Political crisis in Mozambique shows no signs of abating
Mozambique’s post-election unrest reflects deep-seated political, economic and social tensions that may lead to challenges in neighboring countries.

In a nutshell
- Protests following elections challenge the ruling party’s dominance
- Economic disruptions strain regional trade, impacting South Africa
- Persistent instability undermines Mozambique’s LNG potential
Since the results of the presidential elections on October 9, 2024, in Mozambique were challenged by voters claiming election fraud, the country has been gripped by a sometimes violent political crisis that has led to hundreds of deaths. Protesters demanding the restoration of “electoral truth” have been vocal and are led – albeit from a distance – by Venancio Mondlane, an Evangelical pastor and former radio host who was an opposition candidate in the election. Mr. Mondlane, who referred to himself as the “candidate of the people” during his campaign, asserts that he was the rightful winner of the presidential balloting. He fled the country after two of his aides were slain.
According to initial results, Daniel Chapo, the designated successor of the Frelimo (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique, Mozambique Liberation Front) party to incumbent President Filipe Nyusi, secured a landslide victory with 77 percent of the vote. The country’s highest court in late December confirmed the result though restated the tally, saying Mr. Chapo secured 65 percent of the vote while Mr. Mondlane garnered 24 percent. This keeps Frelimo, which faces allegations of authoritarianism, in power and enables the party to extend its rule that began in 1975.
Besides domestic contestation, international and regional observer missions, including those from the European Union, the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have raised concerns about the integrity of the electoral process, but to no avail.
The inauguration of Daniel Chapo is expected to escalate the unrest and violence, as Mr. Mondlane describes the next phase of protests as the ‘final battle.’
Tensions in Mozambique, which lies on Africa’s southeastern coast, began to escalate even before the official results were announced. On October 18, 2024, Paulo Gwambe, a member of Mr. Mondlane’s Podemos party, and Elvino Dias, a lawyer drafting an appeal for submission to the Constitutional Council, were shot dead in the country’s capital, Maputo.
Since then, protests have increased in number and intensity, with hundreds of protesters being detained, and fatalities including children. Despite the violence and the economic disruptions felt both internally and regionally, demonstrations are expected to continue. Mr. Mondlane returned to Maputo on January 9, where he was received like a hero and called for additional demonstrations. “These three days are crucial for our lives. We have to show that the people are in charge. Peaceful demonstrations from 8am to 5pm against the traitors of the people,” he said in the capital city.
Previously, Mr. Mondlane called on South African President Cyril Ramaphosa to reconsider his government’s acceptance of the election results in Mozambique. The inauguration of Daniel Chapo is expected to escalate the unrest and violence, as Mr. Mondlane describes this next phase of protests as the “final battle.”
A fractured country
Suspicions of electoral fraud and political violence have plagued Mozambique’s politics since the adoption of a multiparty system in the early 1990s. This time, however, the scale of protests and the broader internal and regional context suggest that the country may be experiencing a more significant and transformative moment.
Past liberation movements that transitioned into dominant ruling parties are facing mounting challenges across Southern Africa, from South Africa and Zimbabwe to Angola and Namibia. In Mozambique, widespread frustration with Frelimo and a longing for change, especially among urban populations, have coalesced around Mr. Mondlane, who has effectively used social media, particularly Facebook, to rally and organize protests despite operating from outside the country. This use of alternative political communication channels reaches a younger, more urban and politically engaged population. It is likely to shape the trajectory of politics not only in Mozambique but across the continent.
Politically motivated protests have further fueled chaos. More than 300 people have been killed, hundreds of businesses looted and groups of vigilantes are terrorizing neighborhoods. In December, over 1,500 inmates escaped from a prison in Maputo.
