Who will win the competition for influence in Syria?
Syria’s future is troubled by continuing massacres of minority communities, yet the country holds promise as Saudi Arabia looks set to wield the most influence.
In a nutshell
- Iranian, most Russian forces withdrew from Syria, shifting power dynamics
- Resource limitations of Turkiye and Israel may temper their influence in Syria
- Saudis likely to help Damascus normalize relations, launch reconstruction
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Violence erupted suddenly in Damascus at midday on July 9, after months of rising tensions. Mobs of Muslim men tore through the Christian quarters, murdering men and women, forcibly taking children and converting them to Islam, burning and pillaging homes, churches and monasteries. Ahmed Pasha, the local ruler, stood aside and did not order his troops to confront the mob. After seven days, order was finally restored and a new governor was appointed, but an estimated 5,000 were dead (nearly one third of the city’s Christians) and large parts of the ancient city were razed to the ground.
This was the 1860 massacre, memorably recounted in British historian Eugene Rogan’s latest book, “The Damascus Events.” Some analysts view it as the beginning of the modern Middle East. In its aftermath, Arab Christian intellectuals sought a new basis for common ground with their Muslim neighbors, landing on the concept of ethnic Arab nationalism (largely a Levantine Christian invention). Other Christians emigrated, forming the basis for Arab communities in Europe, the United States and South America. European powers led by France promoted the idea of a majority Christian enclave within Syria – to be called Lebanon – as a way of protecting Christians against repeats of this massacre.
Could there be renewed massacres of minorities in today’s Syria? That certainly is a realistic fear. In December 2024, former jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa and his Sunni Arab militia organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly designated a terrorist group) toppled the Assad regime and by March of this year had established an interim government.
It didn’t take long before minority communities in Syria came under attack. In March and April, militia forces affiliated with the new regime massacred over 1,400 members of the minority Alawite community (the core support for the Assad regime) in the coastal province of Latakia. In June, a bomb exploded in the historic Mar Elias Church in Damascus, killing 30 and wounding over 50 worshippers during a service. In July, regime security forces entered the Druze city of al-Suwaida in southwest Syria and massacred several hundred civilians, triggering an Israeli Air Force retaliatory strike on the Syrian Army.
Another fear is that Syria could become a battleground between two U.S. allies, Turkiye and Israel. Turkiye has provided political and military support to President Sharaa, who assumed office in January, and his government. The Syrian Druze enjoy support from Israel (where the Druze are a patriotic minority, serving in the military and in senior government posts) and Israel – now holding a swathe of southern Syrian territory for security reasons – overflies Syria on its way to attack Iran.
Syria after Assad
Concerns with the new Syria, including scenarios of intercommunal violence and Israel-Turkiye conflict, are not far-fetched. The jihadist ideology of Mr. Sharaa’s base of support allows for no toleration of heterodox split-offs from Islam, such as the Druze and the Alawis. The non-Arab minority Kurds have long been marginalized inside Syria. In times of political turmoil, Syrians often retreat into their ethnic and religious communities, and feelings of Syrian nationalism recede. But the very weakness of the al-Sharaa regime – based mainly on a relatively small fighting force – may serve to allow for a continuation of the status quo whereby the minority communities’ militias are tolerated and their de facto autonomy within Syria continues.
Along with scenarios of intercommunal tensions and even violence are two very positive developments in Syria: The Iranians and Russians are gone. If this trend holds, and Syria’s interim government is able to rein in intercommunal violence, then Syria could become a cornerstone in building a more stable, less threatening Middle East.
If this trend holds and Syria’s interim government is able to rein in intercommunal violence, Syria could become a cornerstone in building a more stable, less threatening Middle East.
Under Bashar al-Assad, Syria hosted a large Russian naval base at Tartus and an airbase near Latakia. Iran (and its proxies) had tens of thousands of militia forces in Syria and was building missile bases there. After former President Assad fell, the Russians withdrew their ships and planes (though some personnel remain behind in the bases), and Iran pulled out all of its forces. Mr. Sharaa has publicly vowed not to allow back either Iran or its proxies.
Alone among Arab rulers, he has remained silent and not condemned the Israeli attacks on Iran. Syria under Mr. Sharaa has confiscated Iranian arms shipments on its eastern border intended for Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Israel’s air campaign against Iran would not have been possible under the Assad regime, when Russia controlled Syria’s airspace. During the 12-day war with Iran, the Israeli Air Force flew over Syria unchallenged en route to Iran.
What about Turkiye?
Turkiye has long had a troubled relationship with Syria. In 1938 the founder and first president of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, engineered a referendum in the Syrian province of Alexandretta (home of historic Antioch) allowing him to annex it and give it the Turkish name of Hatay. Later, in the 1990s, when Syria hosted the Kurdish terrorist group PKK, which has recently promised to disarm, Turkiye several times threatened to invade Syria. From the Syrian viewpoint, there are long and bitter memories of 400 years of Turkish domination under the Ottoman empire.
During the recent Syrian civil war, Turkiye used its own proxies to establish a buffer zone inside Syria along the border, and it supported rebel forces led by Mr. Sharaa in the northern province of Idlib. With Mr. Sharaa now in Damascus, Turkiye is a contender to replace Russia and Iran as the preeminent foreign power in Syria.
Facts & figures
Territorial control in Syria
But that expectation is likely to be frustrated. Turkiye under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may intend to expand its influence throughout the Middle East, starting in Syria, but it simply lacks the financial resources to sustain such an expansion. Turkiye’s economy remains structurally dependent on short-term capital inflows from abroad, leaving it vulnerable to shocks from outside. In October 2019, when President Erdogan threatened to invade the Kurdish northeast part of Syria, then U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to “totally destroy and obliterate the Turkish economy” if Mr. Erdogan were to intervene with troops. Mr. Erdogan backed off.
