Signs of an increasingly flexible Turkey in Africa
Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence in Africa – leveraging military, economic and diplomatic strategies – challenges Russia’s presence.
In a nutshell
- Turkey provides military aid, economic partnerships and diplomatic engagement
- French withdrawals create openings for both Russian and Turkish influence
- Russia may be overstretched in Africa
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In Africa, the international community’s attention has recently turned to Russian movements, particularly in the Maghreb and Sahel. For Europe, the reasons are obvious: security concerns related to jihadist terrorism, unchecked migration and control of resources – not just oil and gas, but materials increasingly essential in the global economy such as uranium, manganese and gold.
Moscow has been under the magnifying glass for its private military companies such as Africa Corps (previously called Wagner group), which carry out operations alongside questionable local regimes in Libya, Niger, Mali and the Central African Republic. But the Russians are not the only ones involved in these activities. In several GIS reports we have already cast the spotlight on China and its tactical-strategic changes in terms of security in Africa, and there are other actors moving quietly on the African stage, namely Turkey.
Ankara has been active in Africa since the 1960s, so much so that in 1978 an exclusive department for Africa was opened within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of implementing relations with various African countries. Since the turn of the millennium, Ankara has put an even greater focus on Africa, implementing a more structured effort that is paying off.
There are other actors moving quietly on the African stage, namely Turkey.
Turkey’s activity is not only related to economic gains: It reveals Turkey’s flexibility in pursuit of becoming an international power player. Africa and the Mediterranean are two of Ankara’s chessboards. In 1968, the number of Turkish embassies in Africa was 11, today it is 44 – nearly twice as many as the Italians and only five fewer than the United States.
The Syrian domino
A further shift in this direction came with the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria on December 8, 2024, to anti-government rebels led by the Turkey-backed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The regime change has jeopardized Russian use of Syrian geography for military goals, putting the Kremlin’s Mediterranean and African ambitions at risk. Years ago, Moscow contracted access to Hmeimim Air Base near Latakia and the naval base at Tartus, and also secured access for Russian military personnel to other Syrian bases. Moscow and the new leadership in Damascus are negotiating future cooperation as Russia seeks to keep a foothold in the country.
Since the arrival of Moscow’s mercenaries in Africa, the situation for civilians has worsened exponentially.
It is an open question as to how successful Russian mercenaries have been in helping African regimes suppress rebellion and jihadist movements. Observers are inclined to condemn their actions. The latest study by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project concluded that since the arrival of Moscow’s mercenaries in Africa, the situation for civilians has worsened exponentially.
Having put in a decades-long diplomatic and outreach strategy, Turkey benefits from the perceived failure and brutality of the Russians. Recent moves are enough to highlight the contrast: In 2019 Ankara signed an agreement with the then Libyan Government of National Accord on maritime borders and Exclusive Economic Zones within the Mediterranean Sea, a deal that the new Libyan Government of National Unity reconfirmed in 2022. Those memoranda gave Ankara a new maritime and economic advantage. Turkey is now using the same tactics in Syria through a possible maritime agreement with the government in Damascus.
Military intervention for economic and geopolitical benefit
Notably, Turkey’s 2019 agreements with Libya came on the back of a promise for military intervention. Between 2019 and 2020 Russian contractors sent by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar clashed in Tripolitania against Turkish irregular units called in to defend the Libyan government. These units came from the Turkish private military company SADAT, and were joined by Syrian rebel forces.
That military intervention produced immense benefits for Ankara in the years that followed: from a firm foothold in Libya to far greater exposure across Africa. However, Turkish and Russian areas of action have overlapped frequently. In Libya, this has meant both conflict and sometimes pragmatic cooperation to achieve political and economic goals.
The same is also happening in other nations on the continent where the real winner seems to be Ankara. The Russians, after years of war in Ukraine and the Syrian debacle, are revising their strategy in Africa, while the Westerners, especially the French, are experiencing their worst period there since decolonization.
Within the span of just a few years, the French, who had long been the leading international presence in the Sahel region, have seen doors shut in their faces in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and, in December 2024, in Chad as well. Dakar and Paris are now working on the exit of French troops from Senegal by the end of this year. This comes as France has just left its sole military base in Ivory Coast, though military cooperation between the countries is set to continue. This continuing exodus has so far favored Moscow. Yet the vacuum left by France’s departure may soon create openings across Africa for Turkey.
Ankara’s sway on the rise
Turkish influence on the continent is growing, as the Turks have reportedly already been working as military instructors in Bamako, Mali. It is perhaps no coincidence that Mali has purchased new military equipment from Turkey, such as Akinci drones, produced by the autonomous weapons manufacturer Baykar.
Turkey’s reliability is well known, as GIS expert Teresa Nogueira Pinto recently pointed out. The country’s holistic approach to foreign relations with Africa, which does not center merely on military services but also includes investments in education, such as scholarships for African students in Turkey, is paying off. Turkey’s exports to Africa have doubled over the last 10 years, and Ankara is becoming a key security player in many states, from the Horn of Africa to North Africa, as well as in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and now in the Sahel.
Read more from military and counterinsurgency expert Federica Saini Fasanotti
- The Russian strategy in the Mediterranean
- Italy’s experiment: The Mattei Plan for Africa
- China’s military and private security inroads in Africa
The Sahel is an area of political instability, dramatic poverty and exponential population growth, making it an opportune area for an expendable tool like private military companies, as the Russian experience shows. In addition to Russian activity in Mali, it now seems Turkish private military firms are using Syrian fighters coming through Turkey to protect mines in the Tillabery region in Niger, although companies such as SADAT vehemently deny such claims. According to the United Kingdom-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), in a little over a year, more than a thousand Syrians have reportedly reached Niger via Turkey.
Scenarios
Likely: Turkey bolsters its African position by using more contractors
The most likely scenario for the coming months, especially with regard to the Sahel, is that Turkey benefits from the French withdrawals and Russian reorganization. The tactic of using private military companies abroad to expand influence is working at the moment, even if it has taken a heavy toll on civilians. Use of such entities is one that ensures − once scruples are put aside − satisfactory short-term results with less cost and institutional commitment than formal diplomatic and military engagements.
In this scenario, however, local juntas and governments will have strong leverage and little compunction about severing ties. If local leaders do not see an immediate benefit and adequate improvement in their public perception, they will have no qualms about getting rid of Russian- and Turkish-flagged mercenaries, perhaps even faster than with Western armies.
Unlikely: Turkey renounces military presence on the ground
Turkey, an active member of NATO, could possibly be persuaded by the new U.S. administration of President Donald Trump to withdraw some contractors from Africa if Washington believed a force comprised of formal European militaries would be more effective at fighting jihadist terrorism. This, however, is a remote possibility since neither the countries in question nor their host governments seem interested in having a renewed Western presence on their soil.
The example of Chad is emblematic: The Chadian defense minister in December stated that the total and final withdrawal of the French military contingent by January 31 is “imperative,” “irreversible” and “non-negotiable.” The French departure from its base in Chad took place on January 30.
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