A possible Saudi Arabia-Israel-United States triangle
The Trump administration is poised to swiftly reassert U.S. influence in the Middle East, aiming to rebalance the region’s dynamics in favor of its key allies.
In a nutshell
- Donald Trump’s Middle East policies are predictable, based on his record
- He aims to realign the region’s power balance to favor U.S. national interests
- Key U.S. allies may go along with this plan, but the devil is in the details
Few relationships will determine the future of security, peace and prosperity in the Middle East more than the cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Israel and the United States. The reelection of President Donald Trump, who begins his second term on January 20, 2025, will be a dynamic factor in shaping this three-way relationship, with implications that extend far beyond the region’s borders impacting geopolitical developments in Europe, Africa and the Indo-Pacific.
The new president’s priorities
There is every expectation that President Trump will return to the Oval Office with three priorities for renewed U.S. policy on the Middle East. One is a return to “maximum pressure” against the regime in Iran, which includes cutting off its sources of hard currency revenue, further weakening Tehran’s surrogates and isolating the regime politically and diplomatically.
The second priority will be reinvigorating the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship, in particular reaffirming Washington’s support and aid for Israel’s defense. There is a strong belief in Washington that the Trump administration will withdraw support for a “two-state solution” and instead back Israel’s plans for the future of Gaza and the West Bank.
Third, the U.S. will actively pursue the expansion of the Abraham Accords, which normalized diplomatic relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco during President Trump’s first term. Additionally, the U.S. will reaffirm its strong support for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and other interconnectivity initiatives.
There is a strong likelihood that both Riyadh and Jerusalem already understand the incoming administration’s intentions.
In addition to these priorities, expect the new administration to take a leadership role in combating the “global intifada,” which aims to demonize and isolate the state of Israel. The U.S. will likely play a prominent role in defending Israel in international and multinational forums while emphasizing support for Israel and Israeli interests in bilateral relations. The Trump administration could also seek to weaken the funding and leadership of networks that support antisemitism and anti-Zionism campaigns.
Upon entering office, the administration is expected to immediately launch a campaign to aggressively expand U.S. energy exports while supporting initiatives that promote reliable, affordable and abundant conventional energy for friends, partners and allies. At the same time, the administration will seek to diminish Iranian and Russian energy export revenue.
Finally, expect the U.S. to emphasize countering Chinese influence globally, an effort likely to include diminishing Beijing’s intrusive activities in both the Middle East and Africa while providing regional actors with alternative paths for partnership, development and investment.
These initiatives, which could be implemented from the first days of Mr. Trump’s second administration, will significantly affect the character of the relationship between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the U.S.
There is a strong likelihood that both Riyadh and Jerusalem already understand the incoming administration’s intentions. Leaders in both countries have experience working with Mr. Trump and many of his team. All parties will likely begin with clear views of each other’s priorities.
Challenge from China
The most significant variable affecting the U.S.-Saudi-Israeli trilateral relationship may not be the state of combat operations in the Red Sea, Gaza or Lebanon, but rather the challenge of Beijing.
Two of the most notable Saudi initiatives in recent years have been efforts to liberalize and expand opportunities in the country and to engage more with the West while increasingly engaging China.
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has become noticeably more open to China, particularly as the regional policies of President Joe Biden’s administration have floundered. President Biden has largely been indifferent to China’s encroaching influence in the region. At the start of his presidency, he was openly critical of the Saudi Arabian government and disinterested in the Abraham Accords. Furthermore, his administration explored engagement with Iran, which directly contributed to heightened instability in the region.
Given President Biden’s slights and missteps, Riyadh perceived few risks in strengthening ties with Beijing, even as tensions between the U.S. and China continue to escalate on various fronts. This includes China’s failure to take a meaningful role in addressing Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.
Donald Trump returns to power viewing Beijing’s global efforts as the primary challenge to American security and prosperity.
For its part, Beijing seeks to bring Saudi Arabia and its sovereign wealth fund into China’s sphere of interest as its own cash reserves for international ventures dwindle. Beijing views Saudi Arabia as a market for Chinese technology and a political target. It understands that establishing a sphere of influence in the Middle East requires direct engagement with the regime in Riyadh.
