Somalia’s president tightens grip after Israel recognizes Somaliland
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has handed Somali President Mohamud a chance to rally domestic support and accelerate his centralization drive.
In a nutshell
- Mohamud is exploiting Somaliland recognition for legitimacy
- Puntland and Jubaland are deepening ties with Kenya and Ethiopia
- The U.S. and UK back Mogadishu but bolster relations with regional allies
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Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 has given Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud an opportunity to reinforce his political legitimacy at a time when his authority is increasingly contested domestically. Critics argue that his government is deliberately centralizing power in Mogadishu by shifting Somalia’s clan-based federal system toward a party-driven democratic system ahead of his 2026 reelection bid.
On January 17, 2026, during the inauguration of the North Eastern State as a new federal member of Somalia, President Mohamud reiterated that Somalia is a sovereign state capable of defending itself. He also emphasized that the federal government rejects unilateral measures by regional administrations that undermine its authority. These remarks were seen as a direct response to Somaliland’s growing international engagement and resistance from some federal member states.
Mohamud’s broader strategy
The North Eastern State separated from Somaliland after the latter’s unilateral declaration of independence during the 2023 war. It pledged allegiance to the Somali Federal Government and joined the federal system. The formal acceptance of the North Eastern State into Somalia’s federal framework should be seen as part of President Mohamud’s larger effort to reshape the country’s federal structure by establishing parallel federal states alongside Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland.
This approach highlights the persistent inability of successive governments in Mogadishu to convince Somaliland of the advantages of staying within the Somali state. At the same time, it reflects President Mohamud’s attempt to handle the resistance from Puntland and Jubaland’s leaders, Said Abdullahi Deni and Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe.” Both have consistently opposed the expansion of federal authority, particularly regarding reforms to implement a party-based electoral system. They have also, at times, claimed greater autonomy over their foreign and security policies.
These tensions became particularly evident in March and November 2024, when President Deni withdrew his administration from Somalia’s federal system. This withdrawal was a protest against President Mohamud’s maneuvers to leverage the federal parliament to expand presidential powers. Mr. Deni also opposes Mr. Mohamud’s plan to change the provisional 4.5-clan-based electoral formula – whereby equal parliamentary seats are allocated to the four major clans and a half-share to a coalition of minority clans – to a direct, party-based “one person, one vote” system.
In Jubaland, President Madobe pursued a third presidential term in 2024 despite objections from the federal government that it violated the Jubaland constitution and the 2023 National Consultative Council agreement. Mogadishu declared the process illegitimate and authorized the deployment of the Somali National Army to apprehend Mr. Madobe, but the operation failed, leaving the Jubaland leader in de facto control.
Unable to remove either leader through military or political pressure, President Mohamud began exploiting internal divisions. In Somaliland, he supported the grievances of the 2023 SSC secessionists from the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn provinces by advocating for their reintegration. This resulted in the federal government’s formal recognition of the SSC as an autonomous state in April 2025 and was reinforced by the recognition of the North Eastern State in January 2026.
Regional states diverge on Mohamud’s constitutional changes
President Mohamud’s centralization strategy has led Puntland and Jubaland to strengthen their ties with Ethiopia and Kenya. Both countries have longstanding relations with these regions and consider them crucial buffer zones for their economic and security interests.
Historically, Kenya and Ethiopia have supported a weak central government in Somalia. This strategy aims to prevent the resurgence of a “Greater Somalia” ideology, which could motivate the Somali communities in Kenya’s northern regions and Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State (Ogaden) to pursue unification with Somalia.
Following President Madobe’s successful military resistance against the Somali National Army, relations between Jubaland and Mogadishu deteriorated further. In response, Mr. Madobe strengthened security cooperation with Kenya, leading to coordinated joint operations against al-Shabaab in 2025. These operations improved counterterrorism effectiveness but also limited Mr. Mohamud’s ability to assert federal authority in Jubaland.
Ethiopia, meanwhile, deepened its economic engagement with Puntland. In April 2024, the two sides expanded cooperation in trade, investment, energy and infrastructure development. This partnership assumed added strategic importance following Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, which heightened tensions with Mogadishu. Against this backdrop, Addis Ababa also stepped up security cooperation with Puntland, including arms shipments.
Among Gulf states, reactions to President Mohamud’s constitutional changes have differed. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have prioritized preserving Somalia’s unity, emphasizing cohesion as vital for regional stability. Qatar, in particular, has openly called for dialogue and inclusivity amid constitutional disputes.
Both states have largely continued to support the internationally recognized government in Mogadishu while maintaining limited engagement with Somaliland. Saudi Arabia’s interests in Somalia have traditionally focused on food security through livestock imports, but since 2023, Riyadh has expanded its involvement to include security and military cooperation. Saudi Arabia has also collaborated with Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia to block Ethiopia’s ambitions to secure Red Sea access via Eritrean or Somali ports.
In contrast, Qatar has aimed to establish itself as a mediator between Somalia and Somaliland, aligning its efforts with broader regional ambitions while strengthening its role as a regional partner to the United States. In 2025, Doha hosted talks with Somaliland President Abdirahman Abdullahi “Cirro,” setting the stage for political engagement and development support, all while stopping short of granting formal recognition.
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The United Arab Emirates has taken a quieter dual-track approach, balancing its diplomatic relations with Mogadishu while also fostering closer ties with regional authorities in Somalia. Abu Dhabi has established solid partnerships with Somaliland and Puntland, recognizing them as capable security allies, all while deepening its connections with Ethiopia and Kenya. This strategy culminated in a $3 billion agreement in 2025 to construct a railway linking Ethiopia to the Port of Berbera.
