary, which had held up the NATO expansion, ratified Sweden’s accession the following month, becoming the final NATO member to do so despite earlier assurances that it would not be last.
Turkiye applied for full BRICS membership in 2024; its candidacy continues. Budapest and Ankara also differ sharply over the Israel-Palestine conflict: The Orban governments maintained a close, strategic partnership with Israel, while Turkiye strongly supports Palestinian statehood.
Hungary and Turkiye both sought Chinese investment, particularly in electric-vehicle and battery production. BYD chose Hungary for its first European passenger-car factory and later its European headquarters and research center, while also announcing a $1 billion vehicle plant in Turkiye. The EU’s de-risking policy seeks to reduce strategic dependencies on China rather than eliminate economic ties. Turkiye remains attractive to manufacturers because of its large domestic market, growing automotive industry and access to the EU market through the customs union, which has operated since 1996.
Hungarian companies in Central Asia
Hungarian pharmaceutical, industrial and energy companies have long maintained a presence in former Soviet markets. Companies including Richter and Ganz had established commercial ties and brand recognition during the Soviet period and retained parts of this market presence after 1991. Richter, in particular, remained strongly established across Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
In 2020, Hungarian oil and gas company MOL acquired a 9.57 percent non-operating stake in Azerbaijan’s Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil field, together with an effective 8.9 percent interest in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In Uzbekistan, the Uzbek-Hungarian Potato Research Center began operating in 2021, testing Hungarian potato varieties and seed-production technologies under local conditions. In June 2023, OTP Bank, Hungary’s largest, entered the Central Asian market by acquiring a 73.7 percent majority stake in Uzbekistan’s Ipoteka Bank.
More on Hungary
Following the collapse of Hungarian state-owned airline Malev in 2012, privately-owned Wizz Air has taken over only some of Hungary’s air links with eastern markets. While Wizz Air connects Budapest with Baku, the Budapest-Astana service established in 2017 ended in 2020, and envisaged connections with other Central Asian cities have also not held up.
The Orban governments sought to use political relationships and narratives of cultural kinship to improve access for Hungarian companies and position Budapest as a possible gateway to the EU. The Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship program aims to bring students from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkiye and Uzbekistan to Hungarian universities. Despite Mr. Orban’s anti-migration rhetoric, Russian-speaking Central Asian labor migration to Hungary increased under his watch, particularly from Kyrgyzstan.
Scenarios
Most likely: Hungary’s institutional withdrawal from OTS
The government of Prime Minister Magyar will gradually withdraw from Hungary’s observer status and participation in OTS organizations, probably leading to the closure of the Budapest office. Established relationships will be placed on a commercial rather than a political basis, and Hungarian companies will likely no longer receive preferential treatment.
Following the EU’s planned phaseout of Russian natural gas imports by the end of 2027, more Azerbaijani and Central Asian gas could reach Hungary through Turkiye and the Balkan Stream route. Russia could also facilitate deliveries through swap arrangements, at least until the completion of the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline to China.
Less likely: Budapest maintains OTS engagement
The Magyar government will retain Hungary’s observer status and continue participating in OTS institutions, possibly maintaining the previous government’s ambition of eventually obtaining full membership.
However, it will struggle to maintain good relations with all the powers competing for influence in Central Asia. It may also find it difficult to continue an Eastern Opening policy that differs from the EU mainstream, which would entail political and financial costs.
Least likely: Commercial retreat
Hungarian companies already active in Central Asia will initially remain in these markets. However, if they encounter lasting constraints on growth, some may sell their subsidiaries or reduce their regional presence.
This would weaken Hungary’s commercial position in Central Asia, reduce its political influence and allow local, Turkish, Chinese or other foreign competitors to acquire Hungarian-owned assets and market share.
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