Violent protests in Maputo, in the country’s third-largest city, Nampula, and in the Zambezia province add to the strife caused by the ongoing crisis in the province of Cabo Delgado, which began in 2017. While these events differ in origin, both reflect Frelimo’s failures in governance and the public’s exhaustion with its tight grip on power. They also underscore the interplay between ethnic and regional divides and the country’s persistent economic struggles since gaining independence from Portugal in 1975.
Mozambique cannot be described as a unified nation-state. For instance, unlike Angola on Africa’s southwestern coast, which also achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique remains fractured along regional and ethnic lines. Since independence, there has been a widespread perception that a corrupt political and economic elite from one corner of the country dominates all of Mozambique. While President Nyusi is from Cabo Delgado, his origins did not shift these perceptions of marginalization. In fact, it deepened ethnic competition.
Mr. Nyusi is a Makonde, an ethnic group in northern Mozambique, southeast Tanzania and in smaller numbers in Kenya. The Makonde played a central role in the independence war and hold significant influence within Frelimo. His critics have accused him of promoting the “Makondization” of power, particularly within the security forces, to the detriment of other groups in Cabo Delgado, like the Macua.
As the party continues to exercise centralized and authoritarian control, regional fragmentation has resulted. In 2014, for example, Afonso Dhlakama, the late leader of the party Renamo, threatened to divide the country in two along the Save River if the government failed to address demands for political reform and changes to the security sector.
A decade later, however, the most significant challenge to Frelimo comes not from Renamo but from Mr. Mondlane. As the leader of an informal and dynamic movement, seen by many of his followers as something akin to a messiah sent to save the country, he has united urban youth alongside professionals such as teachers, doctors and even police officers, posing a novel threat to the ruling party’s dominance.
Economic determinants and a spreading crisis
Despite high expectations and optimism surrounding Mozambique’s coal and gas projects, the country remains in a precarious economic situation, burdened by successive crises. These include the infamous “tuna bond scandal,” in which a $2 billion hidden debt was uncovered, as well as natural disasters, insurgency, the Covid-19 pandemic and geopolitical turmoil. Beyond these crises, persistent structural challenges, including inadequate infrastructure, a lack of skilled labor, excessive regulation and limited economic diversification, continue to hinder Mozambique’s ability to capitalize on its natural resources and strategic location.
The fragility and vulnerability of the state’s power, often indistinguishable from Frelimo itself, are starkly evident in Cabo Delgado. Trying to contain violent insurgency in the region, Mozambique has resorted to solutions ranging from a regional force (the SAMIM, which withdrew in 2024) to the services of private military companies such as Russia’s Wagner group (which was also unsuccessful) and a bilateral agreement with Rwanda, under which Rwandan forces would provide security in Cabo Delgado.
Read more by African affairs expert Teresa Nogueira Pinto
- India makes its play for Africa
- Morocco’s firmer position in Western Sahara
- Kagame still holds Rwanda’s consensus together
However, despite recent advances by Rwandan forces, armed insurgency and illicit activities in Cabo Delgado persist. That has further undermined food security in a country where four out of five people depend on agriculture for subsistence. With only about 7 percent of Mozambique’s total land area being arable, this fragility is even more pronounced.
Frelimo’s economic strategy, or lack thereof, has also failed to address challenges in urban centers. Approximately 43 percent of Mozambique’s population is under the age of 15, and more than a third of those aged 20-25 are unemployed, leading to a crisis among the country’s youth. This economic context is relevant because, despite the economic disruption caused by recent protests and shutdowns, many feel like they have little left to lose.
Mr. Mondlane has warned that the ongoing phase of protests, which began in November, would seek to avoid violence but would significantly disrupt the economy. By mid-November, the Public Integrity Centre had declared these elections “the most expensive in Mozambique’s history,” estimating that 10 days of protests had cost the country 340 million euros, equivalent to 2 percent of its projected gross domestic product for 2024. Key sectors such as trade, transportation and services have been hit particularly hard and 1,200 jobs have been lost.

