SECURITYFebruary 16, 2026

Nuclear deterrence after arms control collapse

Rudolf G. Adam

Reading time: 12 min

Post-Cold War nuclear stability is eroding as treaties lapse, proliferation spreads and tactical deterrence gains prominence in a multipolar world.

After the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan to force the end of World War II in the Pacific in August 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used in war. Yet the ensuing 80 years have witnessed over 3,000 nuclear test explosions for military purposes. That span can be subdivided into three periods.

The mounting dangers of global, all-out nuclear war lasted from 1949 to 1969 and were highlighted by the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. That period gave way to an American-Russian detente and a quick succession of treaties on nuclear non-proliferation, limiting missile defense, and nuclear arms reduction and control. From 1970 to about 1992, the system of nuclear arms control was complemented by limitations on conventional weapons and agreements on confidence-building measures. In the subsequent years, almost all agreements on arms control and disarmament lapsed.

Until February 4, 2026, Russia and the U.S. were party to New START, which imposed limits on deployed warheads and strategic delivery vehicles for both countries. The treaty expired at the end of that day, terminating an era of cooperative threat reduction that began in 1972. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said it was a “grave moment” for international peace and security and that the risk of nuclear weapons being used in conflict was “the highest in decades.” The U.S. and Russia are now mulling whether to continue adhering to the caps for a limited time, while other possibilities being floated seek to bring China into talks on nuclear arms control.

New threats in a new era

The threat of nuclear war resurfaced on February 24, 2022, the day Russia launched its war on Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened: “Whoever tries to interfere with us … should know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead to such consequences they have never experienced in their history.” This was understood as a threat to unleash nuclear attacks on countries that lent military support to Ukraine. He doubled down on that threat later that same year: “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.”

This saber-rattling has been repeated by high-ranking representatives of Russia, including former president and prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev. Russian state media have televised simulated nuclear attacks on countries in Western Europe, and presenter Vladimir Solovyov is known to use his broadcasts to threaten European countries with nuclear annihilation.

The need for nuclear deterrence and the options to further develop nuclear weapons have suddenly resurfaced after being dormant for half a century. Here are six theses about the future role of nuclear weapons.

• The world is not reverting to a new cold war.
• There is no return to bilateral arms control and disarmament.
• Proliferation has slowed, but not stopped the spread of nuclear weapons. At the end of this century, a world with more than a dozen nuclear weapon states is far more probable than a world without nuclear weapons.
• The backbone of nuclear deterrence will shift from strategic delivery vehicles to intermediate and short-range tactical or battlefield weapons.
• The threshold against the use of nuclear weapons is eroding.
• The relative usefulness of nuclear weapons diminishes as smarter, less destructive and more selective conventional weapons systems emerge.

The world is not reverting to the Cold War

Some observers deplore a relapse into another cold war. Many argue that the way ahead should be in reviving the arms control and disarmament frameworks that helped to overcome the period of utter confrontation. Both assumptions overlook fundamental changes that distinguish the present situation from the Cold War, which was an exceptional period in history. Two superpowers, situated on opposite hemispheres of the globe with no common border, threatened each other with total obliteration, not because of conflicting geopolitical interests, but due to irreconcilable ideologies.

The bone of contention was divided Germany. It was a bipolar world whose equilibrium was stabilized by clear escalation paths and foreseeable consequences. Both nuclear superpowers accepted parity and avoided potentially disastrous direct military clashes. Deterrence was supposed to be guaranteed by mutually assured destruction. Nuclear war would escalate within minutes to an all-out global conflagration (“nuclear Armageddon”). It was assumed that the principal targets would be cities, as they had been the targets of the two nuclear bombs already used in war.

The hope of a world free of nuclear weapons will remain an empty illusion. There will be no return to the regime of mutual arms control. As bipolarity is gone, so is the concept of mutually assured destruction. Nuclear weapons will retain their principal role of instilling fear and limiting military options of societies that are more vulnerable against nuclear threats – both physically and psychologically.

No return to bilateral arms control and disarmament

Today, there are three nuclear superpowers. By 2030, China is likely to have two-thirds the nuclear potential of Russia and the U.S., and about three to eight times the size of smaller nuclear powers. Any future agreement on the limitation of offensive nuclear weapons would make little sense if it did not include China. And as Europe seeks more strategic autonomy, the nuclear capabilities of the continent’s powers will become more difficult to ignore.

There is little hope of reviving traditional patterns of nuclear disarmament. A trilateral relationship is incomparably more complicated than a bilateral one. It is impossible to define equilibrium in such a complex network. India, for example, has to calculate its nuclear posture both with a view to China and to Pakistan, while the U.S. has to prepare for a simultaneous conflict with Russia, China and North Korea.

Any treaty limiting nuclear capabilities among more than two parties will run into practically unsolvable problems of defining an equitable balance of forces.

