Russia’s next Baltic move may not be invasion
Baltic states are on edge as Moscow’s hybrid warfare poses a growing threat that is already testing NATO’s resolve.
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- Latvia is the most exposed, yet Moscow lacks reasons to invade outright
- Hybrid attacks offer Russia leverage without triggering a NATO response
- Kremlin desperation could still invite dangerous miscalculation
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As a frontline state, Latvia has been heavily impacted by Russia’s war against Ukraine. Even before the full-scale invasion in 2022, it figured prominently in wargames simulating a Russian attack on one or more Baltic states. Like neighboring Estonia and Lithuania, it has taken such risks quite seriously, increasing its defense spending and making extensive preparations to secure the border.
In recent months, warnings about a pending Russian invasion have taken on more urgency. Intelligence sources have claimed to have evidence that Russia is preparing to attack NATO, even before it has concluded its war against Ukraine. Given the seriousness of this threat to the Baltic states, it is essential to be clear about vulnerabilities, intentions and deterrence.
Baltic exposure
Beginning with vulnerabilities, the three states share the same legacy of having been parts of the Soviet Union, of having Russian minorities that arrived during the occupation, and of having been repeatedly warned that Russia does not recognize their independence. The Kremlin’s psychological warfare has ranged from claims that it reserves the right to defend Russians wherever they may live to reports that diaspora communities are required to prepare to receive invading Russian forces. The biggest difference among vulnerabilities, which also conditions scenarios for a possible ground invasion, concerns the respective sizes of Russian minorities that could be expected to act as a Russian fifth column in each country.
While Lithuania does have a Russian minority, it is so small that it has failed to become a political issue.
In Estonia and Latvia, matters are different. At the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, both feared that Russians might become majority populations, which would have put an effective end to all hopes for independence. That fear has since been alleviated. As many Russians have left, their shares of the population have dropped to 20 percent in Estonia and 25 percent in Latvia.
However, as large numbers of those Russians have failed to become citizens either in the Baltic state they live in or in Russia, their presence still poses challenges to national security. In Estonia, 19 percent of ethnic Russians are officially categorized as having “undetermined citizenship,” meaning they are stateless. In Latvia, the number is 25 percent. Official policies to address this problem navigate between Russian accusations of an ongoing genocide against Russian minorities, and European cautions against discrimination.
The two countries also differ in settlement patterns.
In Estonia, Russians are concentrated in the suburbs of the capital city Tallinn and in the almost entirely Russian-speaking city Narva on the border with Russia. The remainder of the country is ethnically homogenous.
In Latvia, Russians are more dispersed. In the Latgale province bordering Russia they make up more than a third of the population. In the province’s largest city Daugavpils, which is Latvia’s second-largest city, they are the majority. The Russian presence in the capital city Riga is even more significant. It was only after the collapse of the Russian Empire and the proclamation of Latvian independence on November 18, 1918, that it became a predominantly Latvian city. In the 1935 census, Latvians made up 63 percent of Riga’s residents and Russians merely 9 percent. But under the Soviet occupation, Russians returned. In 1989, 47 percent of the city’s residents were Russian. Today, Latvians have a slim plurality of 47 percent with Russians at 36 percent.
Lay of the land on the Baltic coast
A second set of differing vulnerabilities concerns geography. A ground invasion requires breaking a common border, so it is important to consider where the borders in question are drawn.
While Lithuania does have a border with the Russian Kaliningrad exclave, it has no border with Russia proper. Its vulnerability lies in being attacked from Belarus, which would require President Alexander Lukashenko being cajoled into doing so.
Estonia has a 294 kilometer-long border with Russia, but the main segment is aquatic – the Narva River, Lake Peipus and Lake Pskov – and the southernmost part is marshlands. A Russian ground invasion of Estonia in consequence would face considerable hurdles.
Baltic exposure to Russia
Latvia in contrast has a 280 kilometer-long border both with Russia and a 173 kilometer-long border with Belarus, implying that a threat of invasion could emanate from either or both of those states. Although there are few natural obstacles to impede an invader, Latvia is the most vulnerable of the Baltic states. This is also reflected in its approach to deterrence.
In early 2024, the three governments reached agreement on the construction of a Baltic Defense Line, an elaborate system of fences, bunkers and other forms of obstacles to delay and channel a potential ground invasion. They have, however, taken different approaches.
In Lithuania, where the main threat to security has been the weaponization of migrants, the government has placed its emphasis on a border fence and roving patrols that prevent migrants from crossing the frontier. The threat of an armed ground invasion is not being met by static fortifications, but rather with “mobility centers,” dispersed hubs where equipment is stockpiled to facilitate rapid deployment.
In Estonia, bunkers and other fortifications are being constructed, but mainly on the southern segment of the border.
As the most exposed of the three, Latvia has made by far the most elaborate preparations. Riga has invested in the creation of a 30 kilometer-deep zone of layered defenses that range from a border fence and an anti-tank ditch to an anti-tank minefield and rows of “dragon’s teeth,” all supported by electronic surveillance. Behind these obstacles are bunkers for defenders and hardened storage for munitions.