As a result of this strategy, China is now a major investor in the Middle East, while in turn, Saudi Arabia has invested large sums in China. In addition, the Saudis are increasingly reliant on Chinese technology rather than that of the U.S. or Israel.
In stark contrast, Israel’s relations with China have clearly soured, while the Trump administration returns to power viewing Beijing’s global efforts as the primary challenge to American security and prosperity.
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While China does not yet pose an immediate threat to the vital interests of the U.S. or Israel in the Middle East, there is a lingering question regarding how much Washington’s new leadership will tolerate partner countries strengthening ties with Beijing while expecting to remain secure under an American regional security umbrella. President-elect Trump has already expressed deep dissatisfaction with European and Asian allies for not equitably sharing burdens. One can only wonder if this policy could extend to friends and allies in the Middle East.
The Iran dilemma
According to this author’s sources, despite the Trump team’s well-known enmity toward the Iranian regime, there are expectations among some in Riyadh that President Trump will cut a separate deal with Tehran. This could threaten Saudi interests and force Riyadh to continue balancing relationships with Russia, China and Iran.
While it is true that Mr. Trump likes to make deals, those who know him well argue that he does not like to make bad deals, so the prospects for an agreement with Tehran that satisfies U.S. or Israeli interests are nearly zero. The U.S. and Israel, for example, are unlikely to compromise on the imperative of eliminating a potential nuclear threat and will insist on restricting the Iranian ballistic missile program.
Some fear that the Israeli government’s ongoing interest in a normalization pact will only increase the cost Saudi Arabia places on a deal.
Another complicating factor could arise if Tehran decides to declare itself a nuclear power – an announcement that, regardless of the regime’s actual nuclear capabilities, would trigger a significant wave of policy reassessment in the region, Europe and the U.S., if not an outright military response.
Israel’s fears
In contrast to Riyadh’s concerns about Washington’s new nuclear deal with Iran, there is greater apprehension in Jerusalem regarding an aggressive U.S. push for Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize ties under the Abraham Accords, which could create serious strategic risks for Israel. The worry is that Riyadh may demand a price that is too high. Some fear that the Israeli government’s ongoing interest in a normalization pact will only increase the cost Saudi Arabia places on a deal. Mr. Trump’s enthusiasm for rapprochement could in fact exacerbate the situation.
Scenarios
With so many moving parts, only a foggy picture of how the three governments will navigate their conflicting interests and strategies emerges. Nevertheless, two broad scenarios are in the offing.
Likely: U.S. initiatives proceed as anticipated
President-elect Trump is likely to enter office with a well-defined maximum-pressure campaign for Iran and policies aimed at reassuring Israel. The U.S. is expected to strongly support the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. Washington will also make every effort to increase U.S. energy exports, which will undoubtedly impact oil and natural gas prices.
In addition, expect the U.S. to respond decisively to attacks on freedom of transit in the Red Sea. The ripple effects of these actions will likely influence negotiations over the Abraham Accords and reshape regional relations with China, significantly altering the security landscape in the area.
It is unlikely that the U.S. will face significant blowback if it backs away from support for the two-state solution – President Trump already did so during his first term and received little international opposition.
Historically, the Iranian regime tends to become more risk-averse when faced with resolute confrontation. The Iranians will likely soften their positions again in response to President Trump’s firm approaches. Furthermore, Tehran may receive only limited support from Beijing and Moscow, as both capitals could come under increased pressure from Washington.
Unlikely: The U.S. and China enter a grand bargain
The second, less likely scenario could include the resolution of conflicts in both Ukraine and the Middle East. This recalls discussions of a “G2 deal,” a compromise between Washington and Beijing that was proposed years ago.
The notion from 2014, however, received no serious consideration at the time in either capital. The idea will almost certainly not be revived, as the level of distrust between the Chinese regime and the incoming U.S. administration could not be higher. Furthermore, evidence of persistent weakness in China’s economy and increasing concerns from U.S. friends and allies regarding the Beijing regime’s behavior suggest that China is not in a strong enough position to close such a deal. Nevertheless, Mr. Trump has reportedly extended Mr. Xi an invitation to his inauguration.
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