The struggle for control of the Red Sea
Ports and trade corridors in the Red Sea are a central arena of competition between global and regional powers.
In a nutshell
- The Red Sea has become a focal point of geostrategic rivalry
- Ports, military bases and trade corridors are reshaping regional alignments
- Instability in the region could disrupt global trade and energy flows
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Connectivity has become a key source of geoeconomic influence, like China’s Belt and Road Initiative or the envisaged India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. The Red Sea, which connects the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, is a prime example of this phenomenon.
Regional and global actors seek influence through ports, military bases, submarine cables, railways, energy routes and logistics hubs. Yet no single power dominates the region. Instead, Gulf states, global powers, African littoral countries and non-state actors such as the Houthis, a Shia Islamist military organization in Yemen supported by Iran, and al-Shabaab, a jihadist militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda, compete for influence through shifting and often unstable alignments.
Chinese and American spheres of influence
The United States and China are strategic competitors in the region. Djibouti, located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, hosts both Camp Lemonnier – the only permanent American military base in Africa – and only 10 kilometers away is the People’s Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti, China’s first overseas military base.
China’s footprint is more impressive when it comes to investments in mobility and connectivity. The Red Sea is a crucial part of the Maritime Silk Road initiative: Approximately one-third of maritime east-west trade goes through the waterway.
Furthermore, the Red Sea is a vital route for China’s energy security, and Beijing has invested in infrastructure across the region, including in African states. Egypt, in particular, has been the destination of substantial Chinese funding: Cumulative investment in the Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (SETC), one of the hotspots of the Maritime Silk Road, exceeded $5 billion by the end of 2025.
Facts & figures
Red Sea geopolitics
- The Red Sea stretches roughly 2,250 kilometers from the Suez Canal to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
- At its narrowest point, the strait is around 30 kilometers wide.
- Red Sea littoral states are Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen.
- The sea is one of the world’s saltiest major bodies of water due to high evaporation and limited rainfall.
- Roughly 12 percent of global trade passes through the Red Sea corridor.
- Around 30 percent of global container traffic transits through the Suez Canal.
- The rerouting of ships around the Cape of Good Hope adds roughly 10-14 days to Asia-Europe shipping times.
- The wider Red Sea region’s population is projected to reach nearly 1.3 billion by 2050.
- Red Sea states are rapidly adopting unmanned systems, drones and digital coordination technologies.
Djibouti plays a central role in Beijing’s regional strategy. Besides being a platform for projecting the power of the Chinese military, Djibouti is also a linchpin of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road through the Pakistan & East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) undersea cable system. China is the main creditor of Eritrea, where it financed critical infrastructure, and it has expanded its footprint in Sudan through the financing of railways, oil refineries and the expansion of Port Sudan’s capacity.
The American presence in African states along the Red Sea is largely rooted in counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations, which became a major strategic priority during the first two decades of the 21st century.
The European Union’s presence in the region is more limited, although strengthening ties between the EU, the Gulf and the Horn of Africa remains an important strategic objective. In 2022, the EU designated the Northwest Indian Ocean – including the final maritime stretch connecting Europe to Asia – as an area of maritime interest. The bloc has also supported security missions such as Operation Atalanta, EUCAP Somalia and the more recent Operation Aspides, aimed at protecting international shipping from Houthi attacks.
Turkiye has also increased its presence in the Horn of Africa, where it is trying to expand a sphere of influence based on military cooperation (including “drone diplomacy”), economic interests and cultural diplomacy.
Old rivalries and emerging allegiances
The Red Sea has also become a critical site for both competition and cooperation between Gulf and neighboring states. Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel have all intensified cooperation with African nations along the Red Sea, investing in infrastructure and technology, and establishing security partnerships. For Israel, the Port of Eilat is of strategic importance, as it provides the country’s only direct access to the Indian Ocean and ensures independence from the Suez Canal.
Since 1979, under its rhetoric of anti-imperialism, Iran has tried to increase its influence in some African countries. Tehran was a key ally of Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, through military and financial support. Relations with Egypt also deepened after Mohamed Morsi rose to power in 2012.
Under the 2020 Abraham Accords framework, a U.S.-led initiative aimed at reshaping regional dynamics, Israel normalized relations with several countries, including the UAE, Morocco and Sudan. In December 2025, Israel recognized Somaliland, which subsequently signaled its intention to join the Abraham Accords. The agreement has created an informal space of cooperation between countries committed to countering Iran and its proxies, including the Houthis, and to securing trade security in the Red Sea.