In Puntland, the UAE has invested around $50 million to support the Puntland Maritime Police Force in its fight against piracy. Meanwhile, in Jubaland, it has invested in port facilities and military infrastructure to advance its security and commercial interests.
Turkiye and Egypt have consistently recognized Puntland and Jubaland as autonomous regions within Somalia and have avoided taking explicit positions on President Mohamud’s constitutional reforms, instead encouraging dialogue and inclusivity. Ankara remains a crucial ally to Mogadishu, especially through its TURKSOM military base, which provides training for the Somali National Army. One possible reason for this strong cooperation could be Puntland’s decision to transfer management of Garacad port – initially built with Turkish assistance – to a company based in the UAE.
Egypt’s approach reflects both its preference for maintaining central authority and its broader objective of countering Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions. Cairo has been pressuring Addis Ababa to sign a legally binding agreement governing the operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
U.S. and UK shift to dual-track diplomacy
The U.S. and the United Kingdom have expressed concerns over President Mohamud’s unilateral moves to amend the constitution and hold elections despite the unstable security situation. Both countries have urged him to focus on restoring consensus with Puntland and Jubaland.
President Mohamud has been strategically co-opting opposition groups, signing a political agreement with a splinter faction of the Somali Salvation Forum, the main opposition coalition body. The Somali Salvation Forum has been challenging Mr. Mohamud’s steps to change the voting system, centralize power, and hold elections despite security challenges the country faces. His deal with the splinter faction has weakened the opposition’s political credibility against him. As such, the U.S. and the UK are hedging their bets, continuing their formal policies of recognizing Somalia’s sovereignty while also establishing military and security relations with Puntland and Jubaland independent of Mogadishu.
This approach is aimed at managing realities on the ground in the lead-up to the 2026 elections, amid expectations that a future administration may adopt a less centralized political strategy. This shift is reflected in increased U.S. security coordination with Puntland since 2025 to counter al-Shabaab operations, as well as the UK’s growing engagement with Puntland’s leadership, including a high-level delegation meeting with President Deni in October 2025. In a similar vein, the U.S. has stepped up its engagement with President Madobe to advance its counterterrorism goals, with intensified security cooperation reportedly focused on operations targeting al-Shabaab.
Collaborating with Puntland and Jubaland aligns with the strategic security interests of both the U.S. and the UK. Due to its coastal location, Puntland plays a crucial role in the political and security dynamics of the Red Sea, which sees approximately 12-15 percent of global shipping traffic. This importance cannot be overlooked, especially when it comes to defending or retaliating against Houthi attacks on commercial vessels. The threat is further heightened by the collaboration between Houthis and Somali pirates, which targets shipping in the Red Sea.
Working directly with the two states also promotes the economic stability of U.S. and UK regional allies, such as Kenya and Ethiopia. This was clearly illustrated by the U.S. and UK’s efforts to secure the Berbera corridor, a critical lifeline for Ethiopia, and to ensure the safety of connections to Kismayo ports, vital to Kenya’s interests. Both Puntland and Jubaland share borders with areas that have been plagued by al-Shabaab fighters, who have historically levied taxes on border crossings to fund their operations. These groups have a track record of launching attacks in Kenya, including the notorious Westgate Shopping Mall incident in 2013.
Scenarios
Most likely: President Mohamud shifts to dialogue on electoral reforms
Mr. Mohamud is likely to backtrack from his unilateral approach to elections in response to the worsening insecurity in the country, driven by the expanding attacks of al-Shabaab.
Meanwhile, Puntland and Jubaland, together with Somali opposition figures, in October 2025, stood against President Mohamud’s proposed constitutional changes, particularly the electoral reforms that threaten their power dynamics. This move demonstrates that both Mr. Deni and Mr. Madobe are committed to remaining active participants in the Somali federal system while ensuring the status quo that protects their authority and influence within their regions. As the elections draw near, it is highly likely that President Mohamud will tackle this challenge through a consensus-driven approach and open dialogue, allowing him to concentrate his political efforts on his own electoral campaign. This is even more likely given the recent political and military tensions between President Mohamud and his former ally Abdiaziz Laftagreen – the president of Somalia’s South West State – who was also his vice chairman of the Justice and Solidarity Party.
Less likely: Revert to a parliamentary system to accommodate regional allies
In a less likely scenario, Mr. Mohamud could agree to revert Somalia to a parliamentary system to accommodate Puntland, Jubaland and the politicians aligned with them. This move effectively limits the immediate presidential powers he has accumulated through political maneuvering since returning to office in 2022.
Least likely: Somaliland recognition talks are initiated
President Mohamud could begin official discussions with Somaliland to find a viable solution to its demand for international recognition. This dialogue will also consider the concerns of Somalis who oppose this demand, especially given his government’s recognition of the North Eastern State. Starting these discussions risks undermining his domestic credibility, as they would revisit a highly controversial issue: the disputed status of a state neither Puntland nor Somaliland recognizes. Also, this would undermine any political credibility needed to support his post-transitional presidential ambitions.
The recent constitution approved by the Somali Federal Parliament in March 2026, which Mr. Mohamud and his allies pushed through, indicate he intends to run for two terms in the future. Under this constitution, the president will be elected by parliament, lawmakers will be elected by the public and the president will appoint a prime minister who can be dismissed by parliament.
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