India’s spacepower meets regional reality

India is a genuine spacepower, but regional crises and domestic demands could limit its strategic ambitions.

A person walks past a mural of Chandrayaan-3. Chandrayaan-3, India’s third lunar mission, achieved a soft landing near the Moon’s south pole on Aug. 23, 2023, making it the first country to reach that region and only the fourth to soft-land on the lunar surface.
A person walks past a mural of Chandrayaan-3. Chandrayaan-3, India’s third lunar mission, achieved a soft landing near the Moon’s south pole on Aug. 23, 2023, making it the first country to reach that region and only the fourth to soft-land on the lunar surface. © Getty Images
×

In a nutshell

  • India’s space program evolved from a development tool to a strategic asset
  • Domestic needs compete with defense and technology for limited resources
  • China and Pakistan continue to constrain India’s long-term focus
  • For comprehensive insights, tune into our AI-powered podcast here.

As great power competition intensifies, strategic rivalry now extends into space as well as land, sea and air. There is no single model for spacepower. China ties its program to national renewal and long-term influence. Russia, facing economic and demographic challenges, focuses on denying others advantages and disrupting the West. India, however, follows its own path.

Operation Sindoor, launched in May 2025 after the Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed dozens of civilians in Jammu and Kashmir, was designed as a calibrated set of precision strikes rather than a full-scale war. It was widely seen as another episode in the longstanding India-Pakistan rivalry. But the operation also showed that Indian military power had become more integrated. Intelligence, precision strikes, cyber capabilities, homegrown technology and space-based support were now working together as part of a single campaign.

In November 2024, India conducted Antariksha Abhyas, its first military exercise focused on space operations. Few outside experts noticed, but it was a dramatic shift because Indian planners now had to consider what might happen if access to communications, navigation, surveillance and other space tools were lost during a crisis. Space had evolved from a matter of prestige and development into a crucial element of military planning.

May 7, 2025, New Delhi: Wing Commander Vyomika Singh (right) of the Indian Air Force briefs the media on Operation Sindoor. The precision strikes that followed the Pahalgam attack drew on integrated capabilities, including space-based support for intelligence, navigation and targeting.
May 7, 2025, New Delhi: Wing Commander Vyomika Singh (right) of the Indian Air Force briefs the media on Operation Sindoor. The precision strikes that followed the Pahalgam attack drew on integrated capabilities, including space-based support for intelligence, navigation and targeting. © Getty Images

There is little doubt that India is a spacepower. Its achievements include indigenous launch systems, lunar missions, an anti-satellite test, a growing private space sector and ambitious plans for human spaceflight.

The real challenge lies elsewhere. New Delhi now aims far beyond South Asia, yet much of its focus remains rooted in the region. China continues to exert pressure along the Line of Actual Control (a notional demarcation line that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory on their mutual border) and to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan can still trigger a military crisis with little warning, and terrorism often disrupts diplomacy. At the same time, economic growth and domestic issues require resources on a scale that older spacepowers did not face.

India is stepping into a broader strategic world, but it cannot leave behind the region that shaped its history. This tension will shape both the scale of its space program and the kind of spacepower it becomes.

Grand strategy and strategic culture

India’s strategic inheritance extends far beyond independence in 1947. Kautilya’s Arthashastra, an early demonstration of realism in international relations written centuries before the modern state system, addressed intelligence, diplomacy, internal order, alliances, war, economics and the calculation of power. Friendship was never treated as permanent, nor was hostility. Circumstances changed. Interests endured.

India seeks room for maneuver. It deepens defense cooperation with the United States while maintaining important military ties with Russia. It participates in the Quad but continues to position itself as a leader of the Global Majority, and it joined the Artemis Accords in 2023 (the U.S.-led framework for civil lunar exploration) without indicating any desire to place Indian policy under permanent American direction.

Viewed through an alliance framework, these positions can appear inconsistent. Viewed through the older Indian concern for freedom of action, they make much more sense.

Jan. 26, 2020, New Delhi: The Defense Research and Development Organization’s anti-satellite missile from Mission Shakti is displayed during the 71st Republic Day parade.
Jan. 26, 2020, New Delhi: The Defense Research and Development Organization’s anti-satellite missile from Mission Shakti is displayed during the 71st Republic Day parade. © Getty Images

The burden of the region

India’s geography has rarely allowed it to deal with just one problem at a time.

