Europe’s faltering liberal democracy
Across Europe, governing parties are facing mounting pressure as social discontent undermines confidence in liberal-democratic rule.
In a nutshell
- Liberal-democratic governments are losing public support
- Criminalization of dissent is strengthening support for populist movements
- Institutional constraints limit change even when opposition parties win
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This is part four of the GIS series on the Crisis of Leadership. Previous installments can be found here.
In the European Union, the liberal-democratic governments of the German-French axis are clashing with the illiberal-democratic governments of Hungary, Slovakia and, more recently, the Czech Republic, which want to reach an understanding with Russia at the expense of Ukraine. Right-wing populist parties across Europe often align with Viktor Orban and Donald Trump.
Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer warn of an existential threat to liberal democracy under increasing external and internal pressure. All three were elected with the promise of far-reaching reforms. They now have their backs to the wall. They call on a political center that is shrinking from election to election, while the parties to the left and right of the center are becoming stronger. All three leaders argue that the future of liberal democracy depends on continuing their chosen course. There is, they argue, no other alternative.
United Kingdom
Keir Starmer replaced the radical left-wing, antisemitic Jeremy Corbyn as the head of the Labour Party in 2020. Thanks to this more moderate course, Labour almost doubled its seats in the House of Commons in the July 2024 elections. But just one year later, polls show that only 22 percent would vote for Labour and only 13 percent think Mr. Starmer is a good prime minister. Some 34 percent would opt for the Reform UK party of the populist Nigel Farage in the next general election. According to British electoral law, this would be enough to make Mr. Farage prime minister.
France
Emmanuel Macron beat Marine Le Pen to the presidency in 2022, with around 60 percent of the vote. By November 2025, some 60 percent of the population was wanted him to resign, and 40 percent called for new elections. According to surveys, if an election were held today Ms. Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) could receive 30 percent of the vote, about twice as many as Mr. Macron’s Renaissance.
Neither President Macron nor Ms. Le Pen is allowed to stand in the 2027 presidential election. Mr. Macron has already served two terms, and a court ruling prohibits Ms. Le Pen from running. Her preferred candidate and protege, Jordan Bardella, is leading in the polls with 30 to 32 percent. According to forecasts, no centrist candidate is likely to reach the second round.
Germany
Christian Democrat leader Friedrich Merz has been at the head of a government coalition between the Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) since May 2025. The CDU/CSU received 28.5 percent of the vote in the Bundestag election in February 2025, followed by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) with 20.8 percent and the SPD with 16.4 percent.
Chancellor Merz promised a political turnaround, as a result of which the AfD would “massively lose substance and thus votes.” But as early as September, 50 percent of voters surveyed said that they were “very dissatisfied” with Chancellor Merz.
According to the same survey, the AfD ranked ahead of the CDU/CSU for the first time in November with 26 percent and 24 percent, respectively. Over half (58 percent) wanted new elections and 74 percent wanted a change of chancellor.
Widespread discontent with liberal-democratic leaders
Dissatisfaction with governments is rooted in the ongoing economic, political and social crisis in Europe, which even the most rousing speeches about the achievements of the EU will not change. In October 2022, Josep Borrell, then high representative for foreign affairs of the European Commission, declared: “We have built a garden. Everything works. It is the best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that humankind has been able to build – the three things together.” Citizens disagree. According to the Eurobarometer 2025, only 42 percent believe that the EU as a whole is “moving in the right direction.”
Low-income workers and employees are particularly affected by the crisis, with more and more voting for the right because they feel abandoned by the traditional parties of the left. While social democracy became bourgeois, the right proletarianized. The election results also reflect the decline of the middle class: Right-wing populist parties are largely capitalizing on the political center’s losses. People no longer believe that their children will have better lives.
The traditional voters of centrist parties are often opposed to painful reforms. Right-wing populist parties, which often outdo the left with their sociopolitical promises, also benefit from this. France has the shortest working week in the EU, the youngest pensioners and the highest taxes among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. But when President Macron raised the retirement age from 62 to 64 in 2023, left-wing parties rebelled together with the trade unions and Ms. Le Pen’s right-wing populists. In November 2025, the measure was stopped and postponed until after the next presidential election.
Over time, the responses of governing parties to the challenge from the right follow a clear pattern. First, they emphasize the absolute incompatibility of their own positions with those of populist parties and rule out any form of cooperation with them (often through measures like Germany’s Brandmauer, or “firewall”).
Second, they gradually adopt right-wing positions and integrate them into government policy. In November 2025, Labour tightened the UK’s migration policy along the lines of the Danish model. Mr. Merz also aims to curb immigration and deport undocumented migrants, but does not dare to position himself openly against his Social Democratic coalition partners as well as the Greens and far-left opposition.
Third, they increase repression and narrow the range of permissible opinions. Those who oppose the liberal-democratic mainstream risk house searches, criminal investigations and even imprisonment. German criminal law protects politicians against “insult, malicious defamation, and libel” by threatening prison sentences of up to three years. Liberal-democratic governments aim to criminalize the right-wing opposition and its supporters by portraying them as fundamentally undemocratic and potentially fascist.
