The agony of Schengen
Issues with the EU’s external border regime are fomenting nationalist tendencies in member states.
In a nutshell
- The Schengen area is at a crossroads: more integration or fragmentation
- Recent migration trends have challenged the EU’s capacity to adapt
- The current situation risks worsening national dissent among EU states
Migratory pressure has created an existential dilemma for the Schengen area. The European Union could either take a huge step toward a closer political union, or it could revert to the pre-Schengen state of affairs – although it will most probably carry on muddling through half-heartedly.
The ideal behind the Schengen idea
In 1985, France, Germany and the Benelux countries agreed to lift border controls. Their vision was an internal market where goods, people and money could flow freely, a “common area of freedom, rights and security.” The EU proudly proclaimed: “The Schengen area is to protect its citizens through increased cooperation … of all the member states. This will offset any security deficit arising from the abolition of internal border controls.” Since then, 23 of today’s EU members have joined (Ireland and Cyprus remain outside the Schengen zone, while Bulgaria and Romania retain control of their land borders), as have four non-EU-countries: Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
In 1985, Europe looked fundamentally different than it does today: The Iron Curtain prevented east-west migration, and the Mediterranean seemed an insurmountable natural obstacle against illegal crossings from south to north. Repeated attempts by migrants to scale the high fences of the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla were, however, early warnings of looming storms.
In 1985, air travel was expensive, while cellular phones and the internet were still in their infancy. Globalization was just beginning.
A decade of changing migration
Around 2010 it became obvious that circumstances were changing more quickly than the EU could adapt. Developments accelerated with the breakdown of strongman Muammar Qaddafi’s rule in Libya. He had been a brutal but effective gatekeeper. The rising trickle of refugees turned into a tsunami in 2015: Around 2 million people arrived in the EU, most of them from Syria. Images of endless streams of migrants entering European countries played a significant role in swaying the vote in the 2016 British EU referendum.
Facts & figures
EU immigration figures, 2008-2024
Politicians swore that such a situation must never be allowed to reoccur. But figures clearly show that a similar phenomenon is under way. In 2015, Germany embraced the concept of a “welcoming culture” (Willkommenskultur). But persistent, uncontrolled immigration fueled a nationalist-xenophobic backlash.
Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-wing party with an extremist wing, founded in 2013, went from strength to strength, even leading (32 percent) in recent regional elections in Thuringia. Another new political force, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) – an odd mixture of aggressive nationalism and Stalinist socialism – was catapulted to about 12 percent support. Nationwide polls predict almost 20 percent for AfD and around 10 percent for BSW, leaving little room for coalitions for the traditional centrist parties. Migration is divisive. It has the potential of injecting a radical, violent element into politics.
Similar swings toward right-wing parties are occurring in Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Hungary and Poland have always been skeptical of liberal immigration policies. Both have built fences to secure their borders. The Hungarian and Dutch governments have declared that they intend not to follow EU directives in matters of immigration. Germany has reintroduced temporary border controls (allowed for six months under Schengen rules), but nobody expects them to be lifted before the general election in autumn 2025.
Berlin has had a consistent policy of accepting immigrants, although they were often given euphemistic names, like guest workers. West Germany absorbed a steady flow of East Germans. It then invited about 4 million “guest workers” from Italy, Portugal, Greece and Turkey. These migrants were expected to earn handsome money for a couple of years and then to return home. But most of them stayed and had their families join them. After 1991, Germany welcomed about 2 million people from the former Soviet Union as “ethnic Germans.” All these movements were strictly controlled by the federal government.
Since 1991, however, the influx of refugees and asylum seekers has pressured governments to respond, revealing their inability to effectively manage and control these movements. Two factors were primarily responsible for triggering a massive swing in public opinion: the clear loss of political control and the large numbers of arrivals, which, after a slight dip, have continued to rise.
Facts & figures
EU asylum claims
Of the 26 million migrants that came into EU countries over the last decade, 4.2 million are workers, 7 million are refugees or asylum seekers, another 7 million are dependents under family reunion schemes, 4 million come for education and 4.2 million are Ukrainians given temporary shelter.
Approximately 16.5 million people (20 percent) of the German population have a migrant background. Many of them, particularly those from other EU and Asian countries, show a smooth record with social integration and cultural assimilation. Others are significantly overrepresented in statistics of violent crime. After some spectacular knife attacks, the sense of general vulnerability has increased. In many primary schools, pupils who have a poor grasp of German outnumber native German speakers.
Rising numbers of people staying illegally
Compounding the rising tide of arrivals is the fact that those denied refugee status or asylum evade repatriation. The backlog of those who stay despite being refused residence is growing rapidly.
