Nuclear stalemate gives way to Cold War II arms race
A renewal of nuclear weapons testing exposes mounting risks, collapsing treaties and a new era of proliferation shaping the second Cold War.
In a nutshell
- Russia uses nuclear coercion in Ukraine to deter Western intervention
- Arms control treaties fade, encouraging nuclear escalation globally
- Unchecked proliferation risks nuclear anarchy involving rogue actors
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United States President Donald Trump’s unexpected announcement about the resumption of nuclear weapons testing sparked a flurry of commentary and brought the topic of nuclear weapons to the forefront of the security debate. This development is worth considering in the context of the ongoing second Cold War, which Russia launched against the West over a decade ago. From the outset, President Vladimir Putin has treated nuclear weapons as a key instrument of blackmail, both directly in his hot war in Ukraine and in the broader neo-Cold War confrontation with the West.
Let us begin with a brief look at the evolution of this topic to date: from Cold War I in the 20th century, through the post-Cold War period to the present era of Cold War II.
Nuclear weapons were the primary determinant of Cold War I. They established the nature and course of the rivalry between the world’s strategic poles at the time: the U.S. with its NATO allies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union with its Warsaw Pact allies on the other. The initial imbalance in nuclear weapons was quickly neutralized as the USSR caught up with the U.S. in developing and perfecting its nuclear arsenal. The resulting balance, at all levels from tactical to strategic, led to a situation in which nuclear war became unwinnable, which is why waging it ceased to be perceived as a rational instrument of policy. This led to the emergence of Cold War I as a strategic confrontation between nuclear powers, below the threshold of kinetic war, while both sides leveraged the nuclear threat for deterrence and mutual coercion.
This strategic approach was reflected in the principle of mutually assured destruction, which expressed the commonly held belief that in a nuclear war, regardless of who initiated it, the destruction of both warring parties would be inevitable due to a guaranteed retaliatory strike. Nuclear weapons and the risk of ultimate escalation were the Sword of Damocles hanging over the world: utterly destructive, with very fragile safeguards. It should be noted that after the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the risk of a U.S.-Soviet conflict was at its peak, arms-control measures were increasingly strengthened through agreements on the reduction and mutual monitoring of nuclear arsenals of the two major world powers.
Post-Cold War nuclear weapons developments
Since the early 1990s, the issue of potential nuclear confrontation between the erstwhile superpowers naturally faded into the background. Instead, a qualitatively new phenomenon emerged: asymmetric nuclear threats. North Korea became a prominent example. With a small nuclear arsenal capable of reaching strategic U.S. facilities, especially on the North American continent, it could and did effectively exert strategic pressure on the world’s largest power with threats of striking American cities.
A similar risk was posed by the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by other so-called rogue states, including Iran. At that time, the risk of non-state actors acquiring or using nuclear weapons emerged, particularly through terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. Missile defense became a response to these asymmetric, selective nuclear threats. Systems capable of intercepting single or small numbers of missiles were developed on a large scale, protecting against threats by so-called strategic asymmetrists − adversarial entities with limited nuclear potential.
Over time, however, missile defense developed to the point where it began to play a crucial role in the nuclear balance. Concerns have arisen that missile defense systems might offer sufficient protection against nuclear strikes, including retaliatory ones, and could encourage a first strike. This undermines the principle of mutually assured destruction on which nuclear deterrence and strategic balance are based.
The new Cold War
Cold War II has been characterized by the emergence of another new phenomenon in nuclear affairs: the use of nuclear deterrence in a war waged by a nuclear power against a non-nuclear state. This is exemplified by Russia’s war on Ukraine. Russia uses its arsenal as leverage not only against Ukraine, primarily with tactical nuclear weapons, but also, and perhaps even primarily, against the West, including the U.S. and Europe, to discourage it from supporting Ukraine. This is an important element of Russia’s strategy, as Western support for Ukraine is a key factor in the war. Without it, Ukraine would quickly lose.
Moscow’s strategy has been largely effective so far. This was reflected, for example, in former U.S. President Joe Biden’s cautious, incremental support in the initial phase of the war, delaying political, and therefore strategic and logistical decisions. Naturally, this led to negative consequences for Ukraine, including the disastrous defeat of its largest counteroffensive in the south in the summer and fall of 2023.
President Putin frequently rattles the “nuclear saber,” emphasizing Russia’s possession of such weapons from the very beginning of the war to hedge his aggression against possible Western operational intervention on Ukraine’s side. He periodically alludes to a possible “Ukrainian provocation” involving a dirty bomb – a conventional device containing radioactive material – or “false flag” sabotage of nuclear power plants. A particular type of pressure on the West has been the disclosure of new nuclear weapon delivery systems – especially the Oreshnik (used in Ukraine), Burevestnik and Poseidon missile systems.