China is India’s main long-term rival. The 1962 war is still remembered, and ongoing clashes along the Line of Actual Control keep those memories alive. China’s influence now extends beyond the Himalayas. Its ports, investments, naval activities and Belt and Road Initiative projects have spread the competition across the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan creates a distinct pressure, posing immediate risks through border clashes, terrorism, violence in Kashmir and nuclear escalation. A crisis could erupt before New Delhi decides whether Islamabad is the main issue or merely a distraction from Beijing.

There are also issues that do not appear on military maps. These include infrastructure, energy, poverty, corruption, social tension and the expectations of a population exceeding 1 billion, all competing with defense and technology for attention.

Great powers often set priorities as if they can tackle one challenge at a time, but India rarely has that option. It must prepare for China, handle Pakistan, fight terrorism, secure the Indian Ocean, modernize its economy, manage social tension and poverty, and expand its global role simultaneously.

This constant pressure helps explain why Indian policy can seem cautious and why progress sometimes looks uneven. India is ambitious, but its strategic environment often interrupts long-term focus.

Spacepower and the problem of integration

India’s space program began with development goals rather than military competition. Domestic needs – communications, agriculture, weather, education, remote sensing and disaster relief – justified public spending. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) earned its reputation by delivering useful results with fewer resources than the U.S. or the Soviet Union required.

Scientific successes broadened India’s ambitions. Missions such as Chandrayaan and the Mars Orbiter Mission, along with improved launch systems, earned the country global recognition and strengthened national confidence in technology.

Military needs came later. Mission Shakti demonstrated India’s anti-satellite capability in 2019, drawing international concern. The Defense Space Agency was created as military reliance on satellites increased. The 2023 Indian Space Policy opened more of the sector to private companies. Human spaceflight, plans for a future Indian station, commercial launches and lunar missions have brought in even more players and goals.

Space requires cooperation between scientists, the military, ministries, universities, companies, diplomats and foreign partners. This can cause bureaucratic friction, but it is also one of the few areas where different mechanisms of Indian power must work together regularly.

The government has not established a separate military branch comparable to the U.S. Space Force. It uses a distributed structure centered on the Defense Space Agency, ISRO, the Defense Research and Development Organization, the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Center, NewSpace India, the Integrated Defense Staff and private companies. This approach could reflect caution or limited resources, or it might indicate a preference for building capability before deciding on a final structure.

Not having a separate space force does not mean India is less serious about military space. It may simply mean that New Delhi has not yet decided how much to separate the military side from the broader national effort. Institutions often reveal an unfinished strategy, sometimes more clearly than speeches.

Strategic autonomy beyond Earth

American expectations regarding India have grown alongside China’s rise. New Delhi is often described as the natural democratic counterweight to Beijing, and there is ample evidence supporting closer cooperation. Intelligence sharing, defense technology, Quad diplomacy, commercial investment and space partnerships have all expanded.

India cooperates with the U.S. because it strengthens India’s power. However, the same government that works with Washington also maintains relations with Moscow, participates in BRICS and preserves diplomatic ties across the developing world. This is the continuation of Indian statecraft under new conditions.

More by Lamont Colucci

Space cooperation follows the same pattern. Artemis offers access, standards, scientific partnerships and influence over emerging institutions, while commercial ties strengthen domestic industry. This kind of joint activity helps India close technological gaps. As India grows stronger, it may become a closer partner, but stronger partners are often more independent as well.

This matters because the next disputes will not all involve China. Lunar resources, commercial rules, data access, technology controls, orbital security and leadership within new institutions may create differences between Washington and New Delhi even as broader cooperation continues.

India need not be hostile to be firm, and independence should not automatically be mistaken for hostility. The West should not be surprised if India becomes more willing to diverge sharply on key issues. History offers few examples of rising powers permanently defining their interests by another state’s priorities. India is unlikely to be the exception.

A wider geography

For centuries, Indian strategy was bounded by the Himalayas, the Indian Ocean and the subcontinent. Those limits have not disappeared, but they are now joined by another geography. Cislunar routes (the region between Earth and the Moon), communications networks, lunar polar regions, orbital positions and the infrastructure connecting Earth to the Moon will matter increasingly as activity expands beyond low Earth orbit.

India’s interest in Artemis, lunar exploration, Gaganyaan (its human spaceflight program), a future national station and commercial development suggest that New Delhi understands the risk of arriving too late. Leaders have long been sensitive to exclusion from institutions created without their participation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, technology controls and debates over membership in international regimes have all reinforced the lesson that rules written by others can become instruments of power.

