Juntas and Moscow reshaping Sahel alliances
Strategic geopolitical realignment, violence and crackdowns are hallmarks of Russia-aligned junta leadership in the Sahel.
In a nutshell
- Military juntas will consolidate power while redefining governance
- Russian partnerships will deepen with Western influence largely absent
- Jihadist expansion may persist, challenging the juntas’ military hold
- For comprehensive insights, tune into our AI-powered podcast here
An examination of maps showing instances of armed violence in Africa immediately reveals a striking fact: The Sahel stands out as the continent’s most acute hotspot. The escalating concentration of militancy is centered in three states: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, each of which has experienced multiple coups over the past five years.
In place of governments elected with varying degrees of democratic legitimacy, three military juntas have taken power, led by Colonel Assimi Goita in Mali, Captain Ibrahim Traore in Burkina Faso and General Abdourahamane Tchiani in Niger. Despite their different personal and professional trajectories, they share a common feature: rich exposure to Western military cooperation programs in the Sahel.
Colonel Goita participated in joint exercises with the United States under AFRICOM and worked closely with the European Union Training Mission in Mali, shaping a professional profile deeply influenced by Western counter‑jihadist structures. Captain Traore was trained within an army closely integrated with France’s Operation Barkhane and with European and American counterterrorism training initiatives, gaining direct familiarity with regional operational dynamics. General Tchiani commanded the Presidential Guard for more than a decade in a country long regarded as the West’s key ally in the Sahel, working in close coordination with French and U.S. contingents stationed in Niger.
From ECOWAS to anti-Western alignment
Following the countries’ coordinated 2024 withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), these three leaders charted a markedly different course from the previous cooperation with the West: a rupture with France, the U.S. and the EU, accompanied by a strategic realignment toward new partners, most notably Russia. Despite some differences, the military strongmen now appear to be converging around a shared political project centered on the reassertion of state sovereignty and the construction of an autonomous regional bloc, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Their decision to leave the West African bloc in January 2024 came after the Nigerian ECOWAS presidency threatened military intervention to reinstate deposed President Mohamed Bazoum following a 2023 coup in Niger. Mali and Burkina Faso warned that any military action against Niger would be considered a declaration of war against their own nations.
The three juntas justified the decision by saying that ECOWAS was acting under the influence of foreign powers and had betrayed the pan‑African ideals of its founders. Following months of escalating tensions fueled by sanctions, suspensions and repeated threats of military action, their withdrawal marked an unprecedented break with West Africa’s principal regional institution.
The exit had significant economic consequences for all three countries. Already fragile and landlocked, they lost access to the broader common market and its free movement of goods and people, exacerbating inflation, shortages of goods and difficulties in paying public sector salaries. The rift has also weakened ECOWAS and led to the near elimination of France’s presence in the region.
Facts & figures
Alliance of Sahel States
As a result, instability has been exacerbated in an area already marked by security pressures and a growing detachment from traditional Western alliances. Starting in 2022 and continuing into this year, crackdowns of various forms have taken place, including Mali’s ban of French television and radio.
The withdrawal of Western forces from the Sahel marked a crucial phase in the regional crisis. France left Mali on August 15, 2022, after breaking with Colonel Goita’s junta, then withdrew its contingent from Burkina Faso on February 19, 2023 – at the request of Captain Traore’s government – and left Niger on December 22, 2023, following the deterioration of relations with General Tchiani’s regime.
France was not the only international actor present: The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali was active from 2013 to 2023. With a contingent of around 15,000 troops, its mission was stabilizing northern Mali, protecting the civilian population, supporting peace efforts and facilitating elections. Following the Nigerien junta’s decision to end military cooperation with Washington, the U.S. withdrew completely from the Agadez airbase in central Niger – what had been one of the main counterterrorism drone hubs in the region – between June and July 2024.
Russia steps in to benefit from African crises
The departures of French, U.S. and UN forces has altered the security balance in the Sahel, leaving an operational and political vacuum. This is accelerating the reorganization of regional alliances and has removed the West’s ability to combat armed groups in the area.
Moscow filled the void through Russian-based private military companies and mercenaries. The Sahel represents one of the Kremlin’s key assets in evading international sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, the regional capitals have bolstered relations with Moscow.
