Sudan War puts African resilience to the test

Social and economic stability in Northeast Africa is far from assured as the Sudanese conflict between warring factions risks spilling south.

Sudanese refugees wait for food at a temporary camp Chad.
Sudanese refugees wait for food at a temporary camp in Chad in spring 2024. Chad is now home to one of the largest and fastest-growing refugee populations in Africa. © Getty Images
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In a nutshell

  • The SAF is gaining ground, but ethnic divisions and foreign meddling persist
  • Prolonged conflict deepens Sudan’s economic malaise, creating regional risk
  • Mediation has faltered; continued violence and regional contagion look likely
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Two years after it began, the war in Sudan has left a massive trail of destruction. Fighting continues unabated and now risks spreading into the neighboring country of South Sudan.

As crises elsewhere draw the focus of analysts and decision-makers, Sudan remains the epicenter of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe. The death toll is estimated at 150,000, while over 12 million people have been displaced. Nearly 47 million, almost half of the country’s population, require humanitarian aid, with many facing the threat of famine. Violence and displacement have spread across all 18 states, and the economy has sharply contracted as conflict disrupts exports, production and essential services.

Violence has intensified since the war broke out in 2023, leading to fragmentation among various civilian defense groups, the increasing presence of foreign mercenaries and a growing outflow of refugees into neighboring countries.

Recent developments, including a shift in the balance of power toward the state-backed Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), which regained control of the Sudanese presidential palace and the international airport in the capital city Khartoum in late March, along with regional diplomatic efforts and the prospect of a new approach from Washington, open a potential path toward easing the conflict. By the end of March, the SAF looked to be on the brink of restoring control over the entire capital city.

A shift in the balance of power toward the state-backed Sudan Armed Forces opens a potential path toward easing the conflict.

However, in the short term, violence in and around Sudan is expected to escalate as the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group battle for control of the city of El Fasher.

Meanwhile, the economic slowdown affecting Sudan has spread south, and the World Bank warns that the South Sudan economy will worsen before it improves. The country, which gained its independence from Sudan in 2011, has seen recent clashes and instances of improvised bombs, sparking fears that it too faces the threat of another civil war.

As violence escalates and a wider conflict looms, Norway and Germany evacuated their embassies in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, while the United Kingdom was sharply reducing its personnel there. The United Nations mission in the country called for restraint, saying a resumption of war there “will not only devastate South Sudan but also affect the entire region.”

Roots of the Sudan conflict

The trigger of the current Sudanese Civil War was the power struggle between two “strongmen,” SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF head also known as “Hemedti.”

Yet the conflict cannot be fully understood without considering two enduring dynamics that have shaped Sudanese politics since independence from the UK and Egypt in 1956: the militarization of power and the deep-rooted divide between an Islamic and Arab identity and a Christian and African identity.

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Facts & figures

GDP per capita has been falling in Sudan

Economic output has been declining in Sudan for the past decade, further stoking unrest in a country torn by war.

The tensions are further exacerbated by sharply diverging interests between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers, and worsening economic prospects.

Although the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s resilient, authoritarian and highly personalized regime briefly raised hopes for a democratic transition, these entrenched structural tensions ultimately accelerated the country’s descent into yet another war.

Turning point in Northeast Africa

After a series of strategic gains and advances made by the RSF in 2023 and 2024, the SAF appears to have regained ground over the past three months. A key turning point was the recapture of Wad Madani, a vital SAF stronghold in Al Gezira state, known as Sudan’s breadbasket.

Three key factors contributed to this victory: defections from the RSF, including high-ranking commanders, to the SAF; a broader SAF mobilization strategy incorporating Islamist militias, community defense groups, foreign fighters and the use of drones allegedly supplied by Iran; and crucially, the SAF’s reinforcement of its air superiority, further exposing the RSF to attacks while severely disrupting the paramilitary group’s key supply lines.

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Facts & figures

Sudanese Army reasserting control

The state-backed SAF is retaking the capital city Khartoum and trying to push RSF militants further west, hoping to force capitulation or negotiations.
The state-backed SAF is retaking the capital city Khartoum and trying to push RSF militants further west, hoping to force capitulation or negotiations.

It is also important to note that the RSF, despite being in an advantageous military-strategic position in regions west of the Nile, is considered hostile by the local population. Forces under General Dagalo’s command have systematically resorted to looting and brutal tactics, conducting massacres against civilians in the Sudanese states of West Darfur and Gezira.

The RSF has also suffered significant diplomatic defeats. In January, under the former Biden administration, the United States accused the RSF of committing genocide against the Masalit community and imposed sanctions on its leader as well as on several companies friendly to the RSF operating in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In March, the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to preserving Sudan’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, expressing concerns over the RSF’s attempts to establish a “parallel government.”

