Trouble brewing in Tajikistan
The little-known Central Asian nation, a living fossil of Soviet-era autocracy, grapples with a set of destabilizing security and economic challenges.
In a nutshell
- Tajikistan is linked with a virulent strain of terrorism, which alarms neighbors
- The leadership transition aims to establish a hereditary ruling dynasty
- There are doubts about Tajikistan’s ability to keep militant Islamists at bay
Perched high in Central Asia’s Pamir Mountains between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, China and Afghanistan, the Republic of Tajikistan is a place that few people from outside the region have ever visited and many might not even be able to find on a map. Yet, recent events have highlighted significant geopolitical reasons to pay attention to developments within the country.
The first and most dramatic of these reasons occurred on March 22, 2024, when terrorists attacked the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, resulting in 145 deaths. Four Tajik nationals were arrested in connection with the attack. All were affiliated with the militant group Islamic State Khorasan Province, commonly known as ISIS-K, which is based in northern Afghanistan.
Expulsion of Tajiks from Russia
The immediate consequence of the attack was a mass expulsion of Tajik nationals from Russia. On August 6, Tajikistan’s Minister of Labor, Migration and Employment Gulnora Hasanzoda stated that during the first six months of 2024, Russia deported over 17,000 Tajik migrant workers. Fearing an escalation of the already significant xenophobia and harassment, many additional Tajiks chose to leave Russia voluntarily. On September 10, the Tajik embassy in Moscow issued a warning to its citizens against traveling to Russia. Given the importance of remittance payments from migrant workers in Russia to the Tajik economy, this is unhappy news.
The impact on Tajikistan of being linked to terrorism has not been limited to its relations with Russia. Equally significant is that the March attack in Moscow followed a January suicide bombing in the Iranian city of Kerman, which left 96 dead. This attack targeted a memorial service for Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a United States drone strike near Baghdad Airport. The Kerman attack was also claimed to have been carried out by Tajik militants affiliated with ISIS-K.
Facts & figures
Tajikistan
- Capital: Dushanbe
- Area: 143,100 square kilometers (55,300 square miles); approx. 25% larger than Bulgaria; over 90% of the country is mountainous
- Population: Around 10.6 million; the main ethnic group is Tajiks (approx. 79.9%), followed by Uzbeks (15.3%), Russians (1.1%) and Kyrgyz (1.1%)
- Religion: 97.5% of the population adheres to Islam
- Key industries: Aluminum production and agriculture, particularly cotton.
- Nominal GDP, 2023: Approximately $12.06 billion; GDP per capita (PPP): around $5,300
- GDP growth rate: 8.3% in 2023, projected to grow by 6.5% in both 2024 and 2025
Source: World Bank, CIA World Factbook
To the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which strongly emphasizes regional security, these developments represent a clear and present danger. When the organization convened for its annual meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 4, 2024, the rise in terrorism, linked to the growing threat to regional stability emanating from Taliban-led Afghanistan, was a focal point. The group’s earlier acceptance of Iran as a full member in July 2023 makes this issue even more pressing.
Ties with Afghanistan
These observations combine to present a second, related reason why Tajikistan merits closer attention. Among the five countries that make up Central Asia, colloquially known as “the Stans,” Tajikistan stands out due to its strong ties to Afghanistan. While the other four countries are Turkic-speaking and share common roots in that tradition, the Tajiks are Farsi-speaking and have cultural and historical connections with Afghanistan. Although estimates vary, it is believed that Tajiks constitute more than a quarter of the Afghan population. In fact, there are more Tajiks in Afghanistan than in Tajikistan itself.
The two countries share a long border through rugged mountainous terrain that presents significant opportunities for drug trafficking and the infiltration of terrorists. This situation is a primary reason why China maintains a military base in Tajikistan, its first fully operational military base outside of its own territory. Troops from this base have been conducting joint border patrols with Tajik border forces, and Beijing has invested in enhancing Tajik border security. There are concerns that Islamist groups may exacerbate instability in China’s already troubled easternmost Xinjiang region, which borders Afghanistan.
The connection between Tajikistan and Afghanistan became especially prominent during the war that the U.S. and its coalition forces launched to dismantle the Taliban in retaliation for harboring the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks. An important U.S. ally within Afghanistan was the Northern Alliance, whose leader, Ahmad Shah Masoud, was an ethnic Tajik with roots in the northern Panjshir Valley.
Following the hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power, the weakened Afghan branch of the Islamic State (ISIS-K) has expanded its presence in the border regions with Tajikistan, where Tajiks are predominant. Although membership in ISIS-K is estimated to be no more than 4,000 to 6,000, including family members, the threat of the group establishing a foothold in Tajikistan is genuine. A crucial question is whether the government can effectively confront the Islamist threat. This situation feeds into a third, politically significant reason to closely monitor current events in the country: It is facing a political transition.
Sensitive transition of power
For countries with weak or absent traditions of democracy, changes in top leadership are moments of truth. Strongmen who maintain power for extended periods typically prioritize their own security and frequently harbor ambitions to establish a hereditary dynasty. North Korea exemplifies the extreme political and economic consequences of creating a hereditary autocracy.
The five countries in Central Asia share common historical traditions of clan-based structures and unaccountable power. Even when we set aside the notable case of Kyrgyzstan – distinct for having held contested elections – the three largest countries, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, provide examples of how elites can agree on an orderly transition to new non-hereditary leadership, albeit in different contexts and timelines.
