Russia’s Eurasian ambitions prompt Japan’s strategic response
Japan needs to adapt its security strategy and strengthen alliances in response to rising tensions with Russia and China.
In a nutshell
- Japan faces a severe security challenge from Russia and China
- Threats may undermine Japan’s socioeconomic and security foundations
- The war in Ukraine and Donald Trump’s second term are contributing factors
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In a sober assessment of Japan’s geopolitical situation, its government states that “Japan is finding itself in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.” This is driven in part by the new threat from Russia.
In 1992, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama proclaimed that the West’s victory in the Cold War marked “the end of history.” At that time, it appeared that the world had exhausted all credible alternatives to liberal democracy, the rule of law and the market economy. Yet, three decades later, globalization – driven by the industrialized West – faces challenges from revived forces of protectionism and nationalism. Japan, reliant on global stability, is particularly vulnerable to these shifts.
Japan’s new security reality
It has been some time since Japan became the preferred East Asian partner for economic and political decision-makers from the West. For years, Japan has held the unique status of being the sole Asian, non-European and non-American nation accepted into the world’s most exclusive circles, namely the Trilateral Commission and the G7. Within a generation, Japan rose to become the world’s second-largest economy. Unlike China’s recent ascent to this status through centrally planned, communist mechanisms and mercantile foreign policy, Japan’s advancement was achieved within a system of democracy and the rule of law.
The country’s success mirrored the approach taken by post-World War II Germany. Following the war’s devastation, both nations focused on economic reconstruction while renouncing military strength. They relied on open global markets, which empowered their export industries to thrive. Simultaneously, they effectively “outsourced” their military defense to the United States.
Japan and Germany secured their protection at a relatively low cost, allowing them to allocate significant resources to domestic welfare and socioeconomic development. It was widely assumed that the American defense umbrella would prove effective in times of crisis and that the breakup of the Soviet Union had permanently eliminated the threat of Russian imperialism.
That assumption gave way to a new reality with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, following the Kremlin’s interference in Romania, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan and reported tensions with the Baltic states, Scandinavia and Poland. Even more so since the invasion, Russia has become the central focus of concerns held by NATO and the European Union. Statements made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in February 2025 during bilateral talks with U.S. officials in Saudi Arabia should draw the world’s attention to Moscow’s imperial ambitions and goal to become the dominant Eurasian power, putting democracies in East Asia on notice. These developments underscore the multifaceted geopolitical challenges facing Japan.
Russo-Japanese tensions
Recently, when Tokyo raised the issue of the Northern Territories, a group of disputed islands currently under Russian control, the Kremlin reminded the world that a peace treaty between Russia and Japan, which would settle the legacy of World War II, remains unsigned.
The 20th century was marked by conflict between the two nations, beginning with the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). With the decisive defeat of Russia’s navy in the Battle of Tsushima in 1905, Japan became the first Asian power to vanquish a major European force. In a broader context, the outcome of this war fueled Japan’s imperialist ambitions.
Following Japan’s unconditional surrender at the end of World War II, the country underwent a significant transformation. As the primary occupying force, the U.S. demanded that Emperor Hirohito not only relinquish his powers but also abandon his divine status. Consequently, Japan adopted a new constitution in 1947, which includes Article 9, renouncing war as a means of self-defense, and this remains in place today.
The shadow of World War II continues to affect Russo-Japanese relations. This lingering influence stems from the Yalta Agreement, which granted Joseph Stalin control over the Japanese Kuril Islands as part of the concessions for the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Pacific War (1941-1945).
The Kuril Islands dispute remains a key obstacle to a formal agreement, with Moscow viewing the islands as Russian territory and Tokyo seeking the full return of what it calls the Northern Territories. The most recent talks on this issue occurred in 2019 during a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Current tensions suggest that resolving the Kuril issue remains challenging.
Over the past few decades, the relationship between the Russian Federation and Japan has been relatively subdued, despite opportunities for greater engagement. With the increasing vulnerability of distant supply chains, Japan has compelling reasons to pursue energy and raw materials in the Russian Far East.
Facts & figures
The Kuril Islands dispute
China-Russia alliance: A growing threat to Japan
Today, the once-robust security cooperation between Japan and the U.S. has fractured. The strong relations established during U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term with Prime Minister Abe have not been sustained. Japan now faces the same uncertainties and pressures as other U.S. allies, such as South Korea, Australia and the Philippines in the Pacific, and the EU along the Atlantic. Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow have forged a “no-limits” alliance. Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin maintain a strong relationship, and the two countries have built a more solid alliance than at any point since the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
The growing Sino-Russian cooperation raises significant concerns in Tokyo. Until the invasion of Ukraine, the military aspect of Tokyo’s geopolitical considerations focused largely on strategic planning, existing or emerging security forums such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), bilateral or multilateral exercises and intelligence exchanges.
Now, Russia is waging a hot war, which provides a backdrop for a new Japanese assessment of the potential of a Sino-Russo Alliance. Tokyo is confronted by a security environment demanding more military hardware and personnel, necessitating significantly higher defense spending. Moreover, with the volatility of Washington’s security policy in the Trump era, Japan – like countries throughout Europe − must urgently expand its domestic defense production.
