Peru’s presidency up for grabs but congress still in charge
The impeachment and congressional appointment of a new president only months before elections underscores the weakness of Peru’s executive branch.
In a nutshell
- Lawmakers consolidate power while weakening executive authority
- Economy stable despite political volatility, masking decay and security risks
- Outsiders figure in elections as voters fed up with established candidates
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In the early hours of October 10, 2025, Peru’s congress removed President Dina Boluarte from office on the grounds of “permanent moral incapacity” in an impeachment vote that passed 122-0. Later that morning, President of Congress Jose Jeri was sworn in as the country’s head of state. Ms. Boluarte’s ouster was precipitated by an alarming surge in violent crime and a shooting at a concert in Lima, which left five people injured. The vote also marked the latest episode in a long line of institutional crises that have made Peru the most politically unstable democracy in Latin America.
Ms. Boluarte’s dismissal marked the culmination of three years of drift, scandal and repression. Regularly described as one of the world’s least popular leaders, she had governed since December 2022 as a hostage of the right-wing congressional bloc that propped up her presidency. That alliance benefited from a pliant executive willing to accept almost any policy demand in exchange for survival. But with the April 2026 elections approaching, and urban crime and transport strikes paralyzing Lima, her allies turned on her.
While Latin American politics is trending to the right, Peru’s right-wing government orientation may face outsider challenges. Yet the country’s power-brokers, while not delivering reforms, maintain economic stability and, like in neighboring Latin American countries, the government may opt for hardline domestic security measures to maintain support from the electorate. Despite churn in the executive branch, investors and Peruvians themselves largely take the country’s political volatility in stride, and that is set to continue.
Despite churn in the executive branch, investors and Peruvians themselves largely take the country’s political volatility in stride, and that is set to continue.
If anything, it is surprising Ms. Boluarte lasted so long. Her survival was never guaranteed. She took office after her predecessor Pedro Castillo (July 2021-December 2022) was arrested following a failed self-coup in which he tried to dissolve the country’s unicameral legislature and intervene in the judiciary and other state institutions. She inherited a fractured country, an emboldened congress and a restive public. From the outset, her legitimacy was fragile. While she was originally elected on Mr. Castillo’s ticket, she quickly aligned herself with conservative congressional factions to avoid his fate, but alienated much of the left, antagonized unions and earned the distrust of regional elites in the process.
Ms. Boluarte quickly became the embodiment of a broader system’s decay. She disappeared for several weeks early in her term without informing the country, was photographed wearing expensive luxury watches she could not afford on a government salary and faced continuous investigations into illegal enrichment and abuse of office. Her administration also weathered the resignation of four prime ministers in less than three years and recurring accusations of repression following deadly anti-government protests in the country’s highlands. By mid-2025, her approval rating – which had lingered in the single digits for most of her presidency – reached a nadir of just 2 percent, the lowest recorded for any sitting president in Peru’s democratic era.
The final catalyst for her downfall came not from a single scandal, but from congress’s calculation that she had become more a liability than an asset. Public frustration over security failures, compounded by transport strikes and economic stagnation, gave legislators an opportunity to act without paying a political price. Ms. Boluarte’s impeachment was co-sponsored by seven ideologically diverse blocs, from the far-left Peru Libre to the far-right Renovacion Popular. The same congress that had tolerated her weakness as a means of control now used it to justify her removal. In doing so, it reaffirmed its supremacy over the chief executive.
The rise of Jose Jeri
Mr. Jeri assumed the presidency with a minuscule popular mandate, a negligible legislative base and limited governing experience. The 38 year-old conservative lawyer from the centrist Somos Peru party became president by virtue of his position as head of the legislature, making him the seventh Peruvian leader in just nine years. Yet, Mr. Jeri was tainted by scandal even before entering the presidential palace. In early 2025, he was accused of rape (charges later dismissed for lack of evidence) as well as influence-peddling.
