Jihadist expansion destabilizes coastal West Africa
Jihadist groups are moving south from the Sahel, exploiting weak governance, local grievances and illicit economies.
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- Jihadists are turning West Africa’s coastal belt into a new front
- Borderlands, parks and weak state control enable militant expansion
- Criminal networks provide jihadists with revenue and logistical routes
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West Africa’s coastal states are undergoing a fundamental transformation as the crisis that has long defined the landlocked Sahel expands southward. With direct, porous borders with key Sahelian states such as Mali and Burkina Faso, as well as a range of domestic vulnerabilities that extremist groups have historically exploited, the West African region seems poised to become the next jihadist-related conflict hotspot.
The steady presence of jihadist groups in the Sahel since 2012, and their recent spread into Gulf of Guinea nations – especially Togo, Benin, Ghana and Ivory Coast since 2021 – reflect the increasingly regional nature of the threat facing West Africa. This security predicament is further aggravated by the growing nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime networks. The inability of civilian governments to contain the expanding threats and ensure security could place more pressure on state institutions, fuel political instability and open the door to military intervention and coups.
Security status
According to the Global Terrorism Index 2026, attacks across sub-Saharan Africa nearly doubled over the past year, from 111 to 221 incidents. The Sahel has become the global epicenter of terrorism, accounting for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2025, up from less than 1 percent in 2007.
Some indicators improved in 2025. Five Sahel countries recorded fewer incidents and fewer civilian deaths than in 2024. That progress should not obscure the wider trend: Overall lethality rose, with fewer but deadlier attacks and continued territorial expansion.
Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, has been the principal driver of expansion into coastal West Africa, using southern Burkina Faso as a staging ground. From there, JNIM units have infiltrated northern Benin, Togo and, intermittently, Ivory Coast. Another key player is JNIM’s rival, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which is also extending its reach through a growing network of local armed affiliates.
Rather than relying primarily on indiscriminate violence against civilians, these groups have increasingly adopted strategies aimed at consolidating their presence and control, building local support and asserting themselves as a de facto governing force.
Zooming in
Benin
Currently the coastal state most exposed to jihadist violence, Benin saw a surge in attacks from five in 2021 to 155 in 2024, with the military suffering record losses. The country’s geographic position makes it a strategic corridor for terrorist groups’ trafficking networks, particularly those operating from Nigeria.
The northern region includes the vast, protected W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) Complex, characterized by a limited road network and rugged terrain. This landscape gives insurgents ample opportunities to move around undetected, significantly complicating military operations and rapid responses.
The country’s security forces continue to struggle with inadequate resources to tackle the increasingly complex threat landscape. This situation stems from years of chronic underinvestment and a longstanding perception of relative stability, which has delayed necessary preparations and capability development.
Togo
Togo’s security environment has deteriorated markedly since jihadist violence first emerged in 2022, making it the second most affected country in the sub-region. While the overall number of attacks remains relatively limited – potentially reflecting Togo’s narrow 126 kilometer-long border with Burkina Faso and its heavily militarized state structure – the trajectory is concerning.
Recent incidents indicate an escalation in both scale and sophistication, exemplified by the July 2024 attack on the Kpinkankandi base, which involved an estimated 100 JNIM fighters. The attackers’ reported ability to penetrate a military installation and seize heavy weaponry underscores the growing operational capabilities of jihadist groups. Limited official reporting further obscures the threat’s scale.
Ivory Coast
The country has considerably strengthened its resilience to jihadist violence since the 2016 Grand-Bassam attack, with enhanced security deployments and socioeconomic investment in the north contributing to the absence of major attacks since 2021. Ivory Coast’s relative stability, however, should not obscure persistent structural vulnerabilities. The country remains exposed to jihadist spillover from Burkina Faso, particularly across remote and difficult-to-monitor border areas.
