Rogue-state alliances challenging global security

North Korea’s deployment to aid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks a pivotal moment as rogue states unite to upend international security.

A Russian pocket first-aid manual translated into Korean
A Russian pocket first-aid manual translated into Korean titled “Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Emergency Medical Treatment (First Aid), Self-administered first aid,” found on a North Korean soldier captured by Ukrainian soldiers in Russia’s Kursk Region. © Getty Images
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In a nutshell

  • Russia’s reliance on North Korea reveals desperation, a weakened military
  • Global security is shifting as new alliances challenge established frameworks
  • China mulls supporting escalating conflicts or delivering prosperity at home
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The sudden appearance of North Korean troops on the frontlines in Ukraine in the autumn of 2024 was a development of major significance. What made it so was not the addition of fresh manpower. Although this was undoubtedly helpful to the Russian side, it fell short of dramatically altering the balance of power on the battlefield. What made the event important was that it marked a transformation of global security with far-reaching geopolitical implications.

When Russia sent its “little green men” to capture Crimea in February 2014, it did so from a position of perceived strength. The Western powers were easily deterred from intervening to support the victim. At the time, the notion of North Korea becoming involved in a campaign of aggression in Europe would have seemed highly improbable.

Yet, as Russia’s war against Ukraine is now in its second decade, and three years since the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin finds itself in a very different position. Faced with the growing realization that it will not achieve its primary goal of defeating Ukraine and taking Kyiv, Moscow has made a pact with Pyongyang that suggests the possibility of North Korean troops being deployed in direct combat against soldiers from NATO. Although the latter must, at the present time, be considered unlikely, it does capture the extent to which the global security architecture is now being transformed.

The Cold War was marked by a standoff between two superpowers that were armed to the hilt with both nuclear and conventional weapons. The final stage entailed United States President Ronald Reagan defining the meaning of “peace through strength.” Having branded the Soviet Union an “Evil Empire” and embarked on a massive rebuilding of the U.S. military force, President Reagan was in a position to negotiate with Moscow and bring the Cold War to a close.

Faced with the growing realization that it will not achieve its primary goal of defeating Ukraine and taking Kyiv, Moscow has made a pact with Pyongyang.

The subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union had three consequences that are presently shaping a new era of global geopolitics. One was a collapse of the Russian economy that paved the way for China to take over the role of the world’s second superpower. Another was that a triumphant Western alliance eased its posture, from seeking peace through strength to banking on appeasement and naive hopes of Russia joining the world of peaceful, democratic nations. The third was that Moscow developed a powerful sense of denial, becoming obsessed with clawing back its former position of influence, irrespective of the cost.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has been deeply revealing. We have seen how military weakness prevented Moscow from securing the speedy victory that many believed to be inevitable; it has provided disturbing insights into how American foreign and security policy has grown toward managing rather than resolving conflicts; and above all, it has revealed that in seeking the destruction of Ukraine, the Kremlin considers no price too high.

The combination of the three has produced an outcome where self-deterrence causes Western governments to shy away from confronting the emerging axis of rogue states including Russia, Iran and North Korea, with China as a patron on the sidelines. The key factor in this development has been the Russian determination to wage a war it simply could not win.

Putin crosses the Rubicon

The Kremlin’s point of no return was marked with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As matters turned sour, it sought to compensate for losses of hardware by leaning on Belarus; to boost manpower it recruited mercenaries from a host of other countries, namely those in the Global South. When it became obvious that neither would make much difference, the Kremlin entered into an agreement with Iran for the provision of large numbers of the notorious Shahed drones and with North Korea for the supply of munitions and equipment. Although this materiel has caused much loss of life and damage to Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, it has had a marginal impact on the strategic direction of the ground war.

Mr. Putin had already been perceived as a supplicant next to a condescending Chinese President Xi Jinping.

In July 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to play his final card, short of escalation to nuclear war. Traveling to Pyongyang, he concluded a “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with North Korea. One can only guess at the emotions among nationalist Russian elites who were forced to witness the President of Russia seated as an equal next to a global pariah, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un. Mr. Putin had already been perceived as a supplicant next to a condescending Chinese President Xi Jinping.

That such humiliation was quietly accepted in Moscow provided eminent illustration of the Russian obsession with destroying Ukraine at any price. The value of North Korean support in the ground war will become clear in time, but it already has clearly disturbing implications for global geopolitics. What at the outset of the Russian aggression against Ukraine was a limited conflict on the fringes of Europe has now been expanded to involve the Korean Peninsula.

The Kremlin’s determination

There were good reasons why President Putin decided that the price of humiliation was well worth paying. By the time he traveled to Pyongyang, Russia’s stockpiles of Soviet-era ammunition and military hardware had been depleted to the point of exhaustion. Meanwhile, due to limits in manufacturing, human resources and funding, Russian military industries could only surge to certain levels the production of critically needed artillery shells and specialized steel needed for replacement of gun tubes.

The main attraction of the deal with North Korea was that the country had massive stocks of artillery, shells and soldiers. As documented by South Korean intelligence, the first stage of the agreement saw huge quantities of artillery shells being shipped out. Then followed trainloads of howitzers and, subsequently, thousands of North Korean troops.

Russia’s grandiose claims of producing large numbers of tanks have in fact boiled down to refurbishing old tanks from the 1970s and the 1960s; even museum pieces from the 1930s have been seen in action. 

Although the quality of the supplies that Russia has been receiving from North Korea is reported to be poor, quantity matters. Even if many North Korean artillery shells have turned out to be duds, or have exploded in the gun tubes, those that have been fired have done much damage. And North Korean soldiers have been no less useful in “meat wave” assaults than their Russian comrades in arms. That said, it remains highly doubtful that even the involvement of North Korea will help Russia come much closer to its goal of destruction of Ukraine.