His cabinet is led by Prime Minister Ernesto Alvarez, a respected former president of the Constitutional Court and figure from the conservative Partido Popular Cristiano. The lineup includes holdovers from the Boluarte administration, such as Economy and Finance Minister Denisse Miralles, signaling continuity in fiscal policy and reassurance to investors. Notably, congressional approval came with strings attached. Specifically, none of the cabinet members would be allowed to run in the 2026 elections, a clear signal that Peru’s congress continues to set the terms of power.
And while markets barely reacted to the transition, political calm has not led to social peace. Within a week of Mr. Jeri’s inauguration, a protester was killed in Lima during clashes with police. The government declared a state of emergency in the capital and neighboring Callao, granting the security forces broad powers to detain demonstrators. While the acting president publicly described protests as a legitimate form of civic expression, his administration simultaneously authorized repressive measures.
Ultimately, the president’s right-wing support is contingent on his willingness to maintain a hard line on security and to protect congressional prerogatives. In this sense, Mr. Jeri’s government is less a presidency than an administrative extension of the legislature’s dominance.
Congressional supremacy and the hollow presidency
Peru’s democracy is in a tough spot. Of the country’s last six elected presidents, only interim leader Francisco Sagasti (2020-2021) left office of his own volition. Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (2016-2018), Martin Vizcarra (2018-2020), Pedro Castillo (2021-2022) and now Dina Boluarte were all impeached by congress. Manuel Merino, who briefly succeeded Mr. Vizcarra, resigned after just five days. The pattern reveals a structural flaw insofar as the country’s hybrid institutional design enables lawmakers to dominate a weak executive branch.
All of this dysfunction speaks to a bigger issue: Peru is a presidential democracy that has become a semi-presidential or even a proto-parliamentary system. This means dual executives − usually, a president and a prime minister − in which it is constitutionally possible for the parliamentary majority to oust the cabinet and its head in a no-confidence vote. Regardless of the governance classification, what is clear is that, unlike the rest of Latin America, contemporary Peruvian politics is characterized by parliamentary agenda-setting and weak presidents. Congress not only impeaches presidents but also controls the national budget, cabinet approvals and key appointments.
With presidents stripped of initiative and legitimacy, and institutions hollowed by politicization, governance has become reactive and transactional. Judicial independence has eroded and regulatory agencies are routinely captured by partisan interests. The emerging system is oligarchical, where a handful of entrenched figures exercise control behind the facade of democracy.
A constitutional reform in 2024 reinstated a bicameral legislature, with the changes taking effect with the 2026 elections, reversing former president Alberto Fujimori’s 1992 abolition of the upper chamber. The reform was presented as a step toward institutional balance, but in practice it further entrenches congressional power. The new senate will share budgetary and oversight authority with the lower house, effectively multiplying veto powers. Under this arrangement, legislators prefer weak presidents who can absorb public anger while they control the budget and patronage. It also explains why Peru’s democracy has survived without collapsing into a dictatorship, but has lost the ability to deliver coherent policy.
Peru’s governance breakdown and economic implications
The paradox of Peru’s current political economy is that chronic instability has not yet caused an economic collapse. The country continues to register moderate growth, maintain low levels of debt and keep inflation in check. Investors, accustomed to turbulence, have taken repeated constitutional crises in stride. However, the deeper risks are mounting.
Congress’s budgetary supremacy means that fiscal policy has become both the anchor of stability and a potential source of vulnerability. The legislature has repeatedly used its control of appropriations to reward allies, fund patronage networks and obstruct executive initiatives. While the country’s Fiscal Council has warned of a looming debt imbalance, the perception that Peru’s technocratic bureaucracy can “keep the lights on” has subdued market alarm. This calm, however, may be deceptive. Without coherent national leadership, investment decisions are increasingly politicized, regulatory agencies have been hollowed out, and long-term infrastructure and mining projects face growing uncertainty.
Mining remains the backbone of Peru’s economy, accounting for nearly 10 percent of gross domestic product and more than half of export revenues. Yet the sector has become a flashpoint for social conflict. The government’s chaotic management of the Registro Integral de Formalizacion Minera program (aimed at establishing stable, recognized conditions for so-called informal miners), which was slashed without a viable replacement, has triggered repeated protests. Clashes between police and the informal miners in Arequipa and La Libertad have turned deadly, while rural militias known as rondas campesinas (“peasant patrols”) have joined demonstrations against what they call “the policy of exclusion and abandonment.”