On June 23, 2025, Mali and Russia signed three cooperation agreements. The first provides for the creation of an intergovernmental commission to strengthen economic, commercial, scientific and technical collaboration. The second introduces a draft agreement for the development of civil nuclear energy in partnership with Rosatom. The third expands security cooperation, with a focus on combating terrorism and organized crime, and establishes commitments to non-interference and mutual support in international forums.
Six months later, the three junta leaders met in Bamako, the capital of Mali, for the Confederal Summit of Heads of State of the AES, the second meeting since the alliance was formed. At that meeting, the Sahel Investment and Development Bank was inaugurated, designed to finance infrastructure without resorting to Western loans, as was a joint television channel aimed at promoting a shared narrative.
But perhaps the most consequential development concerns the plan for a battalion-sized joint military force to operate across borders. In recent years, armed groups linked to Islamic extremism have increasingly been destroyed or neutralized. At the same time, local militia groups, which call themselves “self-defense” groups – like the Dozo in central Mali – are growing in size and activity.
Perhaps the most consequential development concerns the plan for a battalion-sized joint military force to operate across borders.
Nevertheless, joint operations of regional forces with Russian mercenaries have faced public backlash, partly due to the ongoing violence perpetrated by Russians against local populations. In Mali there are reports of secret prisons run by the Africa Corps, a Russian paramilitary outfit formerly known as the Wagner group that is controlled and managed by the Kremlin, where there have been summary executions, rapes and the disappearance of hundreds of detainees.
In January 2026, the French-language magazine Jeune Afrique, the most widely read pan-African news weekly, was banned in Mali for publishing a report on these atrocities.
Read more on the Sahel
- Red alert in the Sahel
- Niger at the heart of the Sahel crisis
- Senegal as a strategic player in the Sahel
The ban also followed the magazine denouncing the crisis caused by a lack of fuel due to the siege of Bamako by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), a branch of al-Qaeda. The blockade was part of a series of coordinated offensives that also hit Sikasso, Koulikoro, Segou and Mopti. The disruption of the main trade routes with Bamako led to severe fuel shortages and a nationwide surge in prices, with the aim of putting pressure on the economy and undermining the military government’s ability to control the situation.
The jihadist group’s operations, along with the junta’s responses, have resulted in some of the highest levels of violence ever recorded in the Malian regions of Kayes, Sikasso and Segou, located in an interregional area that is itself among the 20 most violent in the world.
Scenarios
Colonel Goita, Captain Traore and General Tchiani embody three variations of the same emerging military elite that is transforming the experience gained through cooperation with Western forces into a platform for legitimizing a new, violent paradigm of security and governance in the Sahel. A shared – and very carefully controlled – press, an army and a development bank are the tools of this common project in which the Russians, for the moment, seem to be the external actor profiting the most.
More likely: The AES consolidates in step with Russia as violence grows
In the more likely scenario, the AES strengthens its political consolidation, intensifying cooperation between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger after leaving ECOWAS. The three governments maintain a strong stance on sovereignty, continuing to expel Western actors and intensifying collaboration with Russia, which continues to provide military and logistical support.
However, each state’s ability to control its territory remains limited: Jihadist groups are likely to further expand their activities in rural areas, imposing economic blockades and disrupting trade routes. Already fragile economies will suffer from further regional isolation and inflation, while the population faces systematic shortages of essential goods. Ongoing clashes between terrorists and local militias worsen the situation. The AES joint military force will operate intermittently, failing to reverse the trend toward territorial fragmentation. Violence will therefore remain high, keeping the Sahel as one of the global epicenters of armed instability.
Less likely: The AES becomes a stable and self-sufficient regional hub
In a much less likely scenario, at least in the short to medium term, the AES will transform itself into a surprisingly effective regional bloc. The new development bank will finance strategic infrastructure, improving transport networks and reducing dependence on external loans. The joint military force could become operational, successfully coordinating cross-border operations and thus reducing the offensive capacity of jihadist groups.
Cooperation with Russia could stabilize in less predatory forms, while new partners – such as Turkiye or the Gulf countries – may contribute with investments and training. Increased internal trade and integration would benefit the fragile economies of the three AES countries, allowing their strongman leaders to secure greater political legitimacy.
Contact us today for tailored geopolitical insights and industry-specific advisory services.
Sign up for our newsletter
Receive insights from our experts every week in your inbox.
