A dream deferred: Turkey’s unfulfilled European hopes
Turkey’s EU accession may be on ice, but shared interests and concerns still unite the two.
In a nutshell
- Turkey’s prospects of joining the EU have been all but snuffed out
- The EU and Turkey have many shared interests and concerns
- Both sides will continue their engagement on a transactional basis
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In 1987, then prime minister of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, announced his country’s application for membership in the European Economic Community, the precursor to the European Union, by stating that the path ahead would be “long and narrow, one that is uphill and arduous.” His words proved prescient. Not only has the path been a difficult one, but nearly four decades later, Turkey’s prospects of joining the EU seem slimmer than ever.
Turkey’s accession negotiations were frozen at the behest of the EU in 2018, and that decision was reaffirmed in May by the European Parliament, which cited Ankara’s democratic backsliding as a key factor. While the country still remains an official candidate for membership, one would be hard-pressed nowadays to find anyone willing to bet on it happening.
This is a far cry from the upbeat atmosphere in which the country embarked on this journey, which was a natural extension of its republican-era orientation that began over a century ago when, in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk became the founding father of the Republic of Turkey. Ataturk shaped a westward-looking, secular and democratic nation-state. Allying itself to the transatlantic community, in 1952 Turkey became a member of NATO. The country has Europe’s largest standing army, with robust combat capabilities and a growing indigenous defense industry, and is the host of the Allied Land Command headquarters, making it a potent factor in Euroatlantic security.
What is behind the Turkey-EU accession stalemate?
Despite Turkey’s historical westward trajectory, the reasons behind the now-stalled accession are multifold. A good share of the responsibility undoubtedly lies with Turkey and its gradual drift from attempts to meet the bloc’s membership criteria, despite an initial period of sweeping democratic reforms in the early 2000s.
But others carry responsibility as well. Major EU members, most notably France and Germany, reneged on their agreement to Turkey’s eventual accession by calling in the early 2000s for a privileged partnership rather than membership. This happened as Turkey was fully invested in a whole-of-government effort to align the country with EU standards. The suggestion of alternatives to the jointly agreed membership option came as a shock to Ankara and ran counter to the logic of its widescale reform efforts to join the bloc. Fraught domestic political debates around the issue followed.
Meanwhile, other EU members, namely Cyprus and Greece, have systematically hindered Turkey’s accession process, effectively holding it hostage to their bilateral disagreements with Ankara. This further fueled Turkey’s frustrations. Speaking of the Cyprus effect on Turkey’s EU accession, Sir Peter Westmacott, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Turkey between 2002 and 2006, said, “Once Cyprus was in [the EU], the rules of the game changed.”
Facts & figures
The roots of the Cyprus dispute
The Cyprus question is a long-standing issue stemming from the division of the island into Turkish and Greek Cypriot territories.
Independence: Cyprus gained independence from the UK in 1960 and became a member of the United Nations, but the island was plagued by intercommunal violence between the two founding entities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
1974 coup, military intervention and division: A Greek-led coup aimed at uniting Cyprus with Greece prompted Turkey to intervene under its right of guarantee and occupy northern Cyprus, resulting in the division of the island.
Establishment of the TRNC: Turkey retained control of the northern third of the island, which unilaterally declared independence in 1983 as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognized only by Turkey.
Ongoing division: The island remains divided, with the Republic of Cyprus (south) and the TRNC (north). The Republic of Cyprus, along with nine other countries, became a member of the EU on May 1, 2004. A UN-sponsored plan for reunification was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in 2004, and a more recent effort under UN auspices in 2017 also proved to be inconclusive.
Unresolved issues: The situation has resulted in a complex political landscape, with the status of the northern territory, property rights and the future of the island still unresolved.
Over time, these dynamics instilled a perception in Turkey of having been unfairly treated by the EU, tainting the credibility of the accession process and trustworthiness of the bloc itself. The distrust played into the hands of euroskeptics and accelerated Turkey’s estrangement. Although a majority of the Turkish population, especially the young and well-educated, still favor joining the EU, overall belief that this goal can be achieved has waned considerably.
Today, Europe and Turkey are in much different places compared to when Turkey’s candidacy was officially endorsed by the EU in 1999, followed by the opening of membership negotiations in 2005. Within Europe, internal challenges such as economic hardships, pressure from migratory trends and identity-based discussions on the future of the continent have tempered support for EU enlargement and deepened skepticism toward Turkey’s candidacy.
This newfound focus on enlargement has not altered Europe’s reluctance in Turkey’s case, despite Turkey being a key ally in the continent’s defense against potential Russian aggression.