Ghana
Despite sharing a 600 kilometer-long border with Burkina Faso, Ghana has so far shown considerable resilience to the spread of jihadist violence and has thwarted jihadist attack attempts thanks to relatively strong and well-equipped security forces. Nevertheless, its exposure to the regional threat remains significant.
Ghana, like several other West African states, faces the various socioeconomic and governance challenges that jihadist groups take advantage of: intercommunal tensions, public dissatisfaction and widespread illicit activity, particularly illegal artisanal gold mining. The absence of successful attacks should therefore not be interpreted as immunity: Ghana’s resilience could be tested if jihadist groups expand their territorial ambitions or if instability in its neighbor to the north, Burkina Faso, generates increased cross-border pressure.
Nigeria
As a major regional powerhouse, Nigeria has seen a troubling surge in fatalities, rising by 46 percent in 2025. In northwest Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states, media reports have begun using the moniker “Lakurawa.” The term is largely a misnomer for long-established ISSP operations that exploit chronic instability to sabotage infrastructure, including the Benin-Niger pipeline.
The mechanics of expansion
The southward drift of jihadism should not be viewed as a tactical retreat from Sahelian military pressure but as a strategic pursuit of manpower, resource-rich territory, smuggling routes and proto-state governance in remote areas where authority is weak, building on a convergence of geographical, social and economic vulnerabilities.
Geographic proximity and authority gaps explain much of the spread. The insurgency that began in Mali advanced to Niger and Burkina Faso and, more recently, to coastal states such as Togo and Benin, with growing threats to Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania. Similarly, terrorist groups in Nigeria are moving across borders into Cameroon, Niger and Chad.
Across West Africa, borderlands often represent governance and security vacuums where state presence and territorial control are weakest, creating opportunities for armed groups to establish safe havens. Cross-border natural reserves such as the WAP Complex (spanning Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger) and Ivory Coast’s Comoe National Park are particularly conducive to this dynamic: Their vast, rugged and difficult-to-monitor terrain limits the effectiveness of conventional territorial and aerial surveillance while providing insurgent groups with spaces to regroup, establish logistical networks and sustain operations beyond the reach of state authorities.
The coastal-northern divide sharpens the same vulnerability. Northern regions across the coastal states remain structurally disadvantaged: sparsely populated, poorly served by infrastructure and economically thin. Harsh environmental conditions, exacerbated by historical neglect and political marginalization, have constrained agricultural productivity and reinforced persistent socioeconomic disparities with the more prosperous coastal south.
This pronounced coastal-northern divide can fuel grievances and perceptions of state abandonment, particularly as communities face growing insecurity and limited access to public services, creating conditions that jihadist groups are likely to exploit.
Active militant Islamist groups
Recruitment often hinges on local grievances rather than pure religious ideology. This is even more pronounced in West Africa, where coastal populations are predominantly Christian. The jihadist groups capitalize on tensions between nomadic pastoralists (notably Fulani/Peuhl) and sedentary farmers.
The Fulani, a nomadic ethnic group who have a substantial presence across northern Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Togo, harbor longstanding grievances related to land access, seasonal migration and perceptions of social and political marginalization. Jihadist groups use such grievances to build support and recruit within communities that feel increasingly excluded or insecure.
The risk is compounded by heavy-handed or indiscriminate responses by poorly trained security forces or state-supported civilian militias, which can deepen mistrust and reinforce perceptions of collective targeting, driving these communities into the arms of jihadists for protection.
Politics adds another layer of fragility. While Ghana continues to demonstrate comparatively strong democratic resilience, Benin, Togo and Ivory Coast face growing concerns about political concentration, restricted space for the opposition and the credibility of electoral processes. These trends may signal early signs of democratic backsliding, risking weakened public trust in institutions and increasing the potential for protests, political unrest and institutional confrontation – factors that jihadist groups will not hesitate to play on.
