Will Romania hold or fold? Democracy at a crossroads
Romania prepares for pivotal presidential elections, grappling with potential Russian meddling and the fallout from the controversial barring of Calin Georgescu.
In a nutshell
- Romania’s presidential elections could reshape Eastern European dynamics
- Georgescu’s disqualification highlights fears over foreign meddling
- Six people have been detained for treason and conspiring to alter the constitutional order
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On May 4, Romania will again hold its presidential elections, with a possible runoff on May 18. Given that one of the early contenders, Calin Georgescu, has been associated with a strongly pro-Russian stance, many have expressed concern that the outcome could even make or break Europe’s resolve to end the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Kyiv. Although Mr. Georgescu was recently barred from running due to irregularities and interference by a non-Romanian state actor – a decision that sparked widespread outrage – the election’s outcome will still carry major global implications.
Romania’s geopolitical significance
Romania is important primarily because of its geographical position, in addition to being the sixth-most populous European Union member state. The country shares a long border with Moldova, which is currently under heavy political pressure from Russia, and it has two border segments directly with Ukraine. One is to the north of Moldova, providing access to western Ukraine and the key city of Lviv along the main route for crucial support from the West. The other is to the south of Moldova, leading to the vital Black Sea coastline and the critical Ukrainian port city of Odesa.
The exact role Romania has played in supporting Ukraine is undisclosed, and perhaps it should remain so, but it is believed to be substantial. Along with facilitating overland supplies, Romania has a port on the Black Sea at Constanta which has served as a critical alternative for Kyiv’s exports, for example, during the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports.
The country also plays a vital role in NATO’s forward defense. It has long served as an important base hosting the United States Navy Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense System, and it is currently constructing another military base in Constanta. Designed to accommodate 10,000 soldiers and civilians, it will be the largest NATO base in Europe, surpassing the iconic U.S. base at Ramstein in Germany.
If Romania were to align with Russia, it would upend existing dynamics. Even if the U.S. stays in NATO, the presence of a pro-Russian president in Bucharest could raise serious doubts about the future role of Romania in supporting Ukraine and NATO.
This shift would place Romania in the company of Hungary and Slovakia, potentially blocking the flow of Western aid to Ukraine. In a worst-case scenario, it could also enable Russia to move troops and equipment to its presently beleaguered garrison in Transnistria – a Russian-controlled breakaway region in Moldova that borders Ukraine. This could allow Russian forces to operate near Romania’s coastline in the Kremlin’s long-planned assault on Odesa.
Election upheaval and political instability
The gravity of the situation was underscored by the events of November 24 last year, when Romania held its regular presidential election in which Mr. Georgescu was declared the first-round winner. However, since he did not secure an absolute majority, a runoff was scheduled for December 8. In a surprising turn of events, just 48 hours before the second round of polling, the country’s Constitutional Court ruled to overturn the election result and called for new elections in May.
The unprecedented decision stemmed from incumbent President Klaus Iohannis’s decision to release classified intelligence reports that indicated significant Russian interference in the election. These documents revealed that around 800 TikTok accounts had been suddenly activated a month before the election to provide sweeping support for Mr. Georgescu. This activity was cited as a factor in his unexpected rise from obscurity to secure the most votes. Notably, the reports claimed that the accounts in question had been created back in 2016, allegedly by a “foreign state.”
Having already served two terms and being barred by the constitution from a third, President Iohannis chose to remain in his position until a successor could be elected. While he cited national security concerns as justification, he faced significant criticism for acting contrary to democratic rules and procedures. This criticism came not only from the far-right opposition but also from other candidates who questioned how it might affect their chances in a fiercely contested rerun.
The political standoff between the president and the opposition was marked by the parliamentary elections held on December 1, which resulted in major gains for the hard right, winning nearly one-third of the votes. After losing its majority in both chambers of parliament, the incumbent big tent National Coalition for Romania retained power only with help from a party representing the Hungarian minority. This party is believed to have close ties with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party.
The new government was installed on December 23, receiving only 240 out of 465 votes in favor. The government’s fragility and connections to pro-Russian Hungary provide key context for the political developments that led to tens of thousands of protesters taking to the streets in support of Mr. Georgescu. On February 10, facing an impeachment vote scheduled for the following day, President Iohannis announced his resignation.
The risk of Russian influence in Romanian politics
Russian involvement has also allegedly tainted other areas of Romanian politics. On February 26, Romanian prosecutors raided the home of Mr. Georgescu’s bodyguard and discovered an underground safe containing $10 million in cash and flight tickets to Moscow. Mr. Georgescu himself was detained on the street while on his way to register as a candidate for the presidency, with prosecutors claiming that the charges involved attempted “incitement to actions against the constitutional order.”
During the subsequent raids on 47 properties belonging to alleged members of a pro-Georgescu network, Romanian police found guns, grenade launchers and gold bullion. The network was reportedly led by a former French legionnaire and militia chief from the Democratic Republic of the Congo named Horatiu Potra.