Turkiye’s mismatch between ambitions and resources well predates President Erdogan. For instance, in the 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkiye gained an opportunity to reach out to its Turkic cousins in Central Asia and announced grandiose plans to replace Russian influence in these newly created states. But, back then, Ankara was not able to compete with Moscow for influence in Central Asia.
Likewise in Syria, Turkiye will likely not be able to dominate the new government. As in Central Asia, Turkish companies will help with reconstruction, and Turkish consumer goods will enter the market. But Turkiye lacks the deep pockets needed to significantly finance the national reconstruction of Syria. In addition, the Turkish military lacks the kind of air force (and air defense) to prevent others from using Syrian air space.
What about Israel?
As for Israel, it has neither the intention nor the resources to dominate Syria. Its interests are limited to ensuring a peaceful northern border and, ideally, forging the kind of relationship with Syria that it currently enjoys with Jordan, which provides a strategic buffer for Israel with threats coming from Iran.
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The risks of clashes between Israel and Turkiye in Syria are currently being mitigated. In May, Azerbaijan, an ally of both countries, hosted month-long talks between Turkish and Israeli military officers that resulted in the establishment of a hotline to avert clashes. In addition, Turkiye and Israel maintain direct diplomatic ties, despite President Erdogan’s hot rhetoric toward Israel, and private-sector trade ties remain fairly robust, regardless of frequent political turmoil.
The likely major influence in the new Syria: Saudi Arabia
The Middle Eastern country with both the resources and the interest in supplanting Iran and Russia in Syria is Saudi Arabia. During President Trump’s May visit to Riyadh, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman brokered a brief meeting between the president and Syria’s Mr. Sharaa. President Trump agreed to lift U.S. sanctions on Syria at the crown prince’s request. Billboards in Damascus proclaimed “thank you” to the U.S. president and the Saudi crown prince. The Saudi foreign minister followed up with a meeting in Damascus where he said the kingdom would “be at the forefront of helping Syria rebuild and revive its economy.”
The Middle Eastern country with both the resources and the interest in supplanting Iran and Russia in Syria is Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is best placed to serve as Syria’s reconstruction partner not just economically but also politically, as it has a recent history of rejecting fundamentalist Islam and rehabilitating jihadists. This history might prove relevant to Syria’s new government in dealing with the Islamist militia groups that support the al-Sharaa regime but are taking advantage of the current political chaos to target heterodox Shia communities.
Scenarios
Syria’s interim government has formally been in power only since late March and remains untested, especially in its relations with the country’s many religious and ethnic minorities, some of which are regionally concentrated and able to resist central control from Damascus for the time being. Three scenarios are possible, with the most positive one most likely but two others, much more negative for Syrians, always a possibility in the Middle East.
Most likely: Syria tolerates de facto autonomy in minority regions; follows Saudi Arabia’s pro-Western posture
In this scenario, Syria’s interim government under Mr. Sharaa does not seek to disarm either the Kurdish or the Druze militia in their home provinces, thus tolerating de facto autonomy in the country’s northeast and southwest. This presumes continued central government weakness and international pressure on the government to not allow massacres of the country’s minorities. This de facto autonomy may eventually lead to a federal government in Syria under a new constitution or it may remain an informal albeit fairly stable arrangement.
Saudi Arabia emerges as the main patron of Syria, the leader in financing its economic reconstruction and reintegrating the country into the community of nations. While the U.S. and Israel have significantly weakened Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities, Israel still remains in hot conflict in Gaza. Syria will maintain cool but distant relations with Israel, waiting for a signal from Saudi Arabia before normalizing with Israel. That will likely only appear once there is some political progress between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Turkiye will remain engaged in Syria, especially in the north. But Mr. Sharaa will not feel obliged to follow President Erdogan’s lead on foreign policy and won’t rely on Turkish-supported militias to enforce central government control in minority communities of Syria. Instead, the new Syria will follow the Saudi lead in seeking to align with an American-supported, pro-Western alliance in the Middle East. A key condition to this scenario is that the al-Sharaa regime is able over time to rein in jihadist militia and limit their murderous rampages in the minority communities of Syria.
Less likely: The al-Sharaa government implodes and civil war reignites
The al-Sharaa government could prove incapable of reining in its jihadist elements who are taking violent revenge on heterodox religious minorities, especially the Alawites and the Druze, reigniting Syria’s civil war. The country is carved up between Kurdish, Alawite, Druze and Arab Sunni enclaves, each with a different international patron. This is unlikely, however, given the Syrian public’s utter exhaustion after 14 years of civil war and international isolation, and the overwhelming popular desire to reconstruct civic life and resume normalcy. But continuing violence always remains an option in Syria, especially given long-standing animosities held by jihadists for minorities.
Least likely: Turkiye beats Saudi Arabia to a leading position of influence in Syria
In the event that Ankara finds the wherewithal to establish a series of military bases throughout Syria, including near Damascus, it could use this military presence to become the main foreign power in the country. Saudi Arabia’s influence would be limited to financing reconstruction. The new Syria follows Turkiye’s lead on foreign policy, including a more confrontational and hostile position towards Israel, and becomes aligned more with the BRICS countries than with the West. But as Saudi Arabia, not Turkiye, has the means and interest to become the leading foreign actor in Syria, this scenario is far less likely.
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