Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy remains a work in progress
President Donald Trump’s Indo-Pacific policy shifts from security to economic priorities.
In a nutshell
- NSS frames South China Sea dispute as threat to economy, not sovereignty
- Allies fear U.S. abandonment as demands for burden‑sharing increase
- Administration seeks to rebalance economic ties with China
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More than a year into his second term, United States President Donald Trump’s Indo-Pacific policy remains an uneasy mix of conflicting objectives, competing factional viewpoints and transactional demands directed at friend and foe alike. International security threats highlighted during Mr. Trump’s first term have been overshadowed in the current term as economic goals take priority.
President Trump’s aggressive approach to tariffs in his second term has alienated U.S. allies and partners, who now view Washington as a more immediate threat to their economic well-being than China. These protectionist economic strategies will hinder Washington’s goal of building an international coalition to counter Beijing’s predatory business practices and security transgressions.
The U.S. is now demanding more from its allies while offering less in return, exacerbating fears of abandonment amid rising regional security threats. Public opinion polls in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan reveal a decline in trust in the U.S. commitment to their defense under the Trump administration.
U.S. strategy documents reflect a shift in priorities
The National Security Strategy (NSS) serves as a comprehensive, unified approach that outlines the U.S. government’s strategic vision. It offers guidance for achieving the nation’s diplomatic, economic and security objectives.
President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy warned that revisionist powers like China and Russia are working to undermine U.S. power, values and prosperity through advanced weaponry, cyber operations, intellectual property theft and various influence campaigns. In the Indo-Pacific region, the document pointed out China’s economic coercion, its militarization of outposts in the South China Sea and the associated threats to regional stability and free trade. North Korea was also identified as a serious nuclear threat to the U.S. The administration pledged to strengthen alliances, forge new partnerships and maintain a strong military presence to counter these challenges.
In contrast, the current Trump administration’s November 2025 NSS rejected past American idealism that sought to defend other nations’ democracy and sovereignty. Instead, the document called for a retrenchment toward more narrowly defined American objectives, seemingly adopting a “spheres of influence” approach to dividing the world. Overall, it reads more like a National Economic Strategy than a security-oriented message, prioritizing economic issues as the ultimate stakes. The administration presents this as a necessary correction to past overextension, prioritizing American prosperity and homeland defense.
Rather than decoupling or reducing economic trade with China, as some U.S. conservatives have advocated, the latest NSS aims to rebalance America’s economic relationship with China. It prioritizes reciprocity and fairness to ensure a “genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship.” Instead of framing the relationship with Beijing as a great-power competition, which was a hallmark of President Trump’s first term, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said the current administration seeks “a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations [and] a balance of power” with China.
The 2025 strategy no longer contains the harsh descriptions of the heinous nature of the regimes in China, Russia and North Korea, nor does it address the numerous security threats they pose to U.S. and allied interests. Additionally, there is no mention of the increasing collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, which represents a significant multi-regional threat.
The 2025 NSS accurately highlights the threats to Taiwan and the South China Sea, but fails to identify China as the culprit.
Neither North Korea nor the U.S. objective of denuclearization in that country were mentioned once in the current strategy document, their first omission from an NSS in over a decade. President Trump has frequently praised his “great relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and expressed a desire to meet with him again.
The new NSS also pledges non-interference in other nations’ domestic affairs and to refrain from efforts to impose democratic or social change. This is a major shift away from previous bipartisan efforts that sought to promote human rights and democracy on a global scale, signaling a significant change in approach.
The 2025 NSS accurately highlights the threats to Taiwan and the South China Sea, but fails to identify China as the culprit. The concerns are framed as economic and trade challenges rather than as threats to defending the sovereignty of democratic countries that share American values and principles. The NSS warns that an unnamed “competitor” controlling the South China Sea could disrupt one-third of global shipping or implement a toll system, both of which would have major implications for the U.S. economy.
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Washington demands more from allies
The first-term Trump NSS committed the U.S. to upholding its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, including supporting Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and deterring coercion. However, in the latest NSS, this commitment was softened to a statement that the U.S. “does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.” In contrast, the 2022 Biden NSS emphasized that the U.S. would “oppose” any unilateral change to the status quo, defining it as “critical to regional and global security and prosperity, and a matter of international concern.”
