Regimes in the Maghreb take a hard look at nuclear energy

Countries in North Africa are seeking nuclear energy for prestige and independence, despite security risks and the potential for renewables.

“Nuclear for climate” was a theme promoted in North Africa during the 2022 United Nations COP27 event in Egypt.
“Nuclear for climate” was a theme promoted in North Africa during the 2022 United Nations COP27 event in Egypt. © Getty Images
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In a nutshell

  • Maghreb countries seek nuclear energy despite solar potential
  • Nuclear security concerns persist amid rivalries and political instability
  • Intervention may be required to prevent militarization or proliferation
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The Maghreb has high potential for solar and wind energy production, which could position the region as a key player in renewable energy, yet countries in the region are not pursuing a significant rollout of such safe and zero-emission electricity sources. While aware of the economic and climate potential of renewables, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and even Libya are instead demonstrating a growing interest in nuclear facilities. They assert that nuclear power is a tool to support their energy transition, with the goal of reducing dependence on oil and moving toward sustainable development.

The construction of scaled-up civilian nuclear power plants could provide baseload energy supplies while conferring prestige from joining the nations that harness the atom. Aware of the hypersensitivity around the issue due to the risk of nuclear proliferation, the Maghreb countries have been discreet about their progress in this area and most claim medical advancements and stable energy supplies among their primary goals.

Established research reactors in North Africa

Nuclear facilities in the Maghreb predate the energy transition era. Algeria has two research reactors, the Nur unit completed in 1989 with the help of Argentina, and the Es-Salam reactor, completed in 1993 with the help of China. Algiers has established close cooperation with Russia, through the state-owned Rosatom, to develop a civilian nuclear program that includes the creation of “nuclear medicine and irradiation centers.”

Morocco is already using nuclear technology for medical applications. The Moroccan National Center for Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology boasts the Triga Mark II research reactor, commissioned in 2007, officially dedicated to the production of isotopes for medical applications and to industrial applications such as seawater desalination.

This infrastructure was not designed to produce electricity. Expansion for power generation would cost significant amounts.

Additionally, Morocco is home to one of Africa’s largest deposits of uranium. Algeria and Libya also host unexploited uranium reserves. Tripoli, for its part, had to import 2,263 tons of yellow cake, a uranium intermediate product, in the 1970s to launch Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s nuclear program. With the help of the former Soviet Union, a nuclear research center (Tajoura) and a dual-use civil-military power plant (Sirte) were built.

Nevertheless, this infrastructure, like the aforementioned research reactors, was not designed to produce electricity. Refurbishing and expanding research sites for power generation would cost significant amounts. Such outlays are currently well beyond the financial capacity of the Libyan state, which is currently split between rivals in the east and west of the country. Furthermore, Libya’s nuclear program has not been active since the Arab uprisings of 2011, due to political instability.

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Facts & figures

Nuclear reactors in North Africa

As for Tunisia, the $104 million cooperation agreement with France on nuclear power did not survive the fall of the Ben Ali regime. The country turned its back on the former colonial power and looked east: Russia and Tunisia have now embarked on a project for both nuclear power and research. Despite the economic situation in Tunisia being so dire that implementation of the project is highly improbable, harnessing the atom remains a goal for Tunis.

Renewables versus oil

Maghreb countries pursue the nuclear option despite their high solar and wind energy potential. While the cost of energy from solar and wind power plants is falling, the countries say investment in transmission infrastructure to bring energy from the sunny Sahara to the Mediterranean coasts, where most people live, is too high. Other factors come into play.

Algeria could reasonably weather the investment of north-south electricity transmission lines, but there is reluctance regarding the vision of “all-electric” – seen in North Africa as a Western idea for which the Maghreb is not ready. To put it bluntly, countries in the Maghreb believe oil has a lot of miles left in it, and rushing into renewables would be pointless. Worse, it would be risky, some officials claim. Yet a move to nuclear power would surely spell a decrease for local oil demand as well.

The oil-endowed countries of the Maghreb make the calculation that, were massive investments made in solar and wind energy, markets could interpret this as the beginning of a gradual retreat from oil. Knowing how markets can overreact, states in the region do not want to contribute to oil price instability. However, the arguments largely disregard that creating scaled-up nuclear power facilities would also imply their move away from fossil fuels.

Keeping up appearances

The mastery of nuclear energy is seen as a symbol of technological maturity and prestige for any country, and countries in the Maghreb perceive it as a way to enhance their status as emerging powers. Building a civil nuclear industry at scale for power generation is an exclusive affair for national authorities and requires cooperation with other nuclear powers, whether Russia and China on the one hand, or European, American and east Asian countries on the other.

Read more from Arab affairs expert Pierre Boussel

In contrast, solar energy is widely accessible to corporate entities, power generators and the average citizen. And therein lies the give-and-take: Most Maghreb states that seek energy independence as a long-term goal want to use nuclear development to appear closer to global powers and position themselves on the international stage.

