How Trump’s policies could drag out the war in Ukraine
Trump’s presidency marks a stark departure from Biden’s Ukraine policy, favoring concessions to Russia.
In a nutshell
- Trump admires Putin, undermines Ukraine and weakens Western leverage
- Russian and Ukrainian public opinions remain irreconcilably divided
- The ongoing war is likely to continue; U.S. aid under Trump may diminish
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When Donald Trump retook office as president of the United States, one thing was clear about his policies toward Ukraine and Russia: He would not continue to do what his predecessor, Joe Biden, had done.
President Biden’s policy toward the war in Ukraine was strong verbally but lacked in tangible assistance, especially military support. The U.S. provided enough aid to ensure that Ukraine did not lose, but it was timid, half-hearted and insufficient. Clearly not enough to win. By “winning,” I mean pushing Russian troops out of Ukraine, or at least liberating meaningful parts of Ukrainian territory controlled by Russia.
The result of this policy is a situation where the front has not moved significantly since the autumn of 2022, although fighting is still ongoing. Tens of thousands of soldiers are dying on both sides, and hundreds of civilians, including children, are dying on the Ukrainian side under steady Russian bombardment.
Although Russia – now with the support of troops and materiel from North Korea, among others − is more active on the front, attacking and making territorial gains, these are not substantial and come with enormous losses of manpower and equipment. This war of attrition shows no signs of abating.
The mindsets of Trump and Putin
It was obvious that with Mr. Trump’s return, U.S. policy regarding Ukraine and Russia would change, but it was not clear how. Some (such as President Trump’s former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo) argued that the American leader would not fear Russian President Vladimir Putin and would help Ukraine win the war. But many more argued the opposite. It turns out they may have been right.
No one could take Mr. Trump’s boasting that he would resolve the war within 24 hours of assuming office seriously. Many believed, however, that he could do so in a few months. Yet even this was an unrealistic expectation, although only now is that becoming apparent.
The main reason why President Trump does not even try to hide his pro-Putin stance is that he shares two important instincts with the Russian president (and other dictators as well) – the autocratic and the imperial. The autocratic instinct has been on full display since Mr. Trump’s defeat in the 2020 presidential election, when he refused to acknowledge his loss, culminating in the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. If there is one most important cornerstone on which democracy rests, it is the peaceful transfer of power on the basis of free and fair elections.
It was obvious that with Mr. Trump’s return, U.S. policy regarding Ukraine and Russia would change, but it was not clear how.
President Trump’s imperial instinct, in turn, is behind his dismantling of the post-war international order, a fundamental principle of which was the unacceptability of changing borders by force. This is demonstrated by Mr. Trump’s (repeated) statements on Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal and Gaza.
Both of these instincts are also (and especially) behind the current U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Russia. Despite Vladimir Putin being a ruthless, imperial dictator, President Trump admires him.
Evidence of Mr. Trump’s affinity for the Kremlin boss can be seen in Russia rejecting his ceasefire proposal – that Ukraine had accepted – with little consequence. President Trump and his team (especially U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff) have routinely blamed Ukraine for starting the war, while Washington has been coming up with proposals that favor the aggressor.
For example, they propose recognizing Crimea as Russian territory. Or that the price for peace could be Ukraine giving up four of its regions claimed by Russia, none of which Russia controls completely. And if that were not outrageous enough, they are offering Russia the lifting of sanctions, while refusing to discuss any security guarantees with Ukraine and demanding that Ukraine give them minerals and repay the military aid the Biden administration gave the country free of charge.
President Putin, of course, sees that Mr. Trump has a soft spot for him. This does not deter him in his maximalist demands, it encourages him even more. And so Mr. Putin not only refuses to negotiate peace, but he dares to demonstratively ignore the ceasefire proposals President Trump has proposed and Ukraine has accepted.
How Ukrainians and Russians feel about Russia’s war
If a temporary ceasefire is not possible, how can a more permanent, peaceful solution to this war be achieved? The problem is not only President Trump’s accommodating stance toward Mr. Putin, but also the state of public opinion in Russia and Ukraine. This is the fundamental reason why a peaceful solution is hardly conceivable at the moment. The problem is that there is no intersection between the majority opinions in these two countries, and that is necessary to reach an acceptable compromise. Not only is there no common ground, the majority positions are miles apart.
Ukraine is a democratic country that has been bleeding and fighting for its survival for three years now, so emotions are running high. Despite being an autocrat, President Putin is deeply concerned with public opinion and tailors much of his strategy to sustain it. After all, the war against Ukraine itself is a tool not only to consolidate power and draw the dictator’s reins, but also to increase his popularity. The imperial yearnings of the Russian population are very strong as well. This has been illustrated throughout his previous terms in office, when Mr. Putin effectively revived his waning popularity through acts of aggression against neighboring countries, in 2008 against Georgia and in 2014 and 2022 against Ukraine.
