Sino-Mongolian relations shrouded in resentment
The two countries are mired in historical grievances over land, culture and language, complicating diplomacy on modern geopolitical issues including energy.
In a nutshell
- Mongolia’s “third neighbor” policy balances relations with superpowers
- Cultural preservation efforts are pitted against China’s Sinicization policies
- The Power of Siberia II project highlights tensions over energy negotiations
Mongolia’s relationship with China is not only shaped by recent geopolitical developments, but also by a long joint history. It is hard to imagine that either side will escape these historical shadows in the short term.
The largest landlocked country in the world and its 8 million inhabitants are sandwiched between Russia to the north and China to the south. This challenging location leaves Mongolia no choice but to treat both its neighbors well. It is for this reason that even after the fall of the Soviet Union, Ulaanbaatar still maintains a close relationship with Moscow: Mongolia imports 95 percent of its oil and more than 20 percent of its electricity from Russia.
Meanwhile, its relationship with China is also essential, but riddled with tension. Modern Mongolia is split into two: the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, established in 1947 and administered to this day by China; and Mongolia, or Outer Mongolia as China calls it, which is now an independent country. Despite historical land disputes, China is Mongolia’s biggest trade partner, buying 84 percent of its exports. In an effort to strengthen its relationship with Beijing, Mongolia joined the Belt and Road China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor program back in 2016.
Not only does Ulaanbaatar have to balance between China and Russia, but also between Russia-China on the one hand, and the West on the other. Mongolia, as a young democratic sovereign state, has devised a foreign policy that is not overly dependent on either China or Russia, which it officially calls the third neighbor policy. “Mongolia is landlocked, but not mindlocked,” the country’s prime minister, Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene, told the United States last year. Thus, Japan, South Korea, the U.S. and even the European Union and NATO have become its cooperative partners.
This double balancing act adds to the complexity of Sino-Mongolian relations at a time when ideological divides are stark (reinforced by the war in Ukraine), and in the face of Beijing’s obstinacy and refusal to take clear sides. If Beijing still had the same mindset as it did during the Deng Xiaoping era after the late 1970s, China could have facilitated the smooth development of China-Mongolian relations. However, the opposite is true of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): Its stubbornness has resulted in a bumpy diplomatic path.
Push to restore an ancient language
The Mongolian authorities have decided to reintroduce an ancient script that has existed for more than 700 years, with the plan to fully revert to the use of the Mongolian script from 2025 onward. Over the years, Mongolia’s language policy has changed several times. In October 1945, with the support of the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia’s population of 750,000 people voted in a referendum on independence from China, which resulted in 98.5 percent in favor. In January 1946, the Republic of China recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia, which was from then on known as Mongolia to the rest of the world. After independence, the Latin alphabet was introduced, but failed rapidly. As a protectorate of the Soviet Union, it was officially declared just a few months later, on January 1, 1946, that the Cyrillic alphabet would be used.
Since then, the norm has been to write Mongolian in the Cyrillic alphabet. But in recent years, with the growing sense of democracy and national self-esteem in the countries that were once ruled or controlled by the Soviet Union, countries such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and also now Mongolia, are emphasizing the restoration of their traditional languages, so that linguistic and cultural legacies can be better developed and preserved.
In China, the media are already cheering this as a good opportunity for China to show its soft power: The Inner Mongolia region still uses the traditional Mongolian script. On this basis, Beijing claims that China has become a haven for Mongolian traditions. Yet, it does not mention that Mao Zedong did not maintain the script with the noble goal of preserving Mongolian culture, but rather to fight against the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, which did not share the same ideology at the time.
Mongolians are aware that Beijing is not committed to preserving their culture. In Inner Mongolia, the CCP authorities are using various tactics to eliminate the teaching of the Mongolian language. So much so, in fact, that Mongolians in China are now worried that their grandchildren will no longer be able to communicate properly with their grandparents. To protect their traditions, some Inner Mongolians have sought refuge in (Outer) Mongolia.
Young people in Mongolia generally hold less critical attitudes toward China than their elder countryfolk, and accordingly the degree of their recognition of China is also a bit higher. While many do express skepticism of China, there is also a sense of pragmatism and a perception that Mongolia should learn from China’s rapid development and economic success.
