M23 rebels defy peace talks, expand control in DRC
Angola withdraws as DRC conflict mediator, with Qatar and the U.S. stepping in, as M23 rebels gain ground amid stalled peace talks and regional tension.
In a nutshell
- The U.S. brokered a DRC-Rwanda deal in June, but its success is uncertain
- Rebels and militias remain militarily strong, complicating peace prospects
- M23 rebels govern captured areas, imposing taxes and running mines
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In March, Angola announced that it was stepping back as the principal mediator of the conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The statement from Angolan President Joao Lourenco explained that Luanda wanted to focus on its duties and responsibilities as the new chair of the African Union (AU).
Not long before the surprise announcement, President Lourenco had achieved a breakthrough in the protracted negotiations: For the first time, DRC President Felix Tshisekedi agreed to hold direct talks with the Rwandan-backed March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group. However, a scheduled round of talks in the Angolan capital, Luanda, failed. Representatives of the rebels left the city before talks could begin, blaming the collapse on sanctions imposed by European countries against Rwandan and rebel officials just hours before the planned discussions.
When Angola announced its exit, Qatar had effectively stepped in as the new mediator of the conflict. Around the same time, forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) withdrew – with the agreement of the rebels and Rwanda – from eastern DRC following the loss of 14 South African soldiers, leaving a substantial gap in conflict mitigation efforts. Even before the talks shifted to Doha, Kinshasa made overtures to the United States to explore a minerals-for-security deal to safeguard its resources while enhancing security.
These twists and turns have highlighted the complex nature of the region and the potential ramifications of the different and parallel negotiations underway. While the complexity of the conflict itself makes it difficult to find solutions, it is further complicated by the overlapping geopolitical dynamics of the Great Lakes region.
Facts & figures
Who are the M23 rebels and why are they fighting in eastern DRC?
M23 is one of the roughly 100 armed groups fighting Congolese state forces in eastern DRC, particularly in North Kivu along the borders with Rwanda and Uganda. Formed in 2012 by former troops of the Tutsi-led National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), M23 emerged after claims that the Congolese government failed to honor a 2009 agreement to integrate Tutsi fighters, protect minorities and distribute resources fairly.
According to the United Nation’s Displacement Tracking Matrix, the recent advance of the M23 between January and February alone led to the displacement of 1.2 million people across the North and South Kivu provinces. DRC, the U.S., the UN and others have accused Rwanda of supporting M23, a claim Rwanda firmly denies. UN experts state that the country’s army effectively controls M23, with 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops actively collaborating with the group in eastern DRC as of July 2024.
The geopolitical and resource nexus of the Great Lakes
Geographically, western Central Africa and eastern East Africa form the Great Lakes area. Millions of years of geological activity have created several natural lakes that have influenced the region’s name.
The “Great Lakes” also serves as a collective geopolitical term for the countries in the region. Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Malawi typically comprise this geopolitical zone. Most importantly, the region has one of the highest concentrations of natural resources in Africa. From vast quantities of hydrocarbons to decades of mined metals and abundant rare earth minerals, the region holds immense wealth that sharply contrasts with the widespread poverty among its populations.
While the region’s geology and resources are well known, another consequential element is that it is a crossroads for various regional security complexes across the continent. It is a major overlapping geopolitical zone in Africa. Kenya, DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania are member states of the East African Community (EAC). DRC, Rwanda and Burundi also belong to the Economic Community of Central African States. Meanwhile, DRC and Tanzania are members of the Southern African Development Community, and Kenya is affiliated with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
This intricate web of alliances and organizations complicates peace efforts, making it challenging to convert negotiations into tangible outcomes on the ground.
M23’s expansion in DRC
Although the M23 and related groups have threatened eastern DRC’s security for decades, the recent onslaught (culminating in the capture of the now M23-controlled city of Goma in January) drew heightened regional attention as stakeholders stepped in to prevent bloodshed and initiate negotiations to find political solutions.
In the past, rebellions were halted through agreements that integrated or recognized rebel factions within the security forces of the resource-rich country. This time, however, the well-armed rebels – allegedly backed by thousands of Rwandan troops – were more resolute and determined to capture territories in North Kivu.
Facts & figures
M23 advances in eastern DRC
In 2023, the East African Community, which DRC joined in 2022, resolved to send a stabilization force to protect the population from a possible M23 invasion. This was the first time Kenya deployed forces to the country. Although the regional force was mandated to safeguard cities and towns from the M23 advance, both locals and the government in Kinshasa expected more. From the Congolese perspective, the EAC was not resolute enough in countering the M23 threat. The presence of Rwanda and Uganda in the EAC was also seen as an obstacle to progress.
By the end of 2023, the DRC government announced that the mandate of the East African troops would not be renewed and that Southern African forces would replace them. For Kenya, which had developed an interest in ensuring regional stability, Kinshasa’s stance was seen as counterproductive.
In early 2025, a year after SADC forces replaced the East African mission in North Kivu, M23 captured Goma and its surrounding settlements. The speed and relative ease with which the rebels captured the most important settlement in the province, along with hundreds of Congolese soldiers, quickly overwhelmed the regional troops and sparked interregional diplomatic tensions that remain unresolved.