India does not intend to simply watch the next order emerge from the outside. Its position is unusual. Although it did not create the first space age, it has arrived early enough to help shape the next one. Whether it can sustain that effort while regional crises continue to demand attention remains unresolved.

×

Facts & figures

Key milestones of India’s space program

  1. 1962Indian National Committee for Space Research formed
  2. 1969Indian Space Research Organization established
  3. 1975Aryabhata, first Indian satellite launched
  4. 1980SLV-3, first indigenous orbital satellite launched
  5. 1984Rakesh Sharma becomes the first Indian in space
  6. 2008Chandrayaan-1, first lunar mission (detects water on the Moon)
  7. 2013-2014Mangalyaan, first Asian nation to reach Mars on its maiden attempt
  8. 2017ISRO launches 104 satellites in a single flight
  9. 2019Chandrayaan-2 launched; Mission Shakti – India's first successful anti-satellite test (4th country with this capability)
  10. 2023Chandrayaan-3 soft-lands near the lunar south pole (first nation to do so)
  11. 2023-2024Aditya-L1, first solar mission
  12. 2024-2025SpaDeX, successful space docking
  13. 2025NISAR (NASA-ISRO Earth-observing mission) launched
  14. NextGaganyaan crewed mission (targeted around 2027)

An unfinished transition

India already has the human talent and technological foundation required to remain a serious space actor. The more difficult question is political and strategic. Can the country connect its scientific institutions, armed forces, private companies, diplomacy, industrial ambitions and civilizational confidence over a period long enough to produce enduring power?

That question has followed India beyond space. Economic reform, military modernization, diplomacy and development have all advanced, though rarely at the same pace. Success in one field has not always produced cohesion across the state. Space could be different because so many institutions must participate in it. It might also reproduce the same fragmentation on a more expensive scale.

The outcome will emerge over time from budgets, institutions, crises, partnerships and choices about where India wants to stand as the Earth-Moon system becomes a more contested political arena.

India is trying to act globally without ceasing to be strategically occupied by its own region. That may prove the defining characteristic of its rise.

India’s future as a spacepower will depend not only on engineering but also on whether the country can translate its achievements into a coherent national strategy. If India succeeds, it will help build a more independent and multipolar international order rather than simply joining one led by the U.S. or China. If not, it may remain a technologically advanced power whose influence is constrained by the demands of South Asia.

×

Scenarios

Most likely: Regional compression

In this scenario, India continues to make technological progress, but ongoing crises make it hard to stay focused on long-term strategy. If another major conflict with Pakistan erupts, unrest in Kashmir intensifies or military pressure from China continues, New Delhi will have to redirect its attention and defense budget to urgent security needs. Space programs will go on, but big long-term projects will be delayed. Defense-space spending is increasingly driven by immediate military needs, squeezing longer-term investment in lunar and cislunar programs. Space programs continue, but major long-term projects are delayed. Commercial investment slows as policy priorities shift reactively rather than strategically.

Meanwhile, China continues to build its strength in the Indian Ocean and increase its influence in the Earth-Moon system, while India remains focused on local issues.

Somewhat likely: Strategic integration

In this scenario, India steadily integrates military modernization, commercial space efforts, diplomacy and technological innovation into a unified national strategy. This results in a space program that is not only larger but also stronger and more adaptable. As government policies become clearer, private investment grows. India develops more of its own launch capabilities, and military and civilian planning work more closely together. A stronger commercial space sector generates returns that fund further expansion of indigenous military capability.

India becomes a key leader in shaping the Earth-Moon system alongside the U.S. and its partners. While it maintains strategic independence, it relies more on its own capabilities than on balancing among other countries, establishing itself as an independent pole in the emerging cislunar order.

Likely in the long term: Strategic independence

As India’s economy, military and technology grow, its foreign policy becomes more independent rather than more closely tied to others. India continues to work with the U.S. on defense, business and space, but disagreements arise over lunar rules, technology sharing, commercial regulations and the organization of the Earth-Moon system. India seeks to reshape the international system to better align with its own priorities.

New Delhi assumes independent leadership in select space institutions and gradually helps build a multipolar space order that neither Washington nor Beijing fully controls. By the 2040s, New Delhi acts less like a junior partner and more like an independent power whose support must be earned rather than taken for granted.

Contact us today for tailored geopolitical insights and industry-specific advisory services.

Related reports

Scroll to top