To its credit, the 2025 NSS document vowed to “strengthen U.S. and allied capabilities to block attempts to occupy Taiwan by linking maritime security issues along the First Island Chain.” (The First Island Chain refers to the string of islands from Japan to Taiwan, the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula, serving as a strategic military barrier to contain China’s expansion into the Pacific.) However, there is a far greater focus on demanding that allies share and shift the burden of defense, with the statement that “the U.S. military cannot and should not act alone in this endeavor.”
The document proclaims that “the days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over” and that America’s allies and partners must assume primary responsibility for their regions and contribute far more to collective defense while the U.S. serves as “convener and supporter.” The Trump administration’s focus on defending the First Island Chain while neglecting any mention of deterring North Korea has raised South Korean concerns of a repeat of the U.S.-declared Acheson Line, which triggered the 1950 Korean War.
U.S. actions toward China emphasize economic rebalancing
The primary declared purpose of President Trump’s tariffs (many of which were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in February 2026) was to address perceived excessive trade barriers. However, an underlying objective was to weaken China’s economic dominance over its trading partners and reduce the massive trade deficit the U.S. had with China. Although bilateral discussions in 2025 led the U.S. to reduce threatened sanctions in exchange for China’s resumption of exports of rare earth minerals, Beijing did not make any meaningful concessions to reduce its large trade surplus with the U.S. or address unfair trading practices.
To lay the foundation for future trade agreements, the Trump administration complied with several requests from China. This included a breach of U.S. law by allowing the TikTok social media app to continue operating in the country without requiring it to divest from ByteDance, the Chinese company that controls its algorithm. President Trump also insisted that NVIDIA be permitted to sell its advanced H220 artificial intelligence chips to China, with 25 percent of the sales directed to the U.S. government. On the same day as President Trump’s decision, the Justice Department announced criminal charges against a company that was selling NVIDIA’s chips – which are considered essential for modern military applications – to China.
Washington chose not to impose sanctions on China’s Ministry of State Security for its extensive covert cyber operations known as Salt Typhoon, which compromised U.S. telecommunications networks. Officials were concerned that imposing sanctions could jeopardize a potential trade deal with Beijing.
Mr. Trump has downplayed concerns regarding China’s aggressive actions toward Taiwan. In December 2025, Beijing conducted its largest military exercises in recent years, simulating a complete air and sea blockade of Taiwan and sending a significant number of ships into Taiwan’s 12 nautical mile contiguous zone. However, President Trump responded that “nothing worries me” about these exercises, stating, “I have a great relationship with [Chinese] President Xi [Jinping].”
All these decisions prioritized commerce over national security, though they align with the administration’s stated goal of negotiated reciprocity and avoiding escalation.
Scenarios
Most likely: U.S. seeks to improve relations with China
In the run-up to President Trump’s April summit with President Xi in China, the U.S. will continue to downplay Beijing’s economic and territorial transgressions to avoid jeopardizing potential bilateral trade deals. Reports suggest that the NSS’s criticism of China was softened at the request of Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who sought to preserve the positive momentum from President Trump’s October 2025 meeting with the Chinese leader.
Despite its initial maximalist approach in early 2025 to impose massive tariffs on China, the Trump administration subsequently backed down after seismic shocks to the U.S. stock market and corporate warnings about the costs of a trade war with China. Although Beijing has not fulfilled its commitments in return for the easing of sanctions, Washington is unlikely to resume forceful tariff actions.
Less likely: The U.S. steps up criticism and pressure on China
A bad summit with President Xi could lead President Trump to adopt stronger rhetoric against Chinese economic extortion and aggressive actions against neighboring nations. Continued Chinese expansionism in the East and South China Seas, especially if it leads to a confrontation with a U.S. ally, might result in a stronger reaffirmation of the American commitment to protecting the sovereignty of those allies. However, this response would contradict U.S. policy from the past year, which views allies more as contributors to U.S. objectives rather than as democracies that need defending.
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