Anticipating risks

The Maghreb states do not profess a desire to become military nuclear powers like the United States, China or Russia. Instead, they claim they are seeking energy independence and symbolic influence. But the risk of drifting toward militarization of nuclear power exists and poses a significant long-term security risk for Africa, the Middle East and Europe if these countries – namely those with unstable regimes – had nuclear reactors and alliances with malign actors.

The region has experienced unpredictable and sometimes brutal political changes, such as the 2011 uprisings that toppled regimes previously thought to be immutable and unassailable. Moreover, and very crucially, deeply entrenched animosity between Algeria and Morocco is unlikely to fade.

Maghreb countries are inflexible on security issues and are adept at building bilateral relationships with major powers to achieve their goals. Algeria has forged alliances with Russia and China for its nuclear research program and in other areas. In the event of a regional conflict, it would be entirely plausible for Algiers to consider using its nuclear facilities for military purposes, putting the broader region at risk. Such a move would result in a Moroccan response as Rabat would claim reciprocity and work to escalate its capabilities to military uses of the atom.

Nuclear theft with impunity in the Maghreb

This climate of latent bilateral tension is exacerbated by the state of division and insecurity in Libya. In March 2023, 10 barrels of uranium were stolen from the Tamanhint base (Sebha district) that is home to Russian Wagner group forces and controlled, perhaps haphazardly, by the forces of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who is closely aligned with Moscow and President Vladimir Putin’s designs in North Africa.

Yellow cake or urania on a conveyor belt.
Yellow cake, or urania, is an intermediate form of uranium after mining that is usually not very radioactive and can be used in nuclear power plants. When enriched it can be used in nuclear weapons. Ten barrels of yellow cake were stolen in 2023 from a military base in Libya that is home to Russian private military contractors. © Getty Images

The day after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officially announced the disappearance of the uranium in yellow cake form, the barrels were recovered while on their way to Chad. The thieves claimed not to know the contents of the barrels, saying that they thought they had instead stolen conventional weapons and explosives. The incident shows that the minimum requirements for securing sensitive sites – in Libya at least − are not met. Neither authorities in Tripoli nor Tobruk have enacted security protocols to prevent a similar theft from happening again, nor has Moscow done anything to boost security there. Apart from a few insignificant measures, the security situation was left essentially unchanged. What happened yesterday in Libya could very well happen again tomorrow.

The IAEA is finding it difficult to report on the dangers posed by nuclear facilities in the region, whether for research or larger scale. Its authority in North Africa is often challenged, as it is by Iran and North Korea. This raises the question of what the agency’s relationship with the Maghreb countries would be if they were to acquire scaled-up nuclear capabilities. For now, the Maghreb countries maintain rhetoric focused on energy independence while largely ignoring the low-hanging fruit of renewables. If a conflict were to break out between rival nations of North Africa, avoiding nuclear militarization on Europe’s doorstep would be a challenge of immense magnitude.

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Scenarios

Less likely: Maghreb countries play by the nuclear rules

Looking forward, it is possible though unlikely that countries in the Maghreb play by the rules in obtaining and managing civil nuclear licenses and facilities. All have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which imposes strict limits on the use of nuclear technology and allows IAEA inspections to verify nuclear material stocks and facilities to ensure they are not diverted for military purposes. The aim of this treaty is to allow countries to diversify their energy sources, reduce dependence on fossil fuels and maintain baseload electricity production.

Faced with the high stakes of nuclear capabilities, the capitals of the region could begin to work together, though there is no sign that animosities are abating. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia could establish coordinating committees to share nuclear security practices while establishing common standards and allowing mutual visits so that none of them suspects others of hidden intents. Nevertheless, such a level of newfound cooperation and trust is – for now – improbable.

More likely: Insecurity and international intervention

A more probable scenario is that should there be a spread of nuclear technology in North Africa, an atmosphere of suspicion and heightened tension would arise and could easily lead to a crisis in the southern Mediterranean that turns into a global issue.

Currently, Algerian officials maintain that the country’s nuclear program is strictly civilian and in line with international standards. But the potential duplicity of a growing Algerian nuclear capability with Russian support arouses suspicions in other countries in the region, especially in Morocco, which is concerned about a North African nuclear proliferation and the possible military use of the Algerian program. The outcome of this would be Rabat having to strengthen its alliance with the U.S. and European countries to counterbalance Russia’s influence in Algeria and the risk from weapons of mass destruction.

For Tunisia, which lacks the resources to finance an independent program, a move into the nuclear club would most likely require it to establish close cooperation with communist China. Beijing already views Tunisia as a possible locale to increase its influence in the Mediterranean.

In Libya, the local authorities are unable to secure the uranium stocks inherited from Qaddafi’s former program, and based on recent events that state of affairs is set to continue. Risks would be higher pending the unabated rollout of additional nuclear facilities there.

Significant amounts of yellowcake could be sold on the black market, feeding criminal networks and non-state actors that may be linked to terrorist groups. The IAEA will be unable to make its voice heard by the Maghreb regimes, and major powers from all sides will have to intervene, to varying extents, to prevent a new proliferation crisis in the southern Mediterranean.

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