In addition to the static defenses, and its own armed forces, Latvian deterrence also includes the presence of a NATO battlegroup. Led by Canada, it includes troops from Sweden and Denmark. In response to the increasing tensions, Germany and the Netherlands have agreed to assign the German-Netherlands Corps, currently headquartered in Munster, to the defense of Estonia and Latvia. Although it will take time to build up strength, it signals that NATO is serious about defending the area.
Russian objectives
Turning to intentions, Russian strategic objectives vary between the three countries. The clear objective for a Russian attack on Lithuania would be to create a land bridge from Russia proper via Belarus to Kaliningrad, greatly enhancing the threat against Poland. A Russian attack on Estonia would also have an obvious objective, namely, to secure the Gulf of Finland and the approaches to port facilities that are vital to the export of oil. In the case of Latvia, it is not immediately obvious why Russia would launch a ground invasion.
Despite all its preparations to repel a ground invasion, or perhaps because of those preparations, the Latvian government plays down the dangers. Speaking on the sidelines of the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara, President Edgars Rinkevics responded to warnings about a Russian attack by noting that “Today, Russia does not have military capability to do that.” He did, however, add that Russia does have the capability to undertake “small or medium scale operations” and he noted that a variety of hybrid operations are “actually happening as we speak.” Threats of a ground invasion form part of a broader Russian strategy that is aimed at destabilizing the Baltic region and probing for weaknesses in NATO resolve.
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Before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia did have considerable political leverage via political parties in Baltic states that catered to the interests of Russian minorities. In Latvia it was mainly Harmony, a center-left Social Democrat party, that absorbed many Russian votes. Between 2011 and 2022, it was the largest party in the national parliament. Although other parties managed to build coalitions to keep it out of government, it was a constant reminder of the danger of active Russian measures to destabilize national politics.
The full-scale invasion turned the tables. In the 2022 national elections, Harmony failed to meet the 5 percent hurdle and in consequence lost its representation in parliament. As in Estonia, the Latvian government has responded to Russian aggression against Ukraine by increasing the pressure for Russians to either integrate or leave. Although opinion polls show that remaining members of the Russian minority have few if any sympathies for Russia, there is reason to suspect that this is conditioned by a desire to keep a low profile. In a crisis, pro-Russian sympathies could still be mobilized.
Scenarios
Most likely: Hybrid operations continue to escalate
The most likely scenario is a continued escalation of Russian hybrid operations to meet four main Russian priorities: influencing public opinion in a pro-Russian direction, raising the costs for countries that support Ukraine, instilling fear of further escalation and undertaking actual preparations for armed conflict.
The first entails activities to promote a pro-Russian sphere in Baltic social media and political organizations. The second features sabotage against critical infrastructure, such as underwater cables and land-based telecommunications. The third is achieved by way of open provocations, such as visible presence of drones over airports and visible breeches of doors to critical installations such as freshwater pumping stations. The fourth involves mapping the vulnerabilities of targeted countries to different forms of sabotage and how they respond to such activities.
Although the Baltic states are far from alone in being targeted (recent events in Germany are worth noting), they have felt the burden more than other NATO members. Both Estonia and Latvia have experienced attacks on underwater cables leading to Finland and Sweden. Russian patrol boats have removed buoys marking the border with Estonia in the Narva River. Lithuania has been forced into repeated suspensions of air traffic, as balloons have been sent over Vilnius airport. In his speech in Ankara, President Rinkevics cited “increased migration pressure, espionage and efforts by hostile actors to plan sabotage or subversion.”
While an escalation of hybrid attacks is to be expected, including interference with GPS that endangers civilian air traffic, it is also vital to look at the track record of such activities. As Russia keeps expanding the scope of what it can get away with, it is careful not to cross the line where serious countermeasures would be bound to follow.
Less likely: Russia escalates to limited armed incursion
An alternate scenario is that Russia does opt for escalation including crossing borders with military force. This could follow the example that was set after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, that is, a repeat of the “insurrection” in Donbas. In Estonia, it would entail a move against Narva, which is a key feature in current Russian propaganda about an ongoing genocide. The Estonian defense rests not only on the Narva River and Lake Peipus. To protect the city of Narva, the government has also committed 15 million euros to the construction of a military base housing a detachment of 200 Estonian troops that is ready to swiftly scale up to 1,000 as NATO reinforcements arrive.
A move against Latvia could begin with an insurrection in Latgale, orchestrated by sleeper cells and professional troublemakers. This would be accompanied by bellicose Russian rhetoric about genocide, by support for the proclamation of a People’s Republic of Latgale and by anti-government rioting in Riga. When the Latvian government cracks down on the insurrectionists, Russia intervenes with cross border shelling, expecting that NATO forces will shy back from firing into Russia. As the violence escalates, a limited cross-border incursion may follow, seeking to breech the defensive lines.
What makes this scenario unlikely to materialize is that it would be met by considerable retaliation, drawing the exposed Kaliningrad exclave into the war. What makes it impossible to discard out of hand is that increasing Russian desperation in the face of Ukrainian drone and missile attacks may prod the Kremlin into a reckless gamble, hoping that it may still humiliate NATO.
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