Criminalizing political opponents
Marine Le Pen was excluded from the presidential elections because, during her time as a member of the EU Parliament, she used money intended for parliamentary staff in Brussels or Strasbourg for employees of her party in France. The judge assessed the embezzlement, which Ms. Le Pen denies, as no less than a “serious and lasting attack on the rules of democratic life in Europe and France.”
In Germany, an assessment by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution that has not yet been reviewed by a court classified the AfD as “confirmed right-wing extremist.” According to the domestic intelligence agency, this was evident above all in a völkisch or “ethnic” conception of the people that allegedly contradicts the constitution. The AfD’s election manifesto states that the national identity of Germans is shaped by a shared language, set of values, history and culture, and cannot be replaced by mere constitutional patriotism.
Facts & figures
Verfassungspatriotismus
Germany’s concept of constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus) defines national identity through commitment to the constitution rather than ethnic, cultural or historical notions of nationhood. Developed in the postwar period by thinkers such as Dolf Sternberger and later Jurgen Habermas, it emerged as a response to the legacy of the Nazi regime and has shaped Germany’s political culture ever since.
Without explicitly naming the AfD, Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier warned of a “party that is embarking on the path toward aggressive hostility to the constitution.” Right-wing extremism, populism and hatred, he said, were the greatest threats to democracy. However, a ban is by no means certain. In Germany, the hurdles for banning a political party are very high, precisely because of historical experience. Such proceedings could take years, and they might politically harm their initiators more than the AfD.
“Constitutional patriotism” is a peculiarity that is scarcely understood outside Germany. The UK has no written constitution at all, and the French, Italians and Poles take it for granted that their national identity is based on a shared language, history and culture. The concept of constitutional patriotism was introduced in Germany in the 1970s and, after reunification, gradually evolved into a state doctrine.
Redefining democracy
Over time, democracy has become a hyphenated concept, with adjectives attached to it for political expediency, like liberal, illiberal, Christian, secular, national or social. Democracy as a simple procedure – guaranteeing the election and removal of a government through genuine competition between parties under the rule of law and with full respect for civil rights, including freedom of expression and assembly – is deemed insufficient. Governments know that a democracy without adjectives would allow citizens to vote out the ruling elites.
Liberal democracy, which in its current form is neither liberal nor democratic, extends far beyond the sphere of actual government activity. It is a power cartel that encompasses the bureaucracy, national and supranational courts, universities and large corporations, and is celebrated by the media, especially public broadcasters, as a regime superior to all other forms of government. The conformity it demands tends toward totalitarianism.
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In Germany, there are state-funded and state-organized reporting offices that call on citizens to denounce those who think differently. Government-adjacent “non-governmental organizations” are showered with taxpayers’ money for their “fight against the right.” In 2024, 182 million euros were allocated to German “democracy projects,” and the black-red coalition increased the 2026 federal budget by a further 10 million euros. For the left, this pays off: At a moment’s notice, those NGOs can mobilize hundreds of thousands of protesters onto the streets. The practice of pressuring parliaments through mass demonstrations was characteristic of communist regimes, where marches were used to simulate popular consent.
“There is no alternative” was the phrase with which former German Chancellor Angela Merkel stifled political debate, whether on the euro bailout, austerity measures during the financial crisis, the energy transition or the opening of borders during the migration crisis. In 2010, the Society for the German Language chose alternativlos (without alternative) as its most problematic word of the year because it suggests “that from the outset there are no alternatives in a decision-making process and therefore no need for discussion or argument.”
The idea that the global triumph of liberal democracy represents the endpoint of historical development – leaving no credible alternatives – can be traced to Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book, “The End of History and the Last Man.” At the time, Mr. Fukuyama was widely mocked by politicians and journalists. Yet, the leaders of today still rely on his thesis as a guiding principle of political action.
Scenarios
Most likely: The center does not move and right-wing parties grow more popular
There is no indication that liberal democracies will change their “no alternative” stance as long as alliances between the centrist middle and the left keep right-wing populist parties in check. Criminalizing political dissent and restricting freedom of expression will strengthen the right-wing opposition.
Likely: A right-wing party wins, but must make deep concessions
If a right-wing populist party wins a national election so decisively that a government can only be formed under its leadership, it will have to moderate elements of its election manifesto. It will need to adhere to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and national constitutional courts, particularly regarding human rights. This applies, not least, to NATO and EU member states in the areas of foreign and security policy. There is little room for a radical political shift.
Somewhat likely: Power shift
In Germany, the “firewall” against the right is likely to hold for the entire legislative period even if the black-red coalition collapses and a CDU chancellor, who might not necessarily be Mr. Merz, seeks a majority through ad hoc support from parties in parliament.
Much depends on the outcome of the French presidential election in 2027. If Mr. Bardella is elected, the balance of power within the EU will shift and the cards will be reshuffled.
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