The capture of Goma and other territories in North and South Kivu clearly signaled the failure of the SADC mission. The frustration caused by this failure led to accusations and counteraccusations. Notably, tensions between South Africa and Rwanda reached an all-time high, with Pretoria accusing Kigali of destabilizing eastern Congo. Rwandan President Paul Kagame responded defiantly. In a strongly worded statement, President Kagame criticized South African officials, including President Cyril Ramaphosa, for misrepresenting the facts and spreading misinformation about their recent discussions on the DRC crisis. His comments were a response to Mr. Ramaphosa publicly blaming the M23 rebel group and the Rwanda Defence Force for the escalating violence in the region.
Despite DRC’s membership of the SADC, East African states viewed South Africa’s influence in their region as unwarranted. This illuminates how DRC’s membership in multiple regional blocs has created both de facto and de jure platforms for various international involvement in its affairs.
These geopolitical overlaps, which complicate the conflict, are reflected in the various peace efforts undertaken by different parties.
Parallel peace efforts and persistent challenges
The Angola-led peace talks, until their abrupt end, were the most long-standing regionally backed effort toward resolving the crisis. Ending just as the Congolese government had agreed to recognize the rebels, the AU-backed talks inadvertently facilitated the start of the Doha talks. As a result, there were fewer obstacles for direct talks between the rebels and Kinshasa in Doha.
Nonetheless, the AU did not withdraw from peace efforts. Soon after, the bloc appointed a group of former heads of state and government, led by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, to act as mediators. The Republic of Togo became the new location for Africa-led peace initiatives.
Meanwhile, the Doha talks between the government and rebels continued with little progress. Multiple ceasefire agreements were violated by both sides. While representatives of the rebels shuttled between Goma and Doha, their fighters expanded control in North and South Kivu.
For weeks, they recaptured areas previously vacated to show good faith in an earlier ceasefire agreement. In South Kivu, they seized several districts and chiefdoms along the southwestern corridor of the RN2 highway. Pro-government Wazalendo fighters also launched repeated attacks on rebel positions despite the ongoing ceasefires.
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Until the U.S. announced it had brokered a peace deal between DRC and Rwanda in Washington on June 27, the State Department had been managing complex peace negotiations between the two nations while other efforts continued. Interestingly, the premise of the Washington talks was that Rwanda could influence the rebels’ actions. Consequently, unlike in the Doha talks, the rebels were not present in Washington.
Shortly after the peace deal was announced, clearing the way for a minerals agreement in eastern DRC, President Kagame stated in early July that he was unsure whether the peace deal would hold. His statement raised concerns among optimists of the U.S.-brokered agreement. To many, the U.S. has the leverage to enforce meaningful peace in the region. However, for other observers, the complexity of the conflict makes it inherently too difficult for them to resolve alone.
On July 19, DRC and the M23 rebel group signed a declaration of principles in Qatar aimed at ending decades of conflict. This agreement is a commitment to achieving a comprehensive peace deal that calls for the restoration of state authority in key eastern cities currently under the control of the insurgents.
Going forward, several factors will influence the outcomes and implications of the ongoing and recently concluded peace talks related to the Congo crisis.
Scenarios
Most likely: Rebels and militias defy peace efforts
Rebels and pro-government militias are unlikely to adhere to the U.S. peace deal or other ongoing talks.
In the short to medium term, neither the current nor the concluded peace negotiations are expected to lead to significant changes on the ground in South and North Kivu. The rebels have demonstrated their ability to govern captured territories both militarily and administratively. In recent months, M23 has imposed taxes, taken control of lucrative mines, implemented banking reforms and started public works projects. They have also increased fighter recruitment and reinforced their front lines. All of this occurred while peace talks were ongoing, indicating that the rebels are unlikely to cede territory for peace in the coming months.
Moreover, pro-government militias, especially the Wazalendo, have shown equal resolve to reclaim territory from the rebels. These militias have launched attacks on rebel positions near Goma and clashed with M23 in Masisi and parts of northern South Kivu. As both sides remain committed to military engagement – fueled in part by identity-based motivations – a truce is unlikely to take root soon.
The U.S. administration might consider deploying private military contractors in the region to enforce peace. Some have pointed to a prior deal between DRC and Erik Prince of the now-defunct American private military company Blackwater as a possible way for stationing these contractors. However, with both rebels and militias deeply familiar with the terrain, such efforts may prove difficult, although recruiting local personnel might be an option.
Somewhat likely: Strategic engagement and regional collaboration
A future U.S. administration might explore ways to engage directly with rebels to promote real change on the ground. While Rwanda might oppose such efforts, a mutually inclusive approach could be crafted. Washington could also include local militias and Kinshasa in these initiatives.
To prevent the collapse of current negotiations, Qatari mediators of the Doha talks could expand participation to include additional regional actors, such as Uganda and Burundi, to enhance the likelihood of success in a process already encountering significant obstacles.
Furthermore, mediators from different peace initiatives might find ways to synchronize efforts and harmonize parallel processes to pursue shared goals.
Least likely: The U.S. sends forces to the region
The U.S. might decide to protect its mineral interests and justify sending troops to the region. The Trump administration could frame this move as a national security issue tied to securing the supply of vital resources. While it may be politically challenging to justify, it is not entirely impossible.
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