Proliferation has slowed but not stopped

Today, the five recognized nuclear powers have been joined by four de facto nuclear powers: Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Iran seems to be on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons. There are at least another 10 countries with nuclear ambitions. Should the belief in America’s extended nuclear deterrence erode further, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan could go nuclear in less than two years. Indonesia and Australia rely on the U.S. deterrence in the Pacific. Should they come to doubt Washington’s resolve to contain China, they too could be tempted to build their own nuclear deterrence. Should Iran achieve a nuclear defense capability, its regional neighbors, such as Turkiye, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, would have a strong incentive to balance that potential.

Given its historical experiences between two mighty neighbors, Poland may consider its own nuclear deterrent should it come to doubt the nuclear guarantees from NATO. There is even talk of Germany shedding its treaty obligations not to develop nuclear weapons. Yet Germany is also facing a collapse of nuclear expertise after renouncing nuclear power. There is no practical military development path for nuclear technology without the broad use of nuclear energy, as civilian power plants supply the material for military applications.

From strategic to tactical nuclear deterrence

The nuclear stability of the past rested on American nuclear guarantees and the dominance of strategic delivery systems. The first condition has come under doubt, the second is obsolete. Of the present nine nuclear powers, five are in Asia and share common borders. For a conflict between them, strategic systems are not required. Intermediate (500-5,500 kilometers) or tactical systems (less than 500 kilometers) are much better suited.

China could reach Warsaw with an intermediate-range missile. Russia can reach the whole of Europe and Asia with intermediate missiles. Russia lies within the range of intermediate missiles from all nuclear powers in Asia. From the Eurasian continent, only the U.S., Australia and Africa require delivery vehicles with intercontinental ranges. The distance between the cities of Amritsar in India and Lahore in Pakistan is less than 50 kilometers. Short-range systems are sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage. Intercontinental delivery systems are unnecessary for intra-continental conflicts.

Strategic systems offer the threat of retaliation. They are likely to provoke a massive reaction, whereas tactical and intermediate systems can actually help to gain operative advantages on the battlefield with limited risk, because they would not directly threaten the survival of the adversary. Such systems could weaken an opponent’s offensive potential without disarming them, and their use is unlikely to lead automatically to a full exchange of strategic arsenals.

It is much more likely that a first-strike use of an individual nuclear device, perhaps a tactical weapon used against a military target, would hasten diplomatic efforts to prevent any further nuclear escalation. Not only would the two belligerents have every incentive to avoid a slippery slope toward mutual destruction; the rest of the world would exert the utmost pressure to contain a nuclear conflict to one single explosion. Self-preservation is more important than the destruction of any enemy. This was the assumption underlying NATO’s nuclear posture during the Cold War. It calculated that the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries might force NATO to cross the nuclear threshold and that after a tactical nuclear warning, the conflict could be settled.

The threshold to use of nuclear weapons is lowering

There is another crucial difference between the Cold War and today. Sixty years ago, nuclear warheads were huge, strategic missiles that had an accuracy of several hundred meters. Today’s warheads are small; unwanted side effects like radioactive fallout have been significantly reduced. The megaton-warheads have given way to smaller ones with yields in kilotons. Today, the accuracy of delivery vehicles is within a few meters. Precise targeting means less destructive power is needed.

Read more on deterrence

• Nuclear stalemate gives way to Cold War II arms race
• Delhi’s ambitious plan for naval power and strategic deterrence
• Russia’s strategy in sending tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus

The last difference is psychological. Politicians and generals who today decide on military operations have no direct experience of nuclear explosions. The last atmospheric nuclear test was in 1980. Whereas people older than 60 years of age live with vivid images of the mushroom cloud, those younger have only theoretical knowledge about nuclear weapons. The nuclear taboo is fraying. Presidents Putin and Trump have both remarked that if you have nuclear weapons, you might as well use them. What do we know about the planning among generals in North Korea, Pakistan or India?

The most dangerous aspect of nuclear deterrence remains its reliance on rational calculations. Deterrence is not a function of weapon inventories. The political resolve to actually use that potential is decisive. Deterrence is about risk-taking. The side more averse to risk is more likely to make concessions faced with nuclear blackmail.

The advent of smarter, less destructive and more selective weapons systems

While the idea of limited nuclear exchange is reemerging, it is also highly unlikely that a nuclear weapon would target a city. Such a move would be regarded as disproportionate, causing a global outcry while uniting most of the international community against the state that committed the atrocity. At the same time, remarkable progress in conventional weapons systems, particularly automated platforms like drones and their use of artificial intelligence, opens up new options in warfare. The military and political ramifications stemming from the use smaller and more accurate weapons are more easily contained. Only countries that do not have sufficiently strong conventional weapons would feel tempted to go nuclear.

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