Political authorities make radical-sounding announcements, but in fact they pussyfoot around effective measures, partly because of a lack of political will, bureaucratic inertia and complicated judicial procedures, partly because of the well-organized resistance of some NGOs. The growing discrepancy between the political discourse and operational paralysis alienates voters and drives them into the arms of radical agitators who promise simple solutions to complex problems.
Facts & figures
Individuals supposed to be repatriated and those who actually left the EU
Schengen procedures are vague. The Dublin III Regulation (604/2013) speaks of people who “forced by circumstances legitimately seek protection.” It neither spells out the circumstances nor does it define what constitutes a legitimate claim. Member states are responsible for migrants “on the basis of the situation obtained when the application is first lodged.”
Fuzzy language leads to contradictory implementation and to operational paralysis. The present situation is incompatible with the letter and the spirit of Schengen. Mushrooming abuse has been tolerated for over a decade. Countries with external borders have grown used to accepting migrants on the tacit understanding that they will move on to more attractive destinations. Once inside Schengen, migrants are practically free to choose the country they wish to stay in.
The three categories of migrants under the Geneva Convention, refugees, asylum seekers and those offered subsidiary protection, create a formidable challenge for any bureaucracy. Which government official can determine whether the claims about persecution or mortal danger are substantiated? In many cases migrants destroy documents, making it impossible to identify them.
Schengen has never faced up to the dilemma that human rights are universal and presuppose equality of all human beings – but citizenship discriminates between nationals and foreigners. It accords essential privileges to those who enjoy it and legitimately withholds them from those who do not belong to the nation. Democracy is about self-determination, and the most fundamental right consists in a people defining itself as a nation. The decision about whom to accept as co-citizen and therefore as participating in exercising those sovereign powers is of fundamental political relevance.
The paradox of the EU’s migration budget
To avoid individual hardships and vociferous criticism from pressure groups, most governments close their eyes and tolerate rampant abuse, which has become endemic. Any attempt to return to the letter of the law will run into deeply entrenched vested interest. When Germany announced that it would reapply Schengen rules it provoked an outcry in Poland, Italy and Austria.
The present practice is harmful both to the receiving countries and to the countries from which migration originates. Germany calculates that expenses for all programs to process, support and integrate 1 million migrants amount to about 25 billion euros annually. The government spends 11.2 billion euros on development assistance. The UNHCR runs shelters for around 60 million refugees globally on less than 10 billion euros and is desperately seeking sufficient funding. The money spent on those happy few in Europe could be immensely more helpful for those truly wretched 60 million.
More from Rudolf G. Adam
- Beyond Putin: Russia against Europe
- Is more less? The challenges facing EU enlargement
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It is decidedly not the “tired, poor and huddled masses” that constitute today’s migratory streams. To successfully navigate the route from Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria to an EU country you need money and information – money to pay the smugglers, the police, the bus and lorry drivers, to buy provisions, and information to choose the safest and yet shortest route and to navigate the complicated legal norms in the “promised land.”
Generally, a successful trip from Sahel Africa to Europe requires about 10,000 euros. The annual per capita income in that area is less than 1,000 euros. Those in need of most help are those unfortunate ones that have neither the means nor the knowledge nor the physical condition to migrate: Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the people of Darfur and Yemen, those in eastern Congo or those caught between Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Scenarios
Least likely: A new migration treaty
The least likely solution would be a new, realistic, global compact redefining the rights and duties of refugees and the conditions for asylum, thus replacing the Geneva Convention. The probability of such an agreement is next to nil. This means that countries are increasingly likely to apply provisions of the Geneva Convention selectively.
Less likely: Centralized EU migration policy
The EU could centralize migratory policy in Brussels. It would be the first step toward political union. This would mean executing Schengen provisions uniformly and resolutely throughout the Schengen area, including effective controls of external borders and swift repatriations of those denied residence permits. In view of the deep divisions between and within member states, this option has a low probability (not more than 5 percent).
Moderately likely: A return to pre-Schengen conditions
The EU could relapse into pre-Schengen conditions, reintroducing national border controls. This would not only gravely affect the internal market (delays at borders, added incalculability), it would create new friction if migrants are returned to the Schengen country in which they first arrived, particularly if countries persist in interpreting and applying Schengen rules differently. This alternative has a probability of 20-25 percent.
Most likely: Continuation of ineffective measures
The EU could shelve the problem and continue to devise verbose rules and symbolic institutions that give the impression of action but remain ineffective. The implication would be a further rise of nationalist and anti-EU political parties. Over the long run, this could tear the EU apart. This is the most probable option (70 percent).
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