Russia’s global pullback creates new power vacuums
Russia’s withdrawal from key conflict zones leaves the U.S. with selective gains, while China and Turkiye are stepping up to expand their influence.
In a nutshell
- Russia’s refusal to back Iran marks an erosion of its great-power reach
- Turkiye expands its influence across the South Caucasus and Central Asia
- China deepens informal control over Russian Far East energy and resources
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When United States President Donald Trump first voiced support for the anti-regime protests in Iran, he also sent a strong message to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Although Washington had previously shown willingness to accommodate Russia, it made clear that it will not hesitate to weaken the Kremlin’s most important ally.
These developments have unfolded against the backdrop of Russia’s grinding war in Ukraine, which has strained Moscow’s resources and exposed the limits of its conventional power.
This double pressure – military exhaustion in Ukraine and the sudden threat to Tehran – poses a serious challenge for Moscow. Iran has not only provided Russia with crucial weaponry, including Shahed drones, but has also long been a partner in developing energy relations and enhancing north-south transport connectivity.
As the U.S. launched its largest military buildup since the 2003 Iraq War, President Putin faced a critical choice regarding Russia’s stance on Iran. Despite a high-profile Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement signed in January 2025, Russia ultimately chose not to support Iran. Like its earlier decision to avoid intervening in Venezuela, the Kremlin opted to distance itself from Tehran.
Moscow’s refusal to stand by Tehran symbolizes yet another step in Russia’s gradual withdrawal from its former status as a great power.
The collapse of the Soviet Union led newly independent states to seek closer relations with the West, moving away from the Russian sphere of influence. Moscow tried to reverse this trend with the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and the 2014 occupation of Crimea, and the results were mixed. Yet after launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin was forced to watch its dominoes beginning to fall at an accelerating pace.
The fall of Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad resulted in the loss of the naval base at Tartus, a critical asset for Russia’s influence in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, in the South Caucasus, the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia enabled Turkiye to replace Russia as the regional hegemon.
In Latin America, the U.S. intervention that toppled Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela has left the Cuban regime next in the crosshairs, leaving Russia without any meaningful foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Chinese social media is filled with calls for Beijing to exploit the Kremlin’s weakness and reclaim territories that many believe were unjustly taken by Russia. In Africa, Moscow’s support for mercenaries such as the former Wagner group continues to erode.
The message to authoritarian regimes around the globe is unmistakable: When it comes down to it, Russia can no longer be counted on to provide tangible support.
Filling Russia’s power vacuum
The central question now is who will fill the voids left by Russia’s retreat. Recent developments suggest a fundamental shift in the trilateral relationship between Russia, China and the U.S, but assessing how this shift will unfold is complicated by three factors.
One factor is that certain regions could spiral into chaos and become simply ungovernable. The precedents of Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that Iran may follow a similar path toward prolonged instability. In situations like these, it will be challenging to determine who might emerge victorious as various insurgent groups and non-state actors frustrate the ambitions of major powers.
A second complication is the rise of Turkiye as a regional power, driven by a distinct pan-Turkic agenda that strongly resonates in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Ankara’s role is further strengthened by its rise as an energy hub in a region where energy stakes are incredibly high, as well as by its complex relationship with the Kurds, who are set to play a major role in shaping the future landscape.
A third complication is that while both China and Turkiye have clear visions for their futures and are aware of the costs they are willing to incur, the U.S. seems somewhat adrift in its strategic goals and the price it is prepared to pay. The lack of clarity on an exit strategy from the conflict with Iran brings back unsettling memories of past involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The behind-the-scenes roles of Russia and China will further complicate U.S. efforts.
Looking into this fog, the U.S. intervention in Venezuela was the easiest call. While it was initially viewed as support for the democratic opposition, it quickly became apparent that the real aim was to gain control over Venezuela’s oil resources. By halting Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba and imposing secondary sanctions on suppliers, the Trump administration tightened its economic pressure on Havana, which depends heavily on Venezuelan crude for its energy needs. The days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Moscow could threaten U.S. interests, are a distant memory. This outcome also has important implications for China, which relies heavily on Venezuelan oil imports.
The U.S. ambition to establish dominance in the Western Hemisphere may face domestic opposition and resistance from other Latin American countries, such as Brazil. However, in terms of hard power, there is very little that Russia or China can do to counter Washington’s moves.