China’s emergence as an economic and military power, alongside Russia’s assertive foreign policy, has intensified debates in Japan about repealing Article 9. If a referendum on amending the country’s constitution were held, a majority might support the article’s abolition. The growing alliance between Moscow and Beijing is likely to strengthen the influence of security hawks in Japan. The repeated intrusion of Russian military aircraft into Japanese airspace in recent months signals the increased use of intimidation in the region.
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For many years, Tokyo took comfort in the then backwardness of the Chinese military and relied on the deep historical distrust between the two countries. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon capitalized on this mistrust by leveraging Mao Zedong’s China as part of their strategy to contain the Soviet Union. Today, however, the “no-limits” China-Russia alliance eliminates this strategic advantage, forcing Japan to confront a unified threat that demands greater military preparedness and a potential reevaluation of its pacifist constitution.
Scenarios
Unlikely for now: Russia and China return to mutual distrust
At present, there are no signs that Russia and China will revert to their historical mutual suspicions, although unexpected shifts can always occur in the world of dictatorships. However, their alignment becomes even more concerning when considering that the implicit security guarantee to Japan from the U.S. – a fellow democracy – in a serious crisis is now in question. This shift produces uncertainty over the reliability of such an alliance when it is needed most.
At issue is whether Japan’s security treaty with the U.S. would hold up if China, possibly backed by Russia, were to invade the Japanese Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Yet, it seems highly unlikely that Washington would engage in a full-blown war with China over these uninhabited islets.
Unlikely: A Russo-Japanese understanding
Currently, there is no indication that tensions will ease soon. As long as Japan continues to support Ukraine in its self-defense, there seems to be little chance of the Kremlin considering a rapprochement with Tokyo. Conversely, a tougher stance toward Japan could be part of the quid pro quo that Moscow needs to offer as compensation for the significant military and economic backing it has received from Beijing.
Ultimately, Japan’s present situation hinges largely not on the limited direct interactions between Moscow and Tokyo, but rather on the significant exchanges occurring between the Kremlin and the White House, which Japan cannot influence. What is particularly concerning are the dealings between President Trump and his administration with President Putin and Russia. The volatile nature of President Trump presents challenges for the Japanese. They have to recognize that Mr. Trump is engaged in his own negotiations with President Putin without consulting or informing Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Whether Japan’s economic heft will make President Trump more receptive to Japanese security concerns about Russia is uncertain.
Most likely: A three-pronged strategy
Japan faces limited options now that Russia seems to be pursuing aggressive imperialism in the far east of the Eurasian landmass. Tokyo recognizes that Russia can conduct large-scale military exercises in its remote eastern regions while engaging in a protracted and bloody conflict on its western fronts. Under these circumstances, the most likely scenario is for Japan to adopt a three-pronged strategy.
Keeping the U.S. engaged in and committed to Japan’s security
The first element of this scenario, a reinforced alliance with the U.S., appears to be manageable but will come at a significant political and economic cost to Tokyo. Japan will need to boost its military involvement, both regionally and globally. This means increasing its defense budget and shouldering a larger share of the expenses associated with American military bases on Japanese soil. It must do all of this regardless of who is in the White House.
Intensifying security cooperation with other potential allies
The second prong, already underway, includes security and military cooperation with new allies within or outside NATO that share the values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. These include but are not limited to Australia, India, the Philippines, Canada, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Such cooperation involves visits by naval units, joint exercises and security coordination in forums like the Quad, where Japan is joined by the U.S., Australia and India.
Tokyo’s relations with New Delhi hold the greatest potential and are vital for Japan’s supply chains and maritime routes in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. This dynamic will be of particular interest, as India is a significant regional contributor to the containment of China while maintaining considerable common interests with Russia.
Pursuing proactive geopolitical engagement toward China and Russia
The third and most challenging task will be Tokyo’s ability to foster a more stable Far East. Within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, there are differing opinions on engaging with Beijing and Moscow. Some members advocate for a hardline stance, while others favor a more cautious approach, wary of the security risks and economic repercussions of pursuing a hardline policy.
Economic considerations weigh less in the case of Russia than with China, as Beijing is a far larger trading partner for Tokyo than Moscow. However, Russia’s neo-imperialist approach introduces new security implications. Japan must confront a renewed threat emerging from the Eurasian continent, which presents various dangers across multiple fronts.
The growing alliance between China and Russia, coupled with a perceived decline in U.S. influence, increases pressure on Japan’s security policy. Beyond significantly enhancing military power, this requires more skillful diplomacy from Japan. Tokyo must navigate this complex landscape carefully, as both Russia and China are known for their expert foreign policy maneuvers.
The unreliability of the U.S. could persist beyond President Trump’s term, complicating Japan’s security strategy. As geopolitics shift toward a multipolar world, the interplay of new and often temporary alliances becomes particularly significant in the Far East. For the foreseeable future, Japan and South Korea, even with U.S. support, will not be able to outweigh the joint military power of Russia and China. In extreme scenarios, this situation might lead to the need for nuclear deterrence, especially as both Russia and North Korea have shown greater willingness to deploy nuclear weapons at lower thresholds.
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