The erosion of treaties on nuclear weapons
Above all, Russia has long been in practical violation of the treaty on the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, namely land-based continental nuclear weapons with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, as distinguished from intercontinental missiles. These weapons fall under the scope of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Iskander missiles, with their extended range of over 500 kilometers, and more recently, Oreshnik missiles, are practical examples of such violations.
The INF Treaty is no longer in force, and neither is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Limitations Treaty. The all-important New START Treaty, which reduces and controls the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, is also at serious risk, as it expires on February 5.
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In such uncertain and risky conditions, Vladimir Putin recently overplayed his aggressive nuclear coercion, to which Washington promptly reacted. President Trump, typically unpredictable, suddenly announced America’s return to nuclear weapons testing. Cold War II is increasingly taking on the trappings of Cold War I, entering its ruts and grooves, raising the question: What direction might nuclear policy take?
Facts & figures
Three paths of potential nuclear arms developments
Scenarios
What are the potential scenarios for the nuclear dimension of Cold War II? Broadly speaking, there are three scenarios: an escalatory nuclear arms race (gray path), treaty-based multilateral nuclear arms control and de-escalation (pink path), and catastrophic nuclear anarchy (black path).
Most likely: Major nuclear powers’ arms race escalation
The first scenario, a nuclear arms race escalation, seems most likely. Even if the New START Treaty on Strategic Nuclear Weapons between the U.S. and Russia were to be extended, the race would likely continue at the non-strategic arms level. However, unlike in Cold War I, this would not be a bilateral race, but a trilateral one with significant Chinese involvement. Under this scenario, we can expect U.S. activity in achieving balance in tactical and continental nuclear weapons, a situation in which Russia currently has a vast, approximately 10-fold advantage in the European theater of war. The advantage is not only numerical, but also qualitative, as the U.S. has only aerial bombs as tactical nuclear weapons, while Russia has the entire range of the tactical nuclear triad, with Iskanders and Oreshniks as examples of their land dimension.
This scenario seems particularly risky for Russia. President Putin is perhaps unwittingly setting Russia on the course of the Soviet Union during Cold War I, which the USSR ultimately lost. That came largely from the attempt to meet the economically, technologically, militarily and socially demanding arms race, in which President Ronald Reagan’s so-called Star Wars program became the symbol of Washington’s challenge to Moscow.
In a potential Cold War II arms race, Russia would suffer a similar defeat. This is especially true since it would be competing against not one, but two rivals. Of the three participating powers, it would be the weakest economically.
Looking further in this scenario, it is worth considering what key development could alter the course of a new nuclear arms race. The Cuban Missile Crisis during Cold War I halted the escalation and led to treaty-regulated de-escalation. Could, for example, the long-running war in Ukraine play such a role at some point? Could it be a possible attempt at limited Russian aggression against NATO in the Baltic region after a victorious conclusion of the war with Ukraine? Or perhaps a conflict over the Arctic or Taiwan?
There could be many such points along the path of a neo-Cold War escalation of nuclear risks. It seems very likely that such a strategic nuclear turning point may prove to be the only salvation from a definitive catastrophe, although it could also result in a continuation of the arms race, perhaps in a more controlled form.
Unlikely in near term: Three global powers agree to arms race de-escalation
This brings us to the second and more optimistic scenario: multilateral treaty-based nuclear arms control and de-escalation involving the U.S., Russia and China, and perhaps – in the most optimistic version – other nuclear players as well.
It is unlikely that this, instead of the escalatory arms race discussed above, will begin to materialize soon. But it could more likely come as a consequence of a previously discussed “nuclear crisis tipping point” in Cold War II. Such a scenario would require political will beyond inter-power contradictions, stemming from an understanding of the gravity and danger of the situation, among all relevant players. For example, China would have to be granted greater freedom than the U.S. and Russia to develop its strategic arsenal, or these powers would have to agree to greater reductions in their strategic arsenals than before. Some limits on non-strategic weapons would likely have to be introduced at the operational and tactical levels.
It is possible that such treaties should also include the arsenals of, for example, France and the United Kingdom. Due to the many conditions that would need to be met for this scenario to occur, its probability, especially in the short and medium term, seems low.
Also very likely: Widespread nuclear proliferation
The scenario of strategic nuclear anarchy resulting from uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons is very likely, perhaps on par with the likelihood of the first scenario. This could follow the arms race among great powers, especially following a collapse of attempts to regulate nuclear arms by treaty.
Under such conditions, especially after the events of Russian aggression against Ukraine or the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, states that can acquire nuclear weapons will do so. There are many such potential candidates worldwide: Japan, South Korea, Australia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Egypt and perhaps some European countries, like Germany, Ukraine, Sweden or Poland.
In a multipolar nuclear world, the possibility of such weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors would exponentially increase. Various local crises and conflicts would emerge, including wars involving the risk or actual use of nuclear weapons, which would threaten a major global catastrophe. This is the worst-case scenario.
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