Chinese efforts to undermine Mongolia’s Buddhist ties
In response to China’s policy, former Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsakhia publicly called on all Mongolians to join in protecting and defending Mongolian culture: “Mongolian traditions cannot be preserved without the Mongolian language.” However, whether in Xinjiang or Tibet or Inner Mongolia (all autonomous regions of China), the CCP is deeply suspicious of resurgent ethnic and cultural awareness. It fears that closer ties across the border between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia will undermine its assimilation policy and control.
Mongolia’s long-standing Buddhist tradition is also a headache for Chinese authorities. China does not want Ulaanbaatar to have any contact with the Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese government considers a separatist. Many suspect China of unduly interfering in Mongolian affairs to undermine the country’s Buddhist ties. This stems from China’s historical interference in Mongolia and Tibet’s search for the reincarnation of the 10th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu (the title given to the Mongolian Buddhist spiritual leader, akin to the Dalai Lama), who died in 1911.
This issue resurfaced when, in the first half of this year, local media in Mongolia revealed that the Mongolian General Intelligence Service arrested three prominent Mongolian temple lamas and a Chinese citizen on suspicion of spying for China. The allegation that Mongolian temple lamas were manipulated by the Chinese once again brought the issue of China’s interference in Mongolia’s spiritual practices into the center of public opinion.
To date, the Mongolian government has yet to find the Goldilocks zone in their approach to preserving traditions without angering the Chinese government.
Facts & figures
Timeline of China-Mongolia relations
12th-13th century – Mongol Empire formation: Genghis Khan united the Mongolian tribes and founded the Mongol Empire, significantly impacting China and its territories.
1271 – Yuan Dynasty established: Kublai Khan, a grandson of Genghis Khan, established the Yuan Dynasty in China, marking the first time Mongolia ruled over all of China.
1368 – Fall of the Yuan Dynasty: The Yuan Dynasty collapsed, leading to the expulsion of the Mongols from China. The Ming Dynasty rose to power, and Mongolia was left divided among various factions.
17th century – Qing Dynasty control: The Manchu-led Qing Dynasty began to exert control over Mongolia, which was formally incorporated into the Qing Empire by the mid-17th century.
1911 – Independence declaration: Following the fall of the Qing Dynasty, Mongolia declared independence in 1911. However, the Republic of China claimed sovereignty over Mongolia.
1921 – Soviet-backed revolution: The Mongolian Revolution led to Soviet support in establishing the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924, making it a Soviet satellite state and further distancing it from China.
1945 – Recognition of independence: In January 1946, the Republic of China officially recognized Mongolia’s independence, following a plebiscite held in October 1945 where the majority voted for independence.
1990 – Transition to democracy: During the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia underwent a democratic revolution, leading to a multi-party system and increased independence from both Russian and Chinese influences.
Trouble with the Power of Siberia II
Another sticking point in Sino-Mongolian relations is the Power of Siberia II project. Since its inception in 2006, the project has been the subject of intense discussions between Russia, Mongolia and China. The total length of the proposed pipeline is about 6,700 kilometers, of which only about 2,700 kilometers are in Russia and more than 950 kilometers are in Mongolia. It is designed to deliver 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Russia to northeastern China. In February 2023, Gazprom preliminarily determined the route of the pipeline, according to which it will pass through Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk and Buryatia.
Russia has its own calculations for such a design. The Power of Siberia II project and its proposed Mongolian branch, “Union Vostok,” promise not only to significantly increase gas supply capacity between the countries, but also to solve a serious problem in some regions of Mongolia and above all in Russia – the so-called “dark skies,” especially during the winter months. At the height of winter, residents of large cities in Russia’s southern Siberia suffer from severe toxic fumes emanating from the use of coal or wood for heating. In such cases, gasification can be a good alternative.
Read more on China from Junhua Zhang
- The politicization of Chinese stock markets
- China and Russia: Toward an alternate financial system
- What is the future of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?
