The path of sanctions evasion leads through Kyrgyzstan
Russia’s war in Ukraine elevates Kyrgyzstan as a China-backed hub for sanctions avoidance, reshaping global trade transparency norms.
In a nutshell
- Kyrgyzstan channels Western and Chinese goods to Russia
- China is building sanctions-resistant trading networks
- Authoritarian trends and the BRI align Bishkek with Beijing
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Russia’s war against Ukraine has greatly enhanced the role of Central Asia as a region for sanctions avoidance. This activity not only generates ample illicit income for all those concerned but also sets a course toward a profound transformation of the global order of transparency in trading relationships.
Although the Russian war machine is the main beneficiary in the short term, China gains in the long run. Beijing has its sights on building an opaque trading system that makes China immune to sanctions from the United States, should it decide to move against Taiwan. One of its main partners in this endeavor is Kyrgyzstan.
Much has been written about how sanctioned products from Western manufacturers continue to flow into Russia. Although it is not alone, Kyrgyzstan is often mentioned as one of the main transit locations for goods that cannot be shipped openly to Russia. For example, German exports to this small market have surged more than tenfold since 2022. This cannot be explained any other way than sanctions busting.
In 2022, the first year of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Kyrgyz exports to Russia rose by a striking 250 percent compared to the year before. Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan are booming in tandem, suggesting that Beijing and Bishkek are developing a common policy of providing clandestine support for the Russian war effort.
Bishkek’s ties with Beijing
While the Middle Kingdom clearly views things from a longer-term geopolitical perspective, for Kyrgyzstan, the interest lies in developing a comprehensive strategic partnership to support its near-term economic development. President Sadyr Japarov’s state visits to China in 2023 and again in February 2025 have, unsurprisingly, been touted by the Kyrgyz side as “truly historic.”
These events mark a major transformation in Kyrgyzstan’s political landscape. In 2005, the country earned a place in history by becoming the only Central Asian country to launch a “color revolution,” when its tulip revolution caused the downfall of President Askar Akaev, who had been in power since 1990. In a region otherwise dominated by clan politics and long-ruling strongmen, this was a significant development. While it gave rise to major concern in neighboring countries, in Kyrgyzstan itself, it set the stage for a process of elections that led to changes in government and even earned the country an international reputation as a regional version of Switzerland.
Early hopes for integration into the Western orbit were, however, unfulfilled. The country has instead become more deeply integrated into China’s strategy for the region, one that features energy imports and heavy investment in infrastructure to support its increasingly important trade with Europe. Although Kyrgyzstan does not have abundant energy resources like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, its geographical location ensured that it would still attract substantial Chinese attention and thus investment.
When President Xi Jinping used a 2013 visit to Kazakhstan to announce the launch of his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Kyrgyzstan was destined to become a vital link. Like many other countries that have secured such Chinese investment, it soon discovered that this was a mixed blessing. The upside was that it could enjoy high rates of economic growth and visible signs of development. The downside featured rising popular discontent about local projects being undertaken mainly by Chinese workers according to patterns seen elsewhere that crowd out local culture while promoting Chinese firms, heritage and language.
Such discontent was fueled by China having long been viewed as hostile both to Islam and to people of Turkic origin. In late 2018 and early 2019, Bishkek experienced anti-China rallies. Although these protests were modest in size, each attracting at most a few hundred people, they shone a light on the problems of Chinese migration into the country and of rising Kyrgyz indebtedness to Chinese creditors. The latter was well in line with Beijing’s overall policy of debt diplomacy, which entails a liberal issuance of credits followed by harsh demands for their repayment.
Kyrgyzstan’s total debt remains manageable at close to 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), but its dependence on China is growing. By the end of 2024, Beijing owned a third of the country’s external debt and provided a quarter of its investment. Most importantly, Chinese-Kyrgyz trade turnover surged to $22.7 billion in 2024, followed by a roughly 50 percent increase in 2025.
It may come as no surprise, then, that the Kyrgyz government so willingly embraces this development. It does, however, stand in stark contrast to other countries in the region, like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, that have been cautious in guarding against an overwhelming Chinese influence by balancing relations with Beijing through involvement with Russia, Turkiye and the West.
Kyrgyz politics
An important milestone in Kyrgyzstan’s transition to becoming a de facto Chinese vassal state was marked in October 2020, when Mr. Japarov came to power. The context was mass protests against the outcome of a parliamentary election that brought victory to parties with close relations to the then-sitting President Sooronbai Jeenbekov. The protests not only caused the election results to be annulled, but amid the chaos of government buildings being stormed, Mr. Japarov was freed from jail where he was serving a sentence for kidnapping. After President Jeenbekov stepped down under pressure, Mr. Japarov was appointed prime minister of the interim government, and in January of 2021 he was elected president.
