A new railway highlights regional dynamics in Central Asia
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are strengthening their economic ties with China through an ambitious railway project linking the three countries along the historical Silk Road.

In a nutshell
- New railway to commence after three decades of debates
- Its impact on European transit from China could be overrated
- Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s historical ties to Russia will remain while economic ties to China will increase
Preparations for the construction of a railway connecting China, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are advancing rapidly. The feasibility study for the Kyrgyz section, which was undertaken and completed in 2022, was formally approved by all three countries in June 2023. This paved the way for the signing and ratification of an intergovernmental agreement, which took place in June 2024.
Stretching over 450 kilometers in total, the rail line will connect Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang province to Torugart, the Kyrgyz border crossing, and continue through Kyrgyzstan taking a northern detour to the Makmal gold mine. It will then proceed to the city of Jalal-Abad in southern Kyrgyzstan and link up with the existing railway to Andijan in Uzbekistan.
The total cost of the 280-kilometer section running through Kyrgyzstan is estimated at $4.7 billion. Half of the funding is expected to come from equity, proportional to the shares held by each party in the tripartite venture, while the other half will likely be financed through debt provided by Chinese state-owned banks. The project is reportedly structured as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) concession, meaning that after a period of cost recovery and profit, the Kyrgyz section of the railway could eventually be transferred to the ownership of the Kyrgyz government.
The railway will have an overall capacity of 15 million tons per year and will serve as a gateway to China’s coastal ports for Central Asian nations. Currently, the Chinese market is primarily accessed by land through Kazakhstan, which is connected by two railway crossings with China, and via Russia’s Trans-Siberian railway. Due to the differing railway gauges between China and Kyrgyzstan, a track change will occur at Makmal, 150 kilometers within the Kyrgyz border. In addition to linking China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the railway holds the potential to transport goods further to European markets via Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey, effectively recreating part of the ancient Silk Road.
Long buildup to construction
The project traces its origins to 1996, when China announced that a railway would be built from Urumqi to Kashgar, the historical Silk Road outpost where caravans would rest after the perilous Taklamakan Desert and right before a treacherous mountain passage. Just a year later, in 1997, a memorandum of understanding to build the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway was signed, marking the beginning of a nearly three-decade saga.
There were numerous obstacles to implementation, but the most significant was the choice of route. The Chinese and Uzbek parties favored a southern route that would run from Irkeshtam, a border crossing with China in southern Kyrgyzstan, to Osh, a city near the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border.
While this proposed route was more economical, it bypassed the northern part of Kyrgyzstan. The fear implicit in the arguments of the Kyrgyz side was that the route might potentially fuel irredentist sentiments in the south of Kyrgyzstan, where there is a significant Uzbek minority.
Facts & figures
The alternative was a northbound route from Torugart. Although this approach was more expensive due to its greater length and the need for additional tunnels and bridges, it presents significant advantages for Kyrgyzstan, namely the possibility of connecting the CKU railway to the more densely populated northern regions and even to the capital Bishkek.
Another technical challenge was the difference in railway gauge: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan use the Russian wide-gauge of 1,520 mm, while China uses the 1,435 mm standard gauge that is also common in Europe. This meant a track change would be necessary, however determining the location for this change was a complex issue. One option was to place the junction at the high-altitude mountain pass at the China-Kyrgyzstan border, though this would significantly increase costs. Another option was at the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border, but this was impractical for Kyrgyzstan because it would require that it one day build its own track change point to connect the new railway to its existing network.
Due to the mountainous terrain, either of the two proposed routes was expected to result in significantly higher than average per-kilometer railway construction costs. The funding requirements far exceeded not only the capacity of Kyrgyzstan’s state-owned railway operator – the only entity capable of managing the project – but also that of the entire Kyrgyz government. The country’s public debt stood at nearly $4.8 billion in mid-2024, close to 50 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP). Of that debt, $1.8 billion is owed to China. Concerns over the growing debt burden played a crucial role in shaping the project, making it challenging to define a funding model that could provide reasonable financial assurances to the Kyrgyz government and its people.
A variety of arguments, vaguely geopolitical, further complicated the public debate. These included concerns about potential Chinese migration or expansion, as well as the broader strategic question of whether the railway could align Kyrgyzstan more closely with China. Some argued that adopting the narrow gauge used by China and Europe for the railway could weaken Kyrgyzstan’s ties with Russia.
The debate in Kyrgyzstan over these issues, which at times bordered on obstructing the project rather than fostering public understanding, dragged on for nearly three decades. Numerous working groups conducted countless studies across various public forums, all to little effect – until recently.
Breaking decades of deadlock
Two key factors seem to have shifted, accelerating the project’s progress. First, public discourse in Kyrgyzstan has matured, allowing for more pragmatic, business-oriented solutions to emerge.
Previously, the idea of using the narrow gauge from China within Kyrgyzstan, with a track change further inside the country rather than at the border, was almost taboo. This created a public narrative where anyone supporting the project was labeled as pro-Chinese. However, the decision to change tracks at Makmal, 150 kilometers from the border, suggests a shift in public perception.
In terms of funding, Kyrgyzstan is required to provide $700 million in equity for the three-way joint venture (of which it will own 24.5 percent). How and when it will finance its stake remains unknown. Yet one thing is clear: With the rest of the $4.7 billion being provided as equity and debt by China and Uzbekistan, the project will represent a major boost in foreign investment for Kyrgyzstan.