Against this backdrop, let us look at the current public opinion regarding peace negotiations and the terms of peace in both Russia and Ukraine.
Views in Russia
In Russia, according to the latest data, from March, support for the Russian army is still high, reaching 79 percent, while 14 percent do not support the troops’ presence in Ukraine. Kremlin propaganda also succeeds in portraying the “special military operation” as successful. Around 72 percent of Russians consider it to be so, while only 16 percent have the opposite opinion, despite it originally being supposed to last merely three days and for Russia to occupy the whole of Ukraine. The “special operation” is now in its fourth year, in which time Russia has occupied an additional 13 percent of Ukrainian territory (7 percent was taken in 2014) and more than 170,000 Russian soldiers are estimated to have been killed and 600,000 wounded.
For most of the war, a slightly larger share of Russian citizens has favored peace negotiations over continuing the fighting. Now, the proportion of those who would prefer peace negotiations is at its highest, reaching 58 percent, while 34 percent of people favor continued fighting.
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What is important, however, is under what conditions Russian citizens would agree to a peaceful resolution of the war. Some 75 percent of Russians would consent if President Putin decided to end the war. But if at the same time he decided to return the so-called “new territories” to Ukraine (yet without Crimea), only 28 percent of people would agree, and 64 percent would disagree. In an earlier poll, only 3 percent of Russians would agree that Ukraine should return to its internationally recognized borders; in other words, that Russia should give up Crimea.
When it comes to the idea of a ceasefire, the data also testified to the above-mentioned gulf between how Russians and Ukrainians perceive the situation. Most Russians would support a ceasefire if it included certain conditions: guarantees for the rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainians (83 percent), protections for the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine (79 percent), a pro-Russian government (73 percent), the lifting of Western sanctions (71 percent) and the demilitarization of Ukraine (70 percent).
Conversely, a majority of Russians would oppose a peace agreement if it involved Ukraine joining NATO (81 percent), the return of Luhansk and Donetsk regions to Ukraine (77 percent), or the return of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts (71 percent). The only issue on which Russians were ambivalent was the presence of peacekeeping military forces in Ukraine (39 percent strongly disagree, 29 percent agree and 16 percent, while disagreeing, could accept it).
Views in Ukraine
And what does the situation in Ukraine look like?
According to a March survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the proportion of Ukrainians willing to accept the loss of part of the country’s territory as the price for sustainable peace is gradually growing. This view is currently held by 39 percent, and its proportion is increasing as the war is prolonged. But 50 percent are still opposed and insist on the return of all Russian-occupied territories, including Crimea. More importantly, even among those open to concessions, most insist on strong and credible security guarantees – preferably, though not exclusively, in the form of NATO membership.
Moreover, Ukrainians know that the Putin regime wants to destroy their country and sovereignty. Only 7 percent of Ukrainians believe that four Ukrainian regions would be enough for Russia, and 87 percent believe that Mr. Putin wants to conquer Ukraine in its entirety.
The March polls also confirmed the counterproductive nature of President Trump’s hostile policy toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, whose approval ratings rose from 57 percent to 68 percent after the White House clash on February 28. Ukrainians rallied around their flag and president, strengthening their resolve to keep fighting even if U.S. support curtailed.
Scenarios
Most likely: War of attrition continues without negotiated breakthroughs
The most likely scenario, considering Washington’s current approach and the maximalist aims of Moscow, is a continuation of the current war of attrition. While a complete halt in U.S. military and other support is unlikely (the Trump administration in early May approved the sale of equipment, training and support for the F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine), a reduction in aid appears probable. This decline could at least be partially offset by increased contributions from other allies, particularly European nations.
Less likely: Washington halts all aid, Russia makes fresh advances
A less likely scenario involves a full cessation of U.S. aid, an outcome that other allies would be unable to fully compensate for. This could allow Russia to make additional, albeit limited, advances on the front. Such gains would likely fall short of capturing key strategic areas, such as the still-unconquered parts of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions. However, it is plausible that the front line could extend into Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk.
Least likely: The U.S. seeks peace through strength and rearms Ukraine
The least likely scenario, though most desirable for Kyiv’s allies, would see a renewed increase in U.S. military aid, coupled with a significant tightening of anti-Russian sanctions. Only under such pressure would President Putin be likely to seriously consider a ceasefire and engage in meaningful peace negotiations. However, Mr. Trump has so far refrained from even mentioning boosting military support, and his sole threats against the Kremlin are limited to sanctions, which experience shows have little deterrent effect on Mr. Putin’s ambitions.
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