Mozambique’s strategic location − linking countries in south-central Africa with the continent’s southeastern coast and its logistic corridors − plays a vital role in regional value chains, connecting landlocked countries with the Indian Ocean via the Ports of Maputo, Beira and Nacala. However, recent protests and strikes have not only paralyzed major cities but have also disrupted transit flows along key trade corridors and operations at the Port of Maputo.
South Africa has been the neighboring country most affected by these disruptions. Border closures and the suspension of operations by some logistics companies have had a significant impact. The South African mining sector, in particular, has been exposed to severe disruptions. In 2023, more than half of South African chrome exports were transported through the Port of Maputo.
Now, many trucks carrying chrome are left stranded at blockades. The risks are expected to persist as Mr. Mondlane has called on truck drivers to join protests. Further disruptions and delays could lead to product shortages and rising prices in neighboring countries.
Scenarios
The medium- and long-term future of Mozambique, along with its impact on the region, will be shaped by several factors, including the progress or setbacks of liquefied natural gas (LNG) development projects, demographic trends and the decisions made by regional, continental and international actors such as the SADC, Rwanda and the United States.
At present, the critical factor will be the evolution of the country’s political and security situation. Within this context, a pair of related conclusions emerge. First, the political and economic model established after the civil war (1977-1992) has failed. Second, Frelimo will not be able to regain widespread support from the population.
Given these conditions, two possible scenarios for Mozambique and Southern Africa should be considered.
Most likely: Protests continue to rage and create regional risks
In the most likely scenario, violence and political uncertainty will persist in the coming months. While the predicament in Cabo Delgado is different from the post-electoral crisis, their concurrent nature further diminishes prospects for stabilization.
This outcome results from Mr. Mondlane’s unwillingness to compromise with Frelimo, as doing so would undermine his political capital. A transition to opposition leadership is highly unlikely, given Frelimo’s deep entrenchment in power and Mr. Mondlane’s lack of a strong organizational base. Additionally, the search for an effective mediator to the situation is unlikely to yield anything in the foreseeable future due to divisions within the SADC, which has a poor track record of resolving political and security crises. Also hampering hopes for foreign support to calm the situation is the transition between administrations in the U.S., which is Mozambique’s primary aid donor and a key source of foreign direct investment.
The prolongation of the current political deadlock is likely to have negative consequences for the South African economy, which has shown some signs of recovery since its coalition government came to power. Impacts are expected to go beyond the mining sector, namely through inflation or weakness of regional currencies. Towns along the border, which rely on trade along the Maputo Corridor, will be particularly affected. It will also worsen the economic outlook for neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe and Malawi, increasing the likelihood of social unrest and political contestation. Such prolonged violence would further increase the number of internally displaced persons and refugees in the region.
Moreover, ongoing uncertainty will hinder Mozambique’s ability to fully benefit from its LNG projects. While sales have increased significantly in recent years, the deterioration of the political and security situation could undermine production and deter further investment.
Less likely: International pressure leads to a negotiated resolution
The emergence of a negotiated solution under international pressure is feasible due to three factors: Mozambique’s high dependence on foreign aid, substantial foreign investment – particularly in LNG megaprojects and mining – and reliance on foreign troops to stabilize Cabo Delgado (with Rwandan forces expanding their operations).
However, this scenario remains unlikely because of Mr. Mondlane’s nationalist-populist stance, which consistently denounces foreign engagement as interference, and his apparent reluctance to negotiate a position within Frelimo’s power structures. While such a scenario, if it came to fruition, might offer temporary relief, it could also delay much-needed reforms. Given the persistent divisions within Mozambique, food crises and the fragility of its economy, ending the cycle of violence and poverty and harnessing the potential benefits of demographic changes would require a bottom-up, less centralized approach to political power. This would need to be paired with a comprehensive strategy for improving connectivity and revitalizing development corridors along key strategic routes.
Contact us today for tailored geopolitical insights and industry-specific advisory services.