Trans-Caspian Pipeline plan gaining critical momentum
Europe eyes Turkmen gas as a strategic solution with growing urgency.
In a nutshell
- Turkmenistan’s vast reserves could reduce EU supply risks
- Southern Gas Corridor expansion could ease reliance on LNG
- Russia’s influence is waning as Central Asia diversifies export routes
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In the turbulent politics of the Caspian Basin, there is one issue that has long resurfaced without yet coming to fruition: building a natural gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea, from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. It would make a lot of sense. Turkmenistan has the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves. Azerbaijan and Turkiye have formed a partnership and developed infrastructure that pipes both gas and oil from the Caspian Basin to Europe.
There are good reasons to suspect that this may now finally happen and that a coalition is being formed both to underwrite the massive investment cost and to tackle the associated geopolitical obstacles. Moscow’s influence in the region has waned and the Kremlin no longer calls all the shots, conflict in the Middle East exposes risks to gas supplies to Europe from the Middle East and Central Asian states increasingly are charting their own course.
Moscow’s reliance on legacy pipelines
Following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union’s interest in replacing Russian gas with fuel sourced elsewhere intensified. Connecting with Turkmenistan would work, both politically and commercially. The main obstacle, aside from iffy financing, has been Russian resistance. Current events, however, suggest that this may no longer be an effective constraint.
In his annual address to the nation in 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin made waves by branding the collapse of the Soviet Union the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” While his reasons for doing so may have been many and varied, two decades later one sticks out as truly existential: Russia’s business model. The transformation of Eurasian pipeline politics has placed Russia in a position where its economic future − which is so critically linked to energy export − is under threat. And there is little the Kremlin can do to reverse the trend.
In the Cold War era, all energy resources on Soviet territory were firmly controlled by Moscow, and all pipelines for export were built via what is now Russia. The breakup of the union gave agency to many actors, large and small, that vied for control. While this applied to both oil and gas, heavy dependence on pipelines made the battle for control over the flow of natural gas especially intense.
Russia’s approach to building pipelines has always been geopolitical rather than commercial. Even at the peak of Moscow’s hold on that market, Norway provided about the same volumes of gas to the EU as did Russia. Yet, there has never been the slightest sign of controversy over Norwegian pipeline deliveries.
The repeated “gas wars” that erupted between Russia and independent Ukraine reflected two things. One was how dependent Russia had become on Ukraine for transit of its energy exports, and the other was how geopolitical priorities trumped what could have been a Norwegian-style commercial operation. The final outcome was that Ukraine halted transit, blocking the lion’s share of Russian energy export to Europe (leaving only liquefied natural gas [LNG], which can be transported via tanker).
What few noted at the time was that the bulk of the “Russian” gas flowing westward via Ukraine originated in Central Asia, mainly in Turkmenistan. It was pumped via Russia to Ukraine and onward to markets in Europe. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, while countries in Central Asia took control over their energy resources and sales, Moscow maintained control when the sole export route was pipelines via Russia.
New dynamics in Central Asian pipeline strategies
China dealt the first blow to Moscow’s control in 2007 by launching construction of the Turkmen section of a network of pipelines to transport gas from Turkmenistan to its western provinces.
This is when the proposal to build a Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) emerged as such a threat for Russia. Having already lost control over a substantial share of Central Asian gas to China, which then lost interest in expanding its Russian gas imports, Moscow looked aghast at the prospect of a second major transport outlet being opened, this time from Central Asia to the West. The Kremlin’s main instrument to prevent this was derived from the legal status of the Caspian as a “sea,” which implied that its five littoral states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan Russia and Turkmenistan – are in joint control.
Having a common interest in promoting Eurasian transport infrastructure that runs north-south, Russia and Iran blocked the TCP, which would boost transports that run east-west. As Russia is now in the fifth year of its war on Ukraine and the United States-Israeli campaign to weaken Iran intensifies, the Moscow-Tehran axis has taken a serious hit. The emerging new powers are Turkiye and its close ally Azerbaijan, both of which have a major interest in upgrading relations and trade with both Central Asia and Europe.
Facts & figures
TCP a perfect fit for the Southern Gas Corridor
An early sign that matters were moving against Russia came in July 2023, when Turkmenistan announced it was ready to redraw the map of natural gas infrastructure. The vision was to link Central Asia and the South Caucasus with Turkiye and onward to Europe. In August of the same year, it signed its first-ever deal to supply natural gas to the EU.