The key issue hindering the implementation of the Power of Siberia II project is that China is not yet happy with the price Russia is demanding for its natural gas – and it is not in a hurry, figuring it will not need the gas in the immediate future. Of course, there are other factors as well, such as Beijing’s pursuit of energy diversification. At the time of price negotiations, China wanted to obtain the feedstock at $60 per 1,000 cubic meters, which is almost five times lower than the current price of gas sold through the Power of Siberia I project ($260 per 1,000 cubic meters). This is, of course, unfavorable to Moscow, which wants to maintain high prices for its exports and therefore opposes China’s terms.
Beijing has been using delay and silence to force Moscow’s hand, refusing to sign the tripartite agreement to start construction. Ulaanbaatar, which had been very interested in the project, decided not to include it in its four-year national plan in August this year, seeing that the prospects for the pipeline are still shaky.
This move made Russian President Vladimir Putin nervous enough to travel to Mongolia in early September this year. He discussed with Ulaanbaatar how to work together to make headway on the pipeline – though of course he knows that the main partner he has to convince is China, not Mongolia.
Beijing is now using Russian experts on China, such as Alexey Maslov, to try to convince President Putin to kick Mongolia off the project. By scapegoating Ulaanbaatar for the project’s failure to launch, Beijing is trying to deflect the blame for its own role in slowing the project down. After all, it was the CCP who advocated that the project be extended from Central Asia to China.
However, Moscow understands that once the pipeline goes through Central Asia, not only could the gasification of many parts of Russia become a problem due to supply shortages, but China will be better able to use Central Asia’s multiple channels of oil and gas to put more pressure on Russia in price negotiations. Not to mention, Kazakhstan also wants to use the project to its advantage.
Politically unreliable
Within China, Mongolia has been portrayed as a politically unreliable transit country for several years. Beijing sees its third neighbor policy as a form of cooperation with the West.
As early as the mid-2000s, consultations have been held between the Chinese, Mongolian and Russian foreign ministries. For the past decade, trilateral meetings between the deputy foreign ministers’ have been held annually. Topics discussed include medium- and long-term planning for the construction of the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, agreements on road and rail transportation between the three countries, disaster prevention and control, and mutual assistance in epidemics. Mongolia also holds joint military exercises with its two neighbors.
Striving for balance, Mongolia became the first observer state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), but even with the organization’s rapid expansion, it did not become a full member out of concern that this would restrict its room for maneuver. In recent years, China and Russia have used various means to urge Mongolia to become a full member. Beijing has not been as patient as Moscow on this issue. The Chinese government has even hinted this year to Mongolia that if it does not become a member of the SCO, Beijing will abandon the trilateral summits.
Scenarios
The development of both Sino-Mongolian and Russo-Mongolian relations will depend on how skillfully Mongolia manages diplomacy on the one hand, and sticks to its democratic principles on the other.
Certain: Mongolia keeps walking the tightrope
President Putin seems to have a better grasp of Mongolia than Xi Jinping, although Moscow and Beijing’s shared diplomatic displeasure with Mongolia’s third neighbor policy is obvious. Because of historical tensions with China, Ulaanbaatar prefers to be closer to Moscow, which is why President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh accepted the invitation from President Putin to attend last month’s BRICS summit, held in Kazan, Russia.
But that does not mean Beijing does not hold strong cards. Given China’s trade importance to Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar may well crack when under pressure from Beijing. Further, Mongolia is highly interested in developing its own minerals, especially rare earths, which have to be shipped to other (mainly Western) countries through Chinese ports. Currently, Ulaanbaatar does not seem to want to risk irking the Chinese, even for the sake of protecting its traditions or democratic principles.
Possible: Externalities force Mongolia’s neighbors to soften
Nevertheless, other scenarios cannot be excluded. Developments within China will also determine the dynamics of Sino-Mongolian relations. If the Chinese economy remains sluggish, then Beijing will need to soften its tone toward trade partners, including Mongolia. Similarly, if the war in Ukraine does not turn out to be favorable for President Putin, an isolated and beleaguered Kremlin will be forced to be more polite and tolerant toward Mongolia. This would give Mongolia more clout in its dealings with Beijing. In short, Mongolia’s relationship with China is not only determined by Ulaanbaatar itself, but also by external factors – which could play in its favor.
Sign up for our newsletter
Receive insights from our experts every week in your inbox.