While his election to the presidency was considered reasonably free and fair, his subsequent actions began to take a decidedly authoritarian turn. Similar to the increasingly pro-Russian government in Georgia, which also had been an early model of a pro-Western color revolution, he followed the Moscow playbook in cracking down on political opposition. A telltale sign was the introduction of legislation modelled on Russia’s notorious law on “foreign agents.” It requires NGOs that have foreign financing to register as “foreign representatives” and thus become targets of persecution.
Additionally, only months after Mr. Japarov became president, important constitutional changes were decided in an April 2021 referendum. The prior rule allowing only single-term presidencies − introduced to guard against strongman rulers − was scrapped and the role of the presidency was expanded.
Since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, sanctions busting has been lucrative, helping boost Kyrgyzstan’s economic growth rate to around 9 percent annually.
Bent on securing a second term in the upcoming 2027 election, and with the opposition already effectively muzzled, President Japarov could delight in parties loyal to him emerging victorious in parliamentary elections on November 30, 2025.
There are important reasons that explain why Mr. Japarov has been able to cement his rule. One is that for all its inherent cultural bias, Chinese investment has been helpful in building vital infrastructure. The opening of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad in December 2024 was a major step toward a deeper integration of Kyrgyzstan into the BRI. Moreover, since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, sanctions busting has been lucrative, helping boost Kyrgyzstan’s economic growth rate to around 9 percent annually.
Another reason is that following several revolutions, like the ousters of President Akaev in 2005 and President Jeenbekov in 2020, many locals crave stability and are willing to accept constraints on their liberties. Turnout in the November elections was only 36.9 percent, suggesting grudging acceptance in return for said stability.
From a Russian perspective, this is welcome news. Where major countries in the region, like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have reacted to the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine by turning a cold shoulder, Kyrgyzstan has been vital in enabling sanctions avoidance. In fact, during a November 2025 visit to the country with a large, high-level delegation, Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to Kyrgyzstan as a “reliable partner.”
The downside for Kyrgyzstan is that by acting as a sanctions-avoidance conduit between China and Russia and providing the Kremlin with a lifeline for its war of aggression, Bishkek loses leverage over its own geopolitical stance.
The main advantage for Beijing in engaging with Bishkek is that it offers excellent opportunities to experiment with sanctions busting. Officials in Beijing are learning as they go how to fine-tune a method of trade that is iron-clad against Western sanctions. Accordingly, the Sino-Kyrgyz relationship has become quite warm.
During President Japarov’s visit to China in 2023, his country was elevated to having a comprehensive strategic partnership with Beijing, the importance of which was underscored by his participation in the pivotal first “China-Central Asia Summit” held in Xian. During his subsequent visit in February 2025, the partnership was elevated even further and a slew of deals were signed. Following the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit that was hosted by China in Tianjin at the end of August, the two sides also expressed great satisfaction with Kyrgyzstan chairing the SCO through 2026.
China needs hassle-free trade routes to Europe
The primary reason for China to continue cultivating its relations with countries in Central Asia remains linked to its interest in developing routes for its crucial trade with Europe. As relations with the United States have deteriorated, this has become an even greater priority.
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Although major countries in the region like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan play a paramount role, there is an important niche for Kyrgyzstan to exploit in developing trade routes that are sanctions-proof. Manas International Airport, once used by the U.S. forces active in Afghanistan, has become an important gateway to Central Asia with lax controls.
Beijing’s heavy investment in upgrading the country’s transport infrastructure also suggests an interest in having an option for trade flows across the mountainous southeastern part of Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and western Tajikistan. Although this route is slower and more cumbersome than one further north, it may serve as a backup if Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan decide to opt for tougher enforcement of sanctions.
Scenarios
Possible: Backlash against growing Chinese dominance in Kyrgyzstan
It is still possible that growing discontent with Chinese influence will cause a backlash. In mid-November 2025, the village of Konstantinovka in northern Kyrgyzstan saw violent clashes between Chinese and Kyrgyz construction workers. Business circles have been miffed by the priority that is given to Chinese investors, especially in the country’s mining sector. The consequences of increasing indebtedness may also play out in ways unpalatable to Beijing. Kyrgyzstan may be prompted to follow the example of its larger neighbors in seeking to balance China’s influence with that of countries further west.
Most likely: China and Kyrgyzstan keep helping one another
The most likely scenario, however, is that Sino-Kyrgyz relations remain on track, with continued Chinese investments securing Chinese firms’ steady growth in control of businesses in Kyrgyzstan. This will occur as a growing share of trade is conducted in Chinese renminbi.
With Bishkek at the helm of the SCO for the rest of this year, the two countries will have win-win opportunities to develop a sanctions-proof foothold for the BRI while supporting President Japarov’s anticipated bid for reelection in 2027. In a broader perspective, this sets an important example of what to expect from the continued deployment of Chinese soft power in Central Asia.
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