Russia’s long shadow over Japan
Japan faces a complex security landscape with rising threats, territorial disputes and evolving alliances.
In a nutshell
- Japan faces the most complex security challenges in Asia
- Three neighboring dictatorships with life-long rulers pose conventional and nuclear threats to Japan
- The Kuril Islands dispute with Russia is the least of Japan’s diplomatic, security and economic worries
The ongoing tectonic shifts of the post-Cold War era are of tremendous significance for Japan’s foreign and security policy. For ages, the country’s remote island location seemed to shield it from the storms of world history. Unlike most of Asia, Japan never became a colony of an imperial power. The wars that engaged the archipelago in the 19th and 20th centuries were initiated by the Japanese and ended in its capitulation of 1945.
The post-World War II occupation by the United States and the subsequent security treaty between Tokyo and Washington, in conjunction with its pacifist constitution of 1947, provided Japan with a unique opportunity. For decades, it could focus single-mindedly on economic reconstruction while profiting from a foolproof protective shield and export market provided by the world’s most powerful nation, the U.S.
Primeval fears and enmities
Over the past two centuries, Japan has impressed the world with two achievements. First, the country catapulted itself from medieval feudalism straight into the industrial revolution, in the rapid process of the Meiji Restoration. It entered the Western world of modernity much earlier than any other Asian country. Second, modern industrialized Japan established that substantial natural resources are not a requirement to become wealthy; a nation can rise to the status of an economic superpower through effort, discipline and innovation.
In two of the world’s three looming conflict flashpoints – the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the South China Sea (including Taiwan) – Japan is directly involved. While it is economically afflicted by the tensions and wars in the Middle East, it is even more tangibly threatened in the Pacific: Japan has maritime borders with both Russia and China, and also with the Northern Mariana Islands (a U.S. territory), the Philippines as well as both North and South Korea.
Two core principles of diplomacy hold true for Japan: There are no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests; and the enemy of my enemy can be my friend. Bearing in mind history, geography, geopolitics and demographics, there can be no doubt that China and Russia have the potential to become each other’s archenemies.
Two core principles of diplomacy hold true for Japan: There are no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests.
It was the knowledge and exploitation of this long-standing rivalry that led Henry Kissinger to his policy to engage China, the most significant reversal in Washington’s China policy since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. The U.S.-China rapprochement was clearly aimed at bringing the Soviet Union to its knees. It was a crucial part of the American strategy to lead the USSR onto the treacherous path of imperial overstretch.
Since Mao Zedong’s days, Chinese leadership has been deeply suspicious of its huge Eurasian neighbor. After all, in 1969, there was a bloody border war between the People’s Republic and the USSR. Equally fearful are the Russians, aware of the shrinking population in their Far East and of the Chinese masses just over the historically disputed borders.
At present, we may be in a phase of Sino-Russian cooperation, with both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin harboring the common goal of a new world order not dominated by liberal Western democracies. President Xi is intent on revamping Chinese ideology and he is wooing nations around the world, big and small, to serve his ambition of global Chinese hegemony. Making Russia economically and technologically dependent on various Chinese products while watching the nominal ally’s powers sapped in its senseless war in Ukraine are part of the same ambitious strategy.
Faced with Russian imperialism
For decades, the Japanese could take for granted the American security guarantee, as both parties in the U.S. Congress supported the commitment to Japan. The U.S. was willing to accept rigid Japanese constraints in military engagements overseas so long as Japan, deemed to be an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” was covering the costs of the U.S. bases on the archipelago.
After the 9/11 terrorist attack against the U.S. and the Iraq War, that changed. Tokyo abandoned its overcautious practice of keeping out of all conflicts beyond its territorial waters and of not engaging in third-party disputes. This new approach, however, did not alter the geopolitical security perceptions under which Japanese diplomacy operated. The main focus remained on the vulnerability of supply chains and the need for Japan to have its major trade routes protected. Overseas routes to the Indian Ocean, Africa and western Asia are vital for Japanese industries operating globally.
Since the outbreak of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, Japanese diplomacy has had to deal with conventional wars fueled by classical nationalism and militarism. The most urgent issue for Japan in this regard is Russia. Beyond the immediate challenge created by the war in Ukraine, longer-term risks from President Putin’s nationalist ambitions loom. Russia has shown that it is, once again, willing and able to use its military to expand its power and reach, which is an alarming development for neighboring Japan.