The financial risk is limited, as the project is structured as a public-private partnership, with private investment handled by the joint venture, in which 75.5 percent is controlled by foreign state-owned entities from China and Uzbekistan.
Reducing the financial risk for Kyrgyzstan means that it will not control or fully own its section of the railway from day one. Central Asian states have a long tradition of controlling so-called strategic infrastructure such as railways, pipelines or high-voltage electric transmission lines within their territories. Kyrgyzstan’s government agreeing to a BOT concession shows the increased maturity of the public discourse.
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Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov appears to be playing a pivotal role in shaping this evolving discourse. While his predecessors also supported the project, the key difference lies in the Kyrgyz president’s ability to push approvals through both public debate and official channels. This is likely due to the increased powers of the presidency in Kyrgyzstan, as well as growing public recognition of the project’s importance. Additionally, the perceived benefits of the railway now seem to outweigh the concerns in the eyes of the public.
The benefits are not hard to grasp: It will not only establish a direct rail link to the second-largest economy in the world with which Kyrgyzstan shares a common border but taking the northern route will also open the potential for a railway connection with the south of the country. The Kyrgyzstan government has already announced the start of construction, with its own funds, of this connection to the CKU.
The second factor influencing the project’s acceleration is Uzbekistan’s economic transformation. As the most populous country in Central Asia, with one of the region’s strongest defense forces, Uzbekistan plays a critical role in maintaining regional stability.
While the new railway will give Kyrgyzstan direct access to China and increase mutual trade, it is unlikely to significantly alter the country’s multi-pillar foreign relations, which are firmly anchored in longstanding ties.
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s “New Uzbekistan” vision has opened the country’s economy to foreign businesses, with trade between China and Uzbekistan increasing by over 50 percent from 2022 to 2023. Chinese investments, totaling billions of dollars, have flowed into sectors like electric vehicles, renewable energy and hydropower, alongside traditional industries such as agriculture and manufacturing. This economic expansion is reinforced by growing political cooperation.
During President Mirziyoyev’s visit to Beijing in January 2024, relations were upgraded to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership in the new era,” with both sides agreeing to “build a China-Uzbekistan community with a shared future from a higher starting point.” A Chinese state-owned company undertaking a BOT investment in the CKU and funding the lion’s share of the costs, shows confidence in the long-term economic benefit from expanding relations.
Scenarios
Unikely: The CKU railway competes with existing rail transit routes between China and Europe
Currently, rail freight between China and Europe transits through Russia, Kazakhstan and Mongolia, with all routes eventually passing through Belarus before reaching Europe. Although freight volumes fluctuate, overall capacity continues to grow. For example, in 2023, rail freight along these routes decreased by nearly 50 percent compared to the previous year, largely due to lower ocean freight costs and concerns about the impact of the war in Ukraine. As ocean freight costs are expected to rise again, possibly by the end of 2024, rail traffic may recover.
One aspect of this new route, beyond its direct connection to China, is that it could serve as an alternative for Chinese goods heading to Europe if relations between Russia and Europe worsen and transit through Belarus and Russia becomes compromised.
However, the CKU railway will pass through several countries and involve multiple modes of transportation to reach Europe, including Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey, with the option of utilizing Caspian Sea ports. Unifying regulatory and technical standards across these countries and making the route financially competitive will take time, especially given current tensions with Iran.
Also, even without the CKU railway, both northern and southern Kyrgyzstan, as well as Uzbekistan, are already connected to European markets by existing railways. Kazakhstan is currently investing in its third railway connection with China, which highlights its confidence. Therefore, the CKU as an alternative transit route to Europe will be a long-term undertaking.
Likely: China’s economic connections with Central Asia will increase
The second issue is how the CKU railway will impact the regional balance. Kyrgyzstan, once a part of the Russian Empire, has maintained comprehensive institutional ties with Russia, despite not sharing a border since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both countries are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), an economic union of five post-Soviet states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia) located in Eurasia together comprising a common market and customs union.
Additionally, they are part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance in Eurasia consisting of six post-Soviet states (the abovementioned five countries plus Tajikistan) that stipulates mutual assistance against security threats and that member states must avoid entering alliances that could pose a threat to other members.
Approximately one in seven Kyrgyz nationals live and work in Russia, sending over $2 billion in remittances annually – a critical contribution to Kyrgyzstan’s $11 billion GDP. Highlighting the strong historical ties, in late 2023, the presidents of Russia and Kyrgyzstan announced the construction of Russian-language schools, with Russia committing $500 million to build nine schools for 11,000 students.
While the new railway will give Kyrgyzstan direct access to China and increase mutual trade, it is unlikely to significantly alter the country’s multi-pillar foreign relations, which are firmly anchored in longstanding ties.
Uzbekistan, which has no common borders with either Russia or China, is not a member of the EEU or the CSTO. It is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Russia, China and Kyrgyzstan are also members. Remittances from Uzbek laborers in Russia totaled $8.6 billion in 2023, roughly one-tenth of the country’s $80 billion GDP. This amount fell, however, by nearly 50 percent due to the war in Ukraine, and due to preferential treatment of labor migrants from EEU member countries in Russia.
Despite weaker institutional ties with Russia compared to Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan’s economic reliance on labor migration remains significant. The construction of the railway under the announced terms signals greater Chinese interest and, more importantly, a surge in investment that could affect the region’s economic dynamics. The ongoing quiet contest for influence, described already in 2018 as a subtle competition for leverage and business, continues.
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