Tajikistan has a long history of cracking down hard on militant Islamism.
Tajikistan is the last of “the Stans” to undertake a transition to new leadership. In contrast to the earlier transitions in this group of countries, the process in Tajikistan is likely to be fraught with complications.
Incumbent President Emomali Rahmon has been in power since 1992 and stands as the last remaining leader from the era of Soviet influence in Central Asia. He appears determined to ensure that power is passed to his son, Rustam Emomali. In recent months, there has been a significant crackdown targeting political opposition figures, prominent media members and even legendary military commanders from the Tajik civil war (1992-1997).
The long crackdown
Although arrests have been made in response to an alleged coup attempt, prosecutors have struggled to present a credible case. The alleged instigator, Saidjafar Usmonzoda, a parliamentary deputy and former head of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, is associated with a party that has historically functioned as a tame opposition and has never posed any form of threat to the regime. However, he has been accused of conspiring with members of the opposition in exile.
Tajikistan has a long history of cracking down hard on militant Islamism. This policy has included the random closures of mosques, imposing fines on women wearing hijabs, forcibly shaving the beards of men and banning parents from giving their children Arabic names. The long crackdown began in September 2015 when the government accused the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan of involvement in an attempted Islamist coup. Although no credible evidence was presented, the party was branded as a terrorist organization and banned from participating in political life.
Read more from Stefan Hedlund on Central Asia
- Turkey winning ground in Central Asia
- Central Asia is coming into its own
- Uzbekistan emerging from isolation
- Central Asia deals with the Taliban
In May 2015, Gulmurod Khalimov, the head of Tajikistan’s special forces, defected to ISIS. In a video posted on YouTube, he stated that the government’s crackdown on Muslims prompted his decision. Mr. Khalimov’s defection was significant due to his high-profile position as a military officer and his previous training in counterterrorism tactics from both the U.S. and Russia. A reward of up to $3 million was offered for information leading to his capture. He was reported killed in Syria in September 2017.
In a parallel process, the government of Tajikistan has been suppressing the Pamiri minority residing in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), which is located in the eastern part of the country. This region, which borders both China and Afghanistan, is home to several ethnic groups that practice Shia Islam, in contrast to the Sunni majority of Tajiks. The Pamiris have been denied official recognition as a minority, leading to systematic oppression.
That conflict came to a head in May 2022 when a peaceful protest was violently suppressed by police and security forces. Over the following weeks, dozens of people were killed and hundreds more were arrested. While the repression of rights for the Pamiri minority does have a religious dimension, it appears that the ongoing crackdown is primarily driven by a desire to crush opposition to the regime rather than an outright fear of militant Islam.
Scenarios
Onward developments in Tajikistan can move in two very different directions.
More likely: Hereditary autocracy is established
This scenario is supported by robust economic growth, driven by increased revenues from gold exports and a surge in infrastructure spending. In 2023, Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 8.3 percent, with forecasts indicating a continued growth rate of 6.5 percent for both 2024 and 2025.
The most likely development is that the president’s transition plan succeeds, allowing the government to retain sufficient resources to keep its loyalists satisfied and prevent a coup. However, this stability is fragile, and both Moscow and Beijing will closely monitor any signs of ISIS-K gaining influence among the young rural poor.
The risks are many. The loss of remittance payments from migrant workers poses a serious threat to the economy. The World Bank has warned of a potential decline in remittances due to escalating global tensions and stricter migration policies in Russia, where many Tajiks work.
Additionally, there is a looming threat to energy security. Global warming has caused the melting of glaciers, which has reduced the water supply for hydropower generation – a primary energy source for Tajikistan. Consequently, the country has faced recurrent electricity rationing during winter months. This year, rationing began on September 22, a full month earlier than usual. Food security is also a pressing issue. Rapid population growth combined with a shortage of arable land has led to an increasing dependence on food imports. This exposes the country to the risks of potential supply chain disruptions or rising global food prices.
Another danger to the regime lies in the risk that a shift toward dynastic autocracy could worsen economic performance. With a majority of the population living at or below the poverty line, deteriorating living conditions may drive people toward militant Islamism. In response, the regime is likely to deal harshly with these threats.
Members of the emerging dynasty appear to be firmly in control, with state media portraying President Rahmon as the “guarantor of peace and stability” while grooming his son to succeed him. As head of the upper house of parliament, Rustam Emomali is building his own team for this transition. Meanwhile, the president’s eldest daughter, Ozoda, serves as chief of staff, and her husband is an influential banker; his other daughters and their spouses hold key positions in major economic sectors.
Less likely: Regime failure
The alternative scenario features a regime collapse with no viable contender ready to take over. A serious challenge to the regime could arise from deepening social and economic deprivation leading to grassroots insurrection, or from an ethnic uprising in Gorno-Badakhshan that spreads nationally.
However, the greatest threat comes from possible defections within the military, similar to that of Commander Khalimov in 2015. Such defections could facilitate increased infiltration by ISIS-K, prompting a military intervention by the SCO. Both China and Russia have troops in Tajikistan that could be requested by the regime to help restore order.
For industry-specific scenarios and bespoke geopolitical intelligence, contact us and we will provide you with more information about our advisory services.