The expansion of terrorist organizations is closely intertwined with the Gulf of Guinea’s illicit economies and cross-border criminal networks, which have long provided revenue and logistical channels for Sahelian insurgencies. Fuel smuggling, livestock trafficking, arms and drug trafficking and other illicit activities create opportunities for jihadist groups to tax, protect or directly participate in criminal flows, turning regional insecurity into a source of income.
This is particularly evident in fuel and gold trafficking. Jihadist groups have reportedly benefited from fuel-smuggling networks operating from Nigeria through Benin toward the central Sahel, charging smugglers for protection and passage. In northern Benin, local economies have already begun catering to militants’ logistical needs, facilitating illicit trade in fuel and supplies. The rapid expansion of illegal artisanal gold mining in northern Ivory Coast and Ghana is increasingly attractive as a revenue source, as militants tax the mines or provide protection for smugglers.
The region’s growing role as a transit corridor for international drug trafficking – particularly cocaine and pharmaceutical opioids originating in Latin America and Asia – adds another layer of vulnerability. Ports along the Gulf of Guinea, notably in Benin, Togo and Guinea-Bissau, serve as entry points for narcotics destined for European markets, while jihadist-controlled trafficking routes extend north through the Sahel.
European stakes
The stability of West Africa’s coastal states is a core European interest, encompassing trade security, energy diversification and geopolitical competition.
The Gulf of Guinea is a vital maritime artery for European trade. Its ports are essential gateways for European imports and exports, including critical access routes to landlocked countries in the interior. This significance has grown recently as global shipping traffic diverts from the Red Sea to avoid Houthi attacks and from the Strait of Hormuz amid the Israel-United States-Iran conflict, making the West African coast an alternative corridor for global supply chains.
As Europe pivots away from Russian energy, the West African littoral states have become a critical node in energy diversification. In the first quarter of 2025, Nigerian oil already accounted for 6.3 percent of the European Union’s petroleum imports. The country is emerging as a major energy export hub, supplying refined petroleum products to Europe and 22 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas annually to global markets. Beyond current production, Ivory Coast and Ghana hold significant untapped hydrocarbon reserves vital to Europe’s long-term energy strategy.
Nevertheless, instability in West Africa’s coastal states threatens to further erode European influence in a region where competitors such as Russia and China are increasingly assertive. The withdrawal of Western forces from the Sahel has allowed Russia’s Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner group) to entrench itself. Moscow uses targeted disinformation to fuel anti-Western sentiment and drive a wedge between littoral states and their traditional European partners.
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Recent shifts in U.S. policy, including the abrupt termination of major USAID programs in early 2026, have created a vacuum in regional engagement that others are seeking to fill. China, for its part, has overtaken Russia as the continent’s leading arms supplier, while Turkiye, India and the United Arab Emirates offer alternative security and financial partnerships with fewer conditions than those attached to Western engagement.
Demography compounds the risk. With two-thirds of the population under 30, the coming decade will be shaped by its youth. Ongoing instability has already led to large-scale population movements; by early 2025, approximately 160,000 asylum seekers were heading toward the Atlantic coast. This surge is straining local infrastructure and may spark further migration toward Europe.
Brussels has tried to respond. The EU has taken a comprehensive approach to enhance security and resilience in the northern regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo and Benin. This includes launching the EU Security and Defense Initiative in Support of West African Countries of the Gulf of Guinea in December 2023. The European Peace Facility has also committed 15 million euros to Togo to strengthen security along its northern border and improve maritime capabilities.
The EU’s reluctance to supply lethal equipment remains a major operational limitation, as support is often limited to training and non-lethal resources. This approach can create the perception among local partners of a double standard in European military support for Ukraine. Geopolitical rivals may take advantage of this inconsistency to challenge the credibility and reliability of European security involvement in the region.