Peru’s security situation, while not yet as dire as neighboring Ecuador’s, has also deteriorated. Homicides and extortion have surged, while organized criminal networks exploit porous borders and corrupt institutions. As extortion metastasizes, public faith in institutions continues to collapse. Polls show nearly 40 percent of Peruvians plan to vote blank or null in April’s elections. President Jeri’s vulnerability is such that even minor missteps could credibly invite yet another impeachment. As such, he has adopted a hardline mano dura (“firm hand”) rhetoric which reflects both genuine public demand and political calculation. In a context where presidents struggle to deliver economic growth, promising order becomes a viable reelection strategy.
Peru’s discredited political class
High voter disapproval of Keiko Fujimori and Cesar Acuna, the two top right-wing presidential contenders for 2026, means that a continuation of the right holding power is not assured. If the recent past is any indication, the most likely victor will be an outsider candidate who defies ideological placement. As of writing, 34 candidates have registered to compete in the election, including Carlos Alvarez, a popular comedian, and George Forsyth, a former soccer goalkeeper. Moreover, according to IPSOS Peru, nearly half the electorate is undecided, making it difficult to predict who the leading candidates may be.
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Nonetheless, the Fujimori family continues to loom large in this landscape. Despite Alberto Fujimori’s death in 2024 and Keiko Fujimori’s repeated runoff defeats, the Fuerza Popular party’s network retains significant congressional influence. Ms. Fujimori’s legal troubles may yet disqualify her from running, but her party’s legislative machine ensures she remains a power broker. The paradox of modern Peruvian politics is that while no president endures, certain congressional coalitions, often anchored by Fujimorismo or regional parties like Alianza para el Progreso, persist across administrations.
This control explains why markets remain relatively calm amid the country’s political chaos. Investors have come to view Peru’s congress as the ultimate guarantor of economic orthodoxy, even as citizens see it as the principal obstacle to democracy. As the 2026 elections approach, the question is no longer who will be president, but whether the office itself still matters.
Scenarios
Most likely: Managed continuity in Peruvian governance
The most likely scenario for Peru post-election is one of continuity without renewal. In this scenario, Mr. Jeri weathers the strikes and protests, preserving a modicum of stability until the April elections, while the transition to a bicameral legislature restores some institutional predictability. Meanwhile, fiscal orthodoxy and high commodity prices sustain investor confidence. Congress, though still dominant, refrains from further impeachments to avoid international backlash. The new president secures a tenuous coalition capable of passing minimal reforms, allowing the country to avoid economic crisis but keeping it trapped in a cycle of elite dominance and public alienation. Ultimately, these moves perpetuate the status quo, and Peru preserves its reputation as a low-drama investment environment despite political churn.
Possible: Populist disruption from a political outsider triggers deterioration
It is possible that political crises, combined with frequent changes of weak presidents and corruption fatigue, pave the way for a populist outsider, possibly from the provinces or with a security background, to channel frustration into a new anti-system movement. In this situation, the winner, lacking congressional support, clashes with an empowered legislature from day one. The ensuing stalemate leads to more protests, policy paralysis and further erosion of trust. Economic fundamentals hold for a time, but capital flight accelerates as governance deteriorates. The risk of social unrest spreads from mining corridors to urban centers, testing the resilience of Peru’s democratic institutions.
Least likely: Institutional meltdown in Lima
A complete institutional breakdown is probably the least likely scenario for Peru, partly because it would hurt entrenched political and economic interests the most. However, if Mr. Jeri fails to survive until the next elections, the country could face another succession crisis. Repeated interim governments would deepen public cynicism and embolden radical movements. A breakdown of security in key mining regions or a violent confrontation between protesters and security forces could precipitate a nationwide state of exception. In this environment, voter abstention soars and a hardline authoritarian wins by default. The presidency becomes ceremonial, confirming Peru’s backsliding into a hybrid regime which is neither purely democratic nor purely authoritarian.
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