The UAE has emerged as a key actor in the geopolitical dynamics of the Red Sea. In 2015, it established a military base at the port of Assab in Eritrea, marking a significant extension of its strategic reach. Beyond its military presence, Abu Dhabi has cultivated an extensive network centered on trade corridors and logistical hubs, with notable footholds in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somaliland.
A pivotal element of this strategy is DP World, the Emirati multinational logistics company, which leads major operations at the port of Berbera (Somaliland) and in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. UAE-Ethiopia relations, particularly military cooperation, investment, port access agreements and migration arrangements, have become a major factor in Red Sea geopolitics. Notably, the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia, mediated the 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Rivalry and tensions between Iran and Israel, and between Qatar and the UAE, have led to the emergence of a strong Israeli-Emirati partnership in the Red Sea region, anchored in common geoeconomic and security interests.
The political and security outlook of the Red Sea region will also depend on developments in key African littoral states, including Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland and Sudan. Egypt remains particularly important, with around 40 percent of EU trade with Asia passing through the Suez Canal. Although Ethiopia lost direct access to the sea following Eritrea’s independence, its proximity to the coast and growing regional ambitions continue to make it a central actor in Red Sea geopolitics.
Like their counterparts on the Arabian Peninsula, some of these African countries are in a situation of profound political uncertainty, where outcomes will both shape and be shaped by regional geopolitical balances.
Ethiopia, which remains strongly committed to regaining access to the Red Sea, will hold general elections in June. The vote will take place in a fragile postwar environment following the conflict in Tigray, as well as growing tensions surrounding the country’s ethno-federal system, even as economic conditions have improved.
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Somalia, meanwhile, remains engaged in a difficult and incomplete stabilization process. Regional rivalries increasingly shape the country’s internal dynamics, as some clans cultivate direct ties with foreign powers while al-Shabaab continues to receive external support. Other actors have deepened divisions over Somaliland, with countries such as the UAE supporting its growing autonomy and strategic importance.
The situation in Sudan, which covers nearly a third of the African Red Sea coastline, is even more fragile. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues, and SAF allies Russia and Egypt are increasing their presence. The country has also become a stage for tensions between Saudi Arabia, which supports the SAF, and the UAE, which supports the RSF.
Scenarios
Major shifts in the post-1945 international order have consistently been accompanied by the emergence of new geopolitical hot spots. The Red Sea reflects this pattern: Once merely a contact zone between economic regions and security systems, it has evolved into a central arena of geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalry.
The current situation will depend on the outcome of the conflict in Iran and the security environment in the Strait of Hormuz. Prolonged instability in the Strait would heighten the strategic significance of the Red Sea corridor, further increasing incentives for external powers to secure influence there.
A weakened Iran would not serve China’s interests, as Beijing benefits from a landscape in which rivals in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea contend with localized insecurity while Chinese assets remain relatively protected. Yet, given China’s deep geopolitical and geoeconomic engagement in the region, a scenario of sustained instability would ultimately expose its vulnerabilities as well.
Most likely: Managed competition between global and regional powers
The most plausible scenario is one in which fragmentation continues, gradually giving way to managed competition under the loose dominance of an emerging hegemonic alignment. This outcome is reinforced by a broader global environment characterized by volatility, increasingly regionalized trading systems and widespread efforts by states to minimize exposure to geopolitical risk. The stabilization of Ethiopia would be a necessary, albeit not sufficient condition for this outcome of managed competition, which could reinforce a triangular allegiance between Ethiopia, Israel and the UAE.
Less likely: Armed confrontation
Nevertheless, the potential for escalation into open armed confrontation cannot be dismissed. The Red Sea remains one of the world’s most militarized corridors, and any miscalculation could easily trigger conflict.
A situation of prolonged conflict involving two or more Red Sea states would deeply disrupt international trade, forcing carriers to opt for the alternative, and longer, route around the Cape of Good Hope. It would also replicate the effects of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, namely an increase in energy prices.
Moreover, war would solidify rival blocs. For Europe, beyond the economic repercussions, this scenario could further increase migratory pressure from the Horn of Africa.
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