Mediation prospects are muddled

The Jeddah Platform, a mediation effort led by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, failed to secure a ceasefire, as both sides ultimately withdrew from negotiations. Similarly, the African Union has been unable to broker a solution, highlighting the limitations of the regional body in addressing security crises and the divisions among its member states.

While mediation efforts have failed, external actors continue to play an important role in the war. Sudan is rich in land and minerals, and endowed with 800 kilometers of coastline along the Red Sea, a vital trade corridor and geopolitical route. Consequently, regional and international players consider that Sudan’s future will determine the balance of power and outcome of spheres of influence in Northeast Africa.

An internally displaced refugee crying with babe in arms in the Gorom refugee settlement camp in Juba, South Sudan, in Jan. 2024.
An internally displaced refugee crying with babe in arms in the Gorom refugee settlement camp in Juba, South Sudan, in January 2024. © Getty Images

Despite fears regarding the strength of Islamic groups, Egypt has provided the SAF with diplomatic support. Iran, in turn, has supplied arms to the SAF, as it attempts to reclaim the influence it lost to the UAE and Saudi Arabia during the last stage of Omar al-Bashir’s rule. Turkey and Qatar, while more discreet, also support the forces led by General al-Burhan.

In response, the UAE has provided support to the RSF. Abu Dhabi has economic interests in Sudan, including in the gold trade and investments in agricultural land. Kenya has also played a significant role in supporting the RSF, with the group choosing Nairobi to launch its parallel government and a “transitional constitution” in February 2025.

Read more on the conflict in Sudan

Changes in the balance of forces on the ground have been accompanied by shifts in the international arena. U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration is expected to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the situation, possibly establishing a linkage between the conflict and the interests of other regional powers under the logic of the Abraham Accords (to which both Sudan and the UAE are signatories).

Moreover, the UAE will find it more difficult to support the RSF after being formally accused by the Sudanese government (represented by the SAF) of complicity in genocide. Russia has also become closer to the SAF following recent events in Syria, as reflected in high-level encounters and the February confirmation that Moscow will set up a naval base near Port Sudan.

At this moment, the main obstacle to reestablishing peace talks in Sudan − and preventing civil war from spreading to South Sudan − seems to be the clash between the SAF and the UAE. Turkey, which successfully mediated an agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia, is assuming a prominent role in mediation efforts.

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Scenarios

Despite the diplomatic, strategic and operational gains made by the SAF, the conflict in Sudan is likely to continue in the short term without resolution. It is not clear if the battle for control of Khartoum is over, with violence escalating against civilians as both sides carry out retaliatory attacks. A change in which group actually holds onto Khartoum may accelerate peace talks. Nevertheless, armed conflict and violence against civilians, including ethnic-based attacks, are expected to continue in the Darfur and Kordofan regions.

In the medium term, three scenarios should be considered: fragmentation and continued violence; a power-sharing agreement; or a decisive military victory by the SAF.

Most likely: War continues and regional security risks grow

In the medium term, the most likely scenario is prolonged conflict and fragmentation. Significant obstacles to a peace agreement remain, including the SAF’s deep suspicion of foreign-led initiatives, the challenge of integrating the RSF’s 100,000-strong force into a post-war security framework and the fear of both sides losing control over key resources.

Even if the SAF recapture of Khartoum holds, the RSF and other armed groups will continue to control vast swathes of Sudanese territory. Fighting is expected to persist in Darfur, where the roots of violence extend far beyond the current war. And, from a diplomatic perspective, accusations of genocide further complicate efforts to incorporate General Dagalo’s claims into a formal agreement.

The prospect of a negotiated path to stabilization is further diminished by the war’s regional impact, and the effects of a vicious cycle of displacement and violence. An estimated 950,000 Sudanese refugees have fled to Chad, where the SAF accuses the government of supporting the RSF.

Instability is also increasing in South Sudan, where oil exports – its economic lifeline − have been severely affected by the conflict. Civil war there was followed by a fragile peace agreement between rivals: South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar. That balance seems to be faltering amid rising ethnic and political tensions: Forces loyal to the president arrested Mr. Machar at the end of March, in essence snuffing out the peace agreement and threatening to plunge South Sudan back into civil war.

Less likely: Negotiated division of Sudanese territory

A second possible scenario involves an agreement establishing that each side will control different parts of the country. While the SAF would not give up control over Khartoum or the White Nile, the atrocities committed by the RSF in Darfur and it being considered a hostile force by most civilians make this scenario of formal and negotiated partition less likely. Another obstacle is that both the SAF and the RSF are struggling with internal divisions, which would likely compromise effective agreements.

Highly unlikely: Sudan’s army claims victory nationwide

A decisive SAF victory and a return to civilian rule remain highly unlikely in the short to medium term.

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