On March 5, Romania’s Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) detained six people on charges of treason. The defendants were accused of negotiating with Russian agents regarding a withdrawal from NATO. According to a statement from DIICOT, they also conspired to transform the constitutional order, which would entail the dissolution of political parties, the establishment of a new government and the adoption of a new constitution.
On the same day, the Romanian Foreign Ministry declared two Russian diplomats – the military attache of the Russian Embassy in Bucharest and his deputy – to be personae non gratae for their actions violating the provisions of the Vienna Convention.
On February 26, Romanian prosecutors raided the home of Mr. Georgescu’s bodyguard and discovered an underground safe containing $10 million in cash and flight tickets to Moscow.
The crisis reached a peak on March 9, when the Central Electoral Bureau (CEB) announced it was disqualifying Mr. Georgescu from running, asserting that he had “violated the very obligation to defend democracy,” and thus his candidacy “does not meet the conditions of legality.” He denounced the ruling, calling it a “direct blow to the heart of world democracy” and claiming that “Europe is now a dictatorship, Romania is under tyranny.” His position resonated with hundreds of far-right supporters, who attempted to storm the CEB’s office but were dispersed by riot police using tear gas. On March 11, the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal to overturn the ruling barring him from contesting the elections.
Given how much is at stake for Russia, it is expected that Russian influence operations will intensify, following the playbook it has already used in meddling in tightly fought elections in Moldova and Georgia.
In Moldova, crunch time arrived on October 20, 2024, when pro-European President Maia Sandu faced reelection alongside a parallel referendum on constitutional changes aimed at facilitating EU membership. Although polls indicated comfortable pro-European outcomes for both votes, the official result revealed a very close race.
In a late-night comment, President Sandu claimed to have evidence of approximately 300,000 votes being bought through foreign interference, labeling it a “fraud of unprecedented scale” and an “unprecedented assault on democracy.” Although the margins were narrow, the government prevailed, with President Sandu being reelected and the constitutional amendment adopted. In July, Moldova will hold parliamentary elections, which is expected to attract more Russian meddling.
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In Georgia, the situation was considerably different. The pro-Russian faction had secured an upper hand by systematically infiltrating and taking control of the country’s government, judiciary and police. As the parliamentary elections approached on October 26, 2024, it appeared that the opposition would achieve a landslide victory. However, outrage erupted when the official results revealed that the government had prevailed only by a slim margin. Although the pro-European president, Salome Zourabichvili, sided with the opposition and condemned the outcome, her term was about to expire. When it did, she was succeeded by a candidate loyal to the pro-Kremlin regime. Despite ongoing large-scale street protests, the current Georgian leadership appears to believe it is safe.
In Romania, the pattern is mixed. The government is fragile, with a major vulnerability in the Hungarian minority party. Unlike the cases in Georgia and Moldova, Romania does not have a president who can support the government. However, the government still controls the country’s judiciary and law enforcement. Its main problem is that Mr. Georgescu and his followers enjoy considerable popular support. When he was barred from running, Mr. Georgescu appeared to be on track to win, with one poll indicating he had 44 percent support.
This is what makes the prospect of Russian election meddling a serious issue. Moldova and Georgia both have a long track record of being divided between pro-Russian and pro-European groups. If this had not been the case, Russian meddling in the nations would not have stood much chance of succeeding. Recent events suggest Romania is even more susceptible than the other two countries.
Scenarios
Most likely: The government holds firm as Georgescu steps aside
The most likely scenario is that the Romanian government holds, remains in control of law enforcement and takes a proactive stance against Russian election meddling. Bucharest may also take heart from Mr. Georgescu’s concession that he will not run. In a Facebook post the evening after the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal, he urged his supporters to select another candidate.
The pro-Georgescu network has been thrown into disarray, somewhat reducing the risk of escalating violence and making Russian election interference more challenging. Although the situation is in flux, it seems likely that the hard right will unite behind George Simion, who represents the country’s second-largest political party, the Alliance for Uniting Romanians.
Mr. Simion has been much less vocal in supporting Russia than Mr. Georgescu. He would probably stand a good chance of advancing to the second round, where he might face the centrist mayor of Bucharest, Nicusor Dan, who has been one of the leading contenders against Mr. Georgescu.
Likely: Violence and foreign meddling to threaten Romanian democracy
Although it is too early to speculate who might emerge as the winner in a second round of presidential elections, there is an alternative scenario. While the pro-Georgescu network has faced a setback, its violence-prone base is likely still intact. Following the crackdown in early March, Mr. Potra went into hiding, calling on his mercenaries to prepare for armed insurrection. Russian election interference will seek to fan such flames, and incendiary comments from abroad will worsen the situation.
Voices condemning what they describe as a Brussels-orchestrated coup against Romanian democracy include Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, White House advisor Elon Musk and Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini. Although the odds are firmly against an armed rebellion, escalating street violence and inflammatory remarks from abroad will cast doubt on Romanian democracy, thus undermining the legitimacy of the government and the president. Given Romania’s crucial role in providing ongoing support to Ukraine and being home to one of NATO’s largest and most strategic forward bases, this situation cannot be taken lightly.
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