China’s nuclear Silk Road
Once reliant on either Western or Russian terms, Global Majority countries now use China’s rise to demand better deals in nuclear development.
In a nutshell
- China offers end-to-end nuclear packages, from construction to financing
- Recipient countries use supplier competition to gain better terms
- Global Majority nations increasingly tie nuclear deals to broader goals
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China’s nuclear ambitions are evident in its growing presence across Asia, Africa and Latin America. Beijing offers a comprehensive package: technology, infrastructure development, power plant maintenance and financing throughout their lifecycle.
Contracts between China and recipient countries always grant extensive privileges and exemptions to Beijing, deepening Chinese presence. This growing network is often referred to as the “Nuclear Silk Road.”
Most analyses of the Nuclear Silk Road focus on China’s geopolitical goals. But an alternative view sees recipient countries not as passive targets, but as deliberate actors using Chinese investment to advance their own agendas. From Bangladesh to Egypt, from the Philippines to Kazakhstan, Global Majority countries are not submissive recipients of Chinese nuclear technology. They have figured out how to leverage competition between nuclear powers to secure better deals, enhance their international standing and break free from traditional diplomatic relationships.
The new nuclear playbook
For several decades, when a state needed nuclear power, it had to accept whatever terms the nuclear club offered. Russia dominated the market with its state-owned Rosatom. Western companies like Westinghouse (United States-based and now Canadian owned) and Areva (France) controlled the high-end segment. Countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh or Egypt had little choice but to accept unfavorable financing terms and limited technology transfer.
Beijing’s entry into the global nuclear market altered the power dynamics. Global Majority countries gained options. They can now pit Chinese offers against Russian, American, French and South Korean proposals, demanding better financing terms, more technology transfer and greater control over their nuclear programs.
Western companies are now struggling to compete with increasingly attractive financing packages from China and Russia. Beijing has committed to building at least 30 nuclear reactors in countries participating in its Belt and Road Initiative by 2030.
Pakistan
Karachi’s nuclear relationship with Beijing goes back decades, but it has evolved into something far more complex than a simple dependency. China has built multiple reactors in Pakistan, including the massive Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. Chinese financing has made these projects possible when Western banks refused to get involved. But Pakistan continues operating nuclear facilities built with Canadian and French technology. They also maintain their domestic nuclear weapons program.
The Pakistani government has been careful to ensure it always has alternatives if any single partner becomes too demanding. A nuclear program has enhanced the country’s energy security, elevated its technological profile, and strengthened its position in South Asia. Chinese involvement has also opened doors to additional infrastructure investment through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Most importantly, Pakistan has demonstrated that Global Majority countries can engage with Chinese nuclear technology without surrendering their sovereignty. They have shown other nations that it is possible to benefit from great power competition without becoming a client state of any one nation.
Southeast Asia
Southeast Asian countries have turned nuclear acquisition into a complex bargaining exercise, comparing offers from multiple suppliers and extracting maximum concessions. Bangladesh, for example, is building its first nuclear power plant with Russian technology and financing. Meanwhile, Dhaka is simultaneously exploring partnerships with Chinese, South Korean and Western suppliers for future projects.
After decades without nuclear power, Manila is carefully evaluating multiple nuclear technologies and suppliers. The Philippines is not rushing into any single partnership. Instead, it is building domestic regulatory capabilities while keeping all options open. This deliberate approach gives the country more clout in negotiations with suppliers.
Chinese companies offer attractive financing and rapid construction timelines. Russian firms provide proven technology and comprehensive fuel cycle services. Western vendors emphasize safety standards and regulatory compliance.
Rather than choosing sides, the Philippines is positioning itself to extract the best elements from each offer. It is demanding technology transfer, local content requirements and favorable financing terms that would have been unthinkable when nuclear suppliers held all the cards.
Middle East
Major Middle Eastern players like Egypt and Turkiye are using nuclear partnerships to enhance their regional influence while maintaining strategic flexibility. In Egypt, the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant, built with Russian technology and financing, serves multiple objectives. It provides energy diversification, positions Egypt as a regional leader in technology and strengthens Cairo’s relationship with Moscow as a counterbalance to Western influence.
But Egypt has not closed the door on other partnerships. The country maintains relationships with Chinese nuclear companies and has explored cooperation with Western suppliers.
Turkiye, despite its NATO membership and ties to the West, is pursuing a nuclear partnership with Russia while also discussing options with China. The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, built and managed by Rosatom, shows Ankara’s efforts to enhance its autonomy even within the Western alliance.
Kazakhstan
Like all Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan inherited substantial nuclear infrastructure and expertise from the Soviet era. It also has the world’s largest uranium reserve.
Astana has secured Chinese investment in uranium mining and processing while maintaining its position as a key supplier to Western nuclear programs. Kazakhstan has also explored partnerships for advanced nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors.
The strategy extends beyond commercial relationships. The Kazakh government has leveraged its nuclear expertise to enhance its diplomatic influence, hosting international nuclear security summits and positioning itself as a responsible steward of nuclear affairs. This approach has elevated the country’s international profile while creating new opportunities for cooperation.
Multipolar nuclear tactics
Despite different contexts, countries that have effectively advanced their nuclear ambitions through the Nuclear Silk Road tend to follow a similar approach. First, rather than relying on a single supplier, they build relationships with Chinese, Western and Russian partners.
Second, they invest in domestic capabilities. They build domestic regulatory frameworks, train local engineers and develop indigenous nuclear expertise. This aims to reduce long-term dependency while enhancing their ability to manage nuclear partnerships more effectively.
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Third, they pit nuclear suppliers against each other to secure better terms, greater technology transfer and more control over their nuclear programs.
Fourth, they do not rush into nuclear partnerships. Successful countries take time to evaluate options and secure favorable terms. They understand that nuclear partnerships are long-term commitments that require careful planning.
Finally, they integrate nuclear strategies with broader foreign policy objectives. Nuclear partnerships are not just about electricity generation; they are tools for enhancing energy security, elevating international standing and strengthening autonomy.
Scenarios
Most likely: Recipient states will welcome all major nuclear players
The most likely scenario is that Global Majority countries will continue to benefit from the competition between nuclear suppliers. They will accept domestic presence from established atomic powers and even grant them some prerogatives. But they will skillfully play them off against one another, constantly renegotiating terms to their own advantage.
Less likely: Nuclear suppliers push back
A less probable scenario involves a backlash from the leading nuclear nations, which could demand more alignment or even binding commitments from the recipient. In this case, the agency of the developing nations would be curtailed, and they would need to adapt their approach.
In this scenario, many Global Majority countries would likely abandon their nuclear projects, shifting to other technologies that allow them greater negotiating power. Some others would likely align themselves with the nuclear country offering the most favorable terms, especially when it comes to financing. This would give Russia and China an advantage, effectively eliminating France from the equation.
Unlikely: Global Majority countries build their own nuclear and financial ecosystems
An unlikely scenario involves Global Majority countries developing their nuclear technology and alternative investment or financing system, which they would use to enhance cooperation among themselves. Few countries are positioned to step up their capabilities, but India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Brazil and Egypt might be able to do so. In this scenario, recipient countries would be completely emancipated from the geopolitical struggle among the major nuclear powers.
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