Scenarios

Most likely: Russia maintains the status quo in its Southeast Asia engagement

The first and most likely scenario is that Moscow focuses on maintaining key components of its legacy ties with countries in the region. That means preserving the bilateral links it still enjoys, namely arms sales to Vietnam and others, or wider regional advances by Russian energy firms (some had previously been scrutinized and subject to economic restrictions).

It is possible the Kremlin makes narrow advances within its few areas of advantage. This could come via additional regular albeit basic joint military exercises with Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia or Laos. Moscow may even expand ties with Myanmar, which faces challenges in its international relationships amid its ongoing civil war and after observers deemed recent elections there neither free nor fair.

Beyond the narrow set of Russian advantages in the region and exploiting periodic opportunities, there will be very little change in the breadth of Moscow’s ties in Southeast Asia. 

Less likely: Russia loses influence and markets in Southeast Asia

A less likely scenario but one that could develop over time is one in which Russia’s few advantages and periodic inroads in the region diminish, hollowing out its influence. Let us take just one example, arms sales. Russia faces constraints in defense production capacity amid its own military activities in Ukraine, while competition from other manufacturing powers is on the rise. Established vendors in countries such as South Korea and relatively newer entrants like Turkiye are both making progress in regional arms deals. This may begin to chip away at Moscow’s significant position as an arms exporter even if it continues to play a role in this space.

One report from March 2025 noted that while Russia’s share of global arms sales was 7.8 percent in 2024, remaining the third-largest defense exporter and trailing only the U.S. and France, arms exports from Russia decreased by 64 percent from 2020-2024 relative to 2015-2019. Sales to countries like Vietnam are showing some relative decline as Hanoi is open to further diversification in the country’s defense mix.

Increasing U.S. scrutiny on Southeast Asia’s links with the Kremlin and growing Sino-Russian collaboration could make Moscow a relatively less palatable choice for some governments, despite aspirations for more engagement. This concern could be exacerbated when paired with longer-term considerations, including Russia’s own domestic economic and demographic challenges as well as the need for greener sources of energy and digitalization, areas where Moscow lags.

Least likely: Russia becomes a key player in Southeast Asia

The least likely scenario would see a broadening of Russia’s relations with Southeast Asia if the Kremlin were to prioritize the region and devote resources there. Should this occur, manifestations would include Moscow positioning itself more prominently as a key contributor in civilian nuclear power, small modular reactors and outer space.

This could also factor into what some Russian officials describe as a broader, multisectoral approach to Southeast Asia. This would entail Moscow as an interregional “bridge” active in segments like food security, energy supplies and trade, or even tourism and cultural exchanges.

Should this scenario come to pass, we may even see unprecedented symbolic firsts such as the attendance of a Russian leader at ASEAN summits. But to date, no Russian president has ever attended an ASEAN summit, and Moscow remains one of a minority of ASEAN’s dialogue partners with ties not having been elevated to the top tier of a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Meanwhile, questions remain around Mr. Putin’s own hold on power and what this may mean for Southeast Asia in the Kremlin’s long-held rhetoric around pivoting eastward in its foreign policy. Few see President Putin loosening his hold on power anytime soon, as evidenced by legislation that could allow him to stay in power until 2036 when he would be 83 and would at that time be the longest-serving Russian leader since Josef Stalin.

Nonetheless, given the Kremlin’s long links among some countries in the region, as well as its attempted inroads in Southeast Asia over the past few years, it would be a mistake to simply assume continuity when forecasting possible futures.