Although sanctions-busting Western manufacturers have provided Russian military industries with continued access to high-tech components needed to produce the missiles that are raining down on Ukraine, sanctions have been effective in restricting access to other components, such as precision machine tools and specialized ball bearings needed in all moving vehicles. Russia’s grandiose claims of producing large numbers of tanks have in fact boiled down to refurbishing old tanks from the 1970s and the 1960s; even museum pieces from the 1930s have been seen in action. Meat wave assaults have consequently become increasingly reliant on civilian vehicles and on scooters, or even soldiers moving on foot across open battlefields.

What comes next for Russia, North Korea and Iran

The outlook for the war is now becoming increasingly reminiscent of the classic game of chicken, where there can be only one winner – or two losers. The likelihood of either side emerging as a clear winner has by now been reduced to very low, so it is the latter outcome that must be placed in focus.

For Ukraine, a loss would mean a shameful compromise that entails acceptance of continued Russian occupation of Crimea and of some territories in the east, coupled with hollow security guarantees that in practice will offer little protection against a renewed Russian offensive some years down the road. Given that the political fallout in Kyiv of such a compromise would be quite substantial, Ukraine may be expected to be ready to pay a very steep price for continued resistance.

For Russia, a loss will mean having to deal with the consequences of failure. Irrespective of whether it will be forced to withdraw its troops from Ukraine or be able to slog it out for another year or two, it has already suffered so much damage that it will be in desperate need of outside assistance to avoid collapse. The very day Donald Trump returned to the White House, when speaking with reporters, he said that Mr. Putin is “destroying Russia” and “Russia is going to be in big trouble.” This is where the involvement of North Korea becomes so important.

President Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House on January 20, 2025, telling reporters that President Vladimir Putin is ruining Russia.
President Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House on Jan. 20, 2025, telling reporters that President Vladimir Putin is ruining Russia, has caused the death of nearly 1 million Russian soldiers in his “ridiculous” war that needs to end, or else Russia will be slammed with additional sanctions. © Getty Images

Even if Russia does end up having to concede to only partial success in Ukraine, it may still be able to rescue enough of its military and economic potential to entertain hopes of a return to great power status in a near future, including an escalation of hostilities against NATO.

This outcome is contingent on continued Russian access to revenues from energy exports to India and China and the European Union looking the other way when Russia uses its sanctions-busting “shadow fleet” of old tankers to export oil. Equally important is that Russian military industries find foreign partners that are willing and able to engage in cooperation.

A change in geostrategic momentum?

Moscow’s military-industrial cooperation with Iran is both ongoing and important, but its outlook and the usefulness of the Russia-Iran security agreement, concluded on January 17, are unclear. Additionally, the atrocities committed by Hamas on October 7, 2023, may have altered American doctrine. It appears the policy of “escalation management” may be giving way to an increasing focus on the use of military power through proxies to resolve rather than manage conflicts.

With weapons and support from the U.S., Israel has taken out Iranian air defenses, severely weakened Hamas and decapitated Hezbollah. Forces backed by NATO-member Turkey have toppled the Assad regime in Syria, where both Russian and Iranian forces have become persona non grata and where Moscow appears to have lost its sole naval base in the Mediterranean. Taken together, this has dealt a savage blow to the “Shia crescent,” to Tehran’s military and strategic clout and to Mr. Putin’s ability to project power abroad.

Read more about geopolitical realignments

The implication is that following a long period of American insistence on appeasement of the Iranian regime, the coast may have been cleared for Israel to aim a decapitation strike against Tehran’s miliary capabilities and its nuclear program. If this is done, and is successful, the implication for Russia will be the end of military cooperation. Even if Iran does escape destruction at the hands of Israel, it is so weakened that it will not be able to provide much meaningful assistance in rebuilding Russian military capabilities.

This again leads back to North Korea, and an outlook that features two very different scenarios.

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Scenarios

Possible but unlikely: Russia and North Korea fully rearm with Beijing’s support

In one direction lies Russia slogging it out in Ukraine and slowly but surely rebuilding its military capability. Cooperation with North Korea will at first entail an unequal exchange whereby Russia receives a sizeable part of North Korea’s stockpiles of armaments, and in return agrees to provide not only oil and food but also advanced technology for rocketry and submarine operations.

If China finds this arrangement to be acceptable, it will provide Russian military industries not only with markets and partners for technology development (assuming that North Korea in turn has access to Chinese partners). It may also entail Russia tapping into long-standing North Korean experience with sanctions busting, ensuring a steady supply of dual-use technologies that slowly but surely may restore Russian engineering capabilities. And it is significant that North Korea is surging its arms production, with manufacturers running at full capacity.

What makes this scenario unlikely is that it hinges so critically on the acquiescence of Beijing at the very moment when China faces sustained economic headwinds and President Xi needs foreign partners. Given that an emboldened North Korea will raise the threat of regional armed conflict on China’s doorstep, in the process enhancing the likelihood of both South Korea and Japan going nuclear, it is unlikely that China will look favorably on further escalation, no matter how desperately this is needed by Russia.

Possible: China loses its appetite to be Putin’s enabler and seeks new partners

A hint of where matters may be headed can be found in the recent proliferation in Chinese social media of accounts of how Russia took advantage of the weakness of the 19th century Qing dynasty to steal large tracts of Chinese land, including what is now Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Although this is not news in China, the novelty lies in demands being raised that China should profit from Russia’s pending collapse by reclaiming those lands. Since such demands would clearly not be posted without regime approval, their appearance sends a powerful signal that the Sino-Russian “unlimited friendship” may be nearing its end.

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