There is most certainly no chance of Japan reclaiming the Kuril Islands (four islets offshore Hokkaido, known as the Northern Territories in Japan) in the foreseeable future. The USSR occupied the archipelago during the realignment of influence in the Far East toward the end of World War II. During the late phase of the Cold War, Moscow still aimed at increasing its naval might in the Pacific. Then came the collapse and the tide turned. Russia disappeared as a substantial naval power in the Pacific.
In retrospect, one has to accept that the best opportunity for a deal was missed when the Soviet Union was at its weakest after the end of the Cold War. At that time, there was the option of a compromise with the four islands being divided between Russia and Japan – a solution that, however, was not acceptable to Japan’s dominant conservative party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Now, the opportune time has passed, and Japan has to deal with a Russia that is willing to use its military capability recklessly. In spite of its heavy engagement in Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its presence as a Pacific power by staging joint naval exercises with the Chinese fleet. The signals sent to Tokyo are clear: do not make the mistake of believing that Russia is fully absorbed with Ukraine.
Japan’s options
Moscow, like China, is taking note of the rapprochement between Japan and NATO and the speculation about the establishment of an “Asian NATO.” This has caused sharp reactions in both Moscow and Beijing, while public debate in Japan and a number of East Asian countries is increasingly turning to the issue of multilateral security institutions.
Read more by Urs Schöttli on Japan and East Asia
- East Asia realignment: Japan and the Philippines move closer
- The new geopolitics of trade in Asia
- Fear of China brings Japan and South Korea closer together
Japan lacks the military, economic and geopolitical might necessary to maintain its independence and integrity. Tokyo has no tool at the ready to play Russia and China against each other. The island nation is faced with the stark realization that its two most powerful neighbors are ganging up to contain it.
Nobody likes a situation in which danger lurks on two fronts, especially when a state’s security is dependent on one overseas partner alone. Japan must take into consideration that its strongest ally, the U.S., harbors its own interests, and these are determinedly China-focused. America’s concerns hardly encompass going to war for the defense of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea or the recovery of the Kuril Islands.
Scenarios
There are two main scenarios for Japan.
More likely: Japan and other South and East Asian states coalesce in Western-oriented security structures
The first is a decisive enhancement of its defensive geopolitical capacities by enlarging security frameworks. That has been happening in the past few years with informal groupings, such as the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of Australia, India, Japan and the U.S.) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S.), reflecting new intercontinental security challenges. These trends are gaining momentum, as recently seen in the trilateral agreement for security and economic cooperation between the U.S., Japan and the Philippines, or closer coordination between the U.S., Japan and South Korea.
Everything indicates that more Southeast Asian countries might join these initiatives in the not-too-distant future. In response, Moscow and Beijing will denounce them, which might bring France into the picture as a nation with territories and interests in the Pacific.
Less likely: Japan normalizes relations with China and Russia
The second scenario seems less likely at present but should not be excluded. It contains the normalization, or at least unfreezing, of bilateral relations between China and Japan, and Russia and Japan. It is no secret that in the ruling LDP camp, there are traditional lobbies for good relations with China and Russia.
The pro-China lobby argues that the economies of China and Japan have lucrative synergies that are being hampered by political tensions. These lawmakers posit that Japan must put its economic interests first when defining its China policy.
The pro-Russia lobby argues in a similar vein. It stresses that Japan and Russia have many common geopolitical interests; that China is by far a graver threat to Japan than Russia; and that it would be foolish to fight on two fronts. While Russia is a very minor player in international trade with Japan, it has vast energy reserves and raw materials that are of interest to Japanese industry. The relative proximity of these resources from Russia’s Far East are not without relevance for Japan.
The late Shinzo Abe, Japan’s long-time prime minister, claimed to have a special relationship with President Putin and had worked diligently for better relations with Russia. Significantly, his father, former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, considered the normalization of Japanese relations with the USSR in the 1980s to be one of his greatest achievements.
Later, short-term Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and the influential Hokkaido politician Muneo Suzuki promoted good relations with Moscow. The pro-Russia lobby’s key point has been that good relations with Moscow can counterbalance the power of China.
For industry-specific scenarios and bespoke geopolitical intelligence, contact us and we will provide you with more information about our advisory services.
Sign up for our newsletter
Receive insights from our experts every week in your inbox.