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China’s Eastern advance and turmoil in West Asia
Another clear case is the Far East. Chinese social media increasingly references the 1860 Convention of Peking, when Russia took advantage of China’s weakness during the Opium War. At that time, the Qing Dynasty was compelled to cede control of roughly 300,000 square kilometers of territory, which included regions such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.
Beijing is unlikely to reclaim these territories through direct invasion. However, as Russia struggles in its war against Ukraine, China will face increasing pressure to strengthen its informal control of those territories to safeguard its own interests in Russian energy and other raw materials. The role of the Russian Pacific Fleet in a potential conflict over Taiwan adds to this urgency. Although this has serious implications for Japan and South Korea, there is little that the U.S. can do to prevent China from expanding its footprint.
The main arena where the outcome of the standoff between China and the U.S. is hard to call is in the Middle East. When civil war broke out in Syria, Russia quickly stepped in to bolster the Assad regime, deploying troops and allegedly participating in the bombing of Aleppo. Yet, when rebel forces advanced against former President Assad in December 2024, Moscow remained completely hands-off. This absence of Russian influence in Syria created a vacuum that Israel capitalized on, increasing its involvement in the southern Druze regions.
Both Europe and the U.S. are being drawn into supporting the new regime, but there is no clear roadmap for this involvement. Additionally, Turkiye is hedging against an expanded Kurdish role. The lack of Russian support for Iran has been particularly significant. While Beijing has offered some military assistance, its primary focus is on restoring oil flows, and it has no interest in state-building efforts.
Although Turkiye will play a role in filling the void left by Russia in the Middle East, it will make the biggest difference in the South Caucasus. There, it is poised to assume Russia’s former role as the regional hegemon and extend its ambitions into Central Asia, where Moscow is also retreating.
Scenarios
Most likely: Protracted mess and selective gains
The most likely outcome is a drawn-out, messy situation. The U.S. secures control over Venezuelan oil flows and shapes Cuba’s trajectory, while China and Turkiye reap the primary benefits from Russia’s retreat elsewhere. Washington will concede influence in the South Caucasus to Turkiye and Azerbaijan and will struggle to gain ground in Central Asia.
As these nations assert their independence, they are likely to engage in strategic maneuvers involving China and Turkiye. Meanwhile, Russia will continue to operate as a disruptive force from the sidelines, though it will likely struggle to exert significant influence. In a final twist to the geopolitical landscape, if Russia’s diminishing presence in Africa coincides with a decline in support from Iran and other backers for various radical Islamist groups, China will have the opportunity to further its interests in the region as well.
Likely: American victory in the Western Hemisphere
A lower-probability but still likely scenario is that the U.S. emerges victorious. While its efforts to control the flow of oil from Venezuela do not extend to controlling production, the oil industry – currently considered “uninvestable” – may become a vital asset in the long run. By successfully pushing both Russia and China out of the region, the U.S. could claim to have established hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.
After defeating Iran and ensuring it cannot develop nuclear weapons, Washington may claim to have brought peace to the region and work to cement relations between Israel and the Gulf states. Having made peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Trump administration may succeed in branding the vital Zangezur Corridor as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.
In November 2025, President Trump hosted a meeting at the White House with the leaders of the five Central Asian nations, potentially allowing him to claim that he has outmaneuvered Chinese President Xi Jinping, who held a similar meeting in Xi’an, China, in 2023. However, given the resilience of Iran’s offensive capabilities and the likely backlash from various countries against the U.S., this scenario is unlikely to materialize.
Least likely: Russian resurgence
The least likely scenario is that Russia will reassert itself. The short-term impact of the war against Iran can be misleading. The spike in oil prices was a real boon. The U.S. overlooked India’s purchases of Russian oil, and the shadow fleet carrying that oil found more willing buyers. With access to Iranian and Venezuelan oil restricted, China is likely to pay a higher price for Russian oil.
Along with the increase in export revenues, the Kremlin may hope that the war against Iran will weaken international support for Ukraine. If the Iranian regime survives in some form, it could even resume military and industrial cooperation with Russia. The recent Iranian bombings of Azerbaijan – a significant oil supplier for Israel – suggest that Moscow may have an ally in countering challenges in the South Caucasus. While these scenarios cannot be entirely dismissed, they would require a prolonged war and a major setback for the U.S. to pave the way for a realistic Russia comeback.
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