Scenarios
Most likely: From border incursions to entrenched influence
The Sahel’s experience offers an important warning for West Africa’s coastal states. Jihadist expansion is driven not only by fighters moving across borders but also by capitalizing on governance deficits and weak state presence. In regions where central authorities are either absent or ineffective in providing basic services and security, terrorist groups have increasingly integrated into local communities. They have taken on roles that are typically carried out by the state. By combining coercion with economic opportunities and maintaining local order, these groups aim to gain acceptance and position themselves as alternative sources of authority.
Early signs suggest this model could be replicated. The main risk for coastal West Africa is therefore not merely the geographic spillover of jihadist violence, but the gradual transplantation of the governance model that has enabled militant groups to consolidate their position in parts of the Sahel.
If state authorities fail to close existing governance and security gaps, jihadist groups are likely to progressively widen local networks, exploit grievances and illicit economies, and establish parallel systems of authority, turning temporary footholds into more durable territorial influence.
National responses remain constrained by pronounced structural weaknesses, while a limited understanding of armed groups operating across the northern borderlands further undermines the ability of states to respond effectively.
Less likely short term, likely longer term: Violence breeds instability
Coastal West African states have so far benefited from a combination of economic growth, political stability and diversified international partnerships, positioning them as relatively resilient alternatives to the crisis-ridden Sahel and as destinations for foreign direct investment. However, this positive trajectory could be at risk as these countries’ resilience is increasingly tested by the spillover effects of regional insecurity.
The economic interdependence between coastal and Sahelian states means that conflict, sanctions and political disruption in the Sahel can quickly affect trade, supply chains and investment in coastal economies. The escalation of violence in the northern parts of West African states threatens agricultural livelihoods and local economic activity in precisely those regions that are already among the most economically and politically marginalized.
These intertwined pressures are placing growing strain on civilian governments. Failure to address mounting economic hardship and to contain the expansion of jihadist violence could fuel public discontent, weaken confidence in state institutions and increase the risk of political instability, including military coups.
Less likely: From insurgency to territorial control
A more extreme trajectory would see jihadist groups move beyond establishing northern footholds and seek to capture and hold a major urban center, or in a more remote scenario, challenge state control over significant territory.
At present, such an outcome appears unlikely. Insofar as it is possible to assess, armed groups operating in the region lack the heavy weaponry, manpower and conventional military capabilities that enabled other insurgent movements, such as those in Syria, to seize and administer large urban areas. Their operational model remains better suited to asymmetric warfare, territorial infiltration and the gradual erosion of state authority. Additionally, territorial expansion might not even be a priority for the group. Inner JNIM dynamics suggest its leadership fears that expanding too fast could fragment the movement’s ranks.
The prospects for such an advance into coastal West Africa are further constrained by demographic factors, including the predominantly Christian or indigenous-belief populations of many coastal states, which may limit the appeal of jihadist ideology.
Nevertheless, these factors should not be treated as absolute barriers. A major deterioration in state capacity, the emergence of local alliances, or the exploitation of acute political or socioeconomic grievances could create openings for jihadist groups to expand beyond their current operating environments.
Least likely in the near term: A regional response
The military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (2020-2023) disrupted regional security cooperation. The subsequent withdrawal of these states from the Economic Community of West African States in 2024 and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States have hindered intelligence sharing with coastal neighbors.
Halting the jihadist advance requires reviving these bilateral and multilateral security mechanisms. Despite current political friction, the Sahelian and coastal states remain profoundly interdependent on both the security and trade fronts. It should thus be considered unrealistic for coastal states to develop an effective security strategy without the involvement of the central Sahel.
The main obstacle to this cooperation is a breakdown in trust, as shown by bilateral disputes such as those between Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, or Benin and Niger. Some coastal states have allegedly been tempted to pursue discreet non-aggression pacts with groups like JNIM to secure temporary relief.
However, standalone arrangements exacerbate regional fragmentation and ultimately strengthen the networks that enable jihadists to sustain their offensives elsewhere. Consequently, a lasting solution is highly unlikely without rebuilding trust and coordinating negotiations through regional or international facilitators, such as the United Nations and the African Union.
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