The significance of this intention was that if major volumes of gas were to start flowing from the Caspian Basin westward, then Turkiye would no longer have the same interest in Russian gas, which covers 40 percent of its needs. Over the past year, it has also indicated a growing interest in linking up with Turkmenistan.
Read more from Stefan Hedlund on Central Asian gas flows
- Ukraine as an energy hub for Europe
- Kazakhstan bypassing Russia in the Caspian Basin
- Turkmenistan’s bid to link up with gas-hungry Europe
In March 2024 it announced that a swap deal had been signed that involved export of Turkmen gas to Iran and export of similar volumes from Iran to Turkiye. Appearing at a meeting of energy ministers of the Organization of Turkic States in Istanbul on December 10 last year, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar gave an even clearer message: “We have reached the phase of taking concrete steps toward our 30-year dream of delivering natural gas to Turkiye through the Trans-Caspian Pipeline.” To strengthen this message, he noted that on the western side of the Caspian the required infrastructure is already in place.
The first link in this infrastructure is the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), which was built to send gas from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkiye. The second is the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) that transports gas across Turkiye to Europe, and the third is the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that provides access to markets in southeastern Europe.
Taken together, these three pipelines comprise the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), a strategic goal for the EU that was completed in 2020. Turkiye and Azerbaijan have been signaling for years that they are ready to upgrade the capacity in this transport corridor. TANAP could be expanded from 16 to 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year and TAP from 10 to 20 bcm/year.
The role of Azerbaijan is also changing. In July 2022, it signed an agreement with the EU to increase the flow of Azerbaijani gas to European markets, potentially reaching 20 bcm/year by 2027. Even more important is that in July 2025 Ukraine began importing Azerbaijani gas via the Trans-Balkan corridor (Bulgaria-Romania-Ukraine). Ironically, this is a route that was originally built by Gazprom to bypass Ukraine. Now it is being used in reverse, to pump gas from Azerbaijan to Ukraine.
Looking forward, the main reason to believe that the Southern Gas Corridor will be extended to include Turkmenistan is that it aligns so well with proclaimed EU ambitions to halt all imports of Russian gas. Significantly, the European Commission has already designated the TCP as a Project of Common Interest, making it eligible to receive public funding from the EU. Both Turkiye and Azerbaijan would stand to gain considerably.
Scenarios
Most likely: TCP moves ahead
The baseline and increasingly likely scenario is that the TCP becomes reality. The need for it to move ahead took on greater urgency in March 2026 when the conflict in the Middle East disrupted tanker shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian attacks on countries around the region have led to the suspension of Qatari LNG production, putting European gas supplies at risk and highlighting the value of increasing supplies through the Southern Gas Corridor.
Nevertheless, the TCP project still faces two critical risks. One is that despite the commercial logic for participants, legal obstacles may still be raised. Although Turkmenistan argues that the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea provides adequate legal basis for the TCP to be built, Russia will challenge this. Given the size of the investment needed, Moscow may succeed in deterring some investors.
Even more critical is that upgrades of the existing infrastructure west of the Caspian will require long-term commitments by Europe. Those who would need to invest in capacity upgrades have been very clear that these commitments must be secured before decisions can be made.
Yet on balance and in light of new risks to gas shipments from the Middle East, it is likely that Turkiye will prevail, European actors will make the long-term commitments and planning for the TCP will move ahead.
Less likely: TCP shelved
The alternate scenario of the TCP being postponed or even shelved rests on European ambivalence and Gazprom still using the TurkStream pipeline to supply gas to Hungary. Launched in 2020, it was designed to pump gas to Turkiye and onward to countries in southeastern Europe. Hungary has since become its main destination.
The Hungarian government has been openly in favor of continued Russian energy supplies to Europe and has secured an exemption from U.S. President Donald Trump to continue such imports. In December 2025 Budapest struck a deal whereby TurkStream’s operating company will be relocated from the Netherlands to Hungary. If the Hungarians succeeds in getting other countries in the region to join, it may signal that gas from the TCP cannot find sufficient markets.
Although a big caveat must be added concerning the unpredictability of the Trump administration’s policies toward Russia, it is likely that Brussels will finally succeed in shutting down this last flow of Gazprom gas, thus clearing the way for Turkmenistan to replace Russia as a major source of gas for Europe.
The irony of this outcome would be that it was Turkmen gas that used to be pumped by Russia via Ukraine to Europe. If the TCP is built, that same gas will be pumped via Turkiye instead, without any Russian involvement.
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