Meanwhile, the rise of right-wing populism has reshaped the European political landscape, introducing a political climate even less permissive to Turkey’s accession to the bloc. This dynamic is at play in the background as the EU adapts to a changing European security landscape after Russia’s war against Ukraine by turning to enlargement as a geopolitical tool.
The EU gave Ukraine a European perspective just four months after the Russian invasion, but this newfound focus on enlargement has not altered Europe’s reluctance in Turkey’s case, despite Turkey being a key ally in the continent’s defense against potential Russian aggression. EU officials sometimes even go out of their way to avoid referring to Turkey as a candidate country. Lamenting the current stalemate in relations, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has questioned the EU’s ability to think strategically.
Actions speak louder than words
The picture on the Turkish side also requires scrutiny and an honest assessment. Though successive governments led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have repeatedly confirmed their unwavering commitment to EU membership, they have fallen short in delivery. Actions speak louder than words.
The controversial arrest in March of Istanbul’s popular mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, the opposition candidate in the next presidential elections and a formidable political rival to President Erdogan, has deepened concerns about the state of Turkey’s democracy, which had already been in a steady decline. Since his arrest, the government continues to sweep the opposition from the political chessboard, having detained Istanbul clerks, blocked Mr. Imamoglu’s X account and banned public display of his image, voice or videos.
According to Nacho Sanchez Amor, the European Parliament’s Turkey rapporteur, Turkey’s accession process has faltered not because of Europe, but as a result of the government’s systematic backsliding on democratic standards and rule of law practices.
Regardless, what started in the early 2000s as a hopeful and promising process toward Turkey’s accession to the EU has lost momentum and essentially devolved into a relationship characterized by mistrust and disillusionment. Ankara and Brussels now find themselves grappling with different sides of the same conundrum: What to do with each other and how to manage an arguably indispensable, yet (politically) underperforming relationship?
Pragmatic win-win options abound
On a positive note, the glass is not entirely empty. The EU-Turkey customs union, in effect since December 1995, has deeply integrated Turkey into the European supply chain. The EU remains Turkey’s largest trading partner while Turkey ranks as the EU’s fifth. This economic interdependence is reinforced by European-sourced foreign direct investments, accounting for more than half of Turkey’s foreign direct investment inflows over the past two decades. It is further bolstered by the presence of a 5 million-strong Turkish diaspora in Europe and geostrategic interests shaped by the war in Ukraine, ongoing instability in the Middle East and the challenge of irregular migration; all areas where Turkey can add significant value to European efforts and benefits from ongoing collaboration.
These multifaceted ties underscore a level of interdependence that continues to bind Turkey and the EU together. Despite political friction, this entanglement, paired with many shared security concerns, compels both sides to navigate their relationship with strategic caution. Moreover, in an era of intensifying great power rivalry and an assertive United States foreign economic policy – characterized by the use of tariffs and trade tools even against allies – there could be potential for deeper geoeconomic alignment between Turkey and the EU. Modernizing the Customs Union agreement, as numerous studies suggest, could yield significant mutual benefits and anchor a more resilient economic partnership.
That the two sides need to work closely on shared interests against the background of the poor state of their political relations, creates a certain picture of a mutually beneficial, yet unfulfilled partnership. EU-Turkey relations are seen to be adjusting to this dynamic by gradually acquiring an opportunistic and transactional character. This would imply an association that functions according to the needs of the current moment and not one designed to frame a principles-based, long-term relationship (as the EU accession process is designed to do).
In Turkey’s eyes, the EU’s choice to focus on its immediate concerns and be more forthcoming toward Turkey in such instances was evident when the EU made every effort, including through the provision of financial support, to sign a deal in 2016 on the fight against irregular migration. The same logic was on display, in Ankara’s view, at the end of 2024, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a 1 billion-euro support package for Syrian refugees in Turkey, while sidestepping President Erdogan’s calls for more engagement between the EU and Turkey.
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The EU’s openness to engagement has been selective and self-interest driven. The growing desire among EU members, including even reluctant France, to enlist Turkey’s support against a revanchist Russia after it became evident that the U.S. could no longer fully be relied upon, was the latest manifestation of the same behavior.
Such experiences have convinced Turkey that Europe is only reminded of Turkey in the face of disruptions and geopolitical contingencies. Though to the delight of President Erdogan’s government, Brussels has also shown that the EU can choose to be muted on Ankara’s governance issues under such circumstances, especially if the bloc truly needs Turkey’s support.
Scenarios
One can imagine three different scenarios for the future of Turkey’s accession process to the EU.
Likely: Muddling through and maintaining the status quo
A plausible scenario entails Turkey retaining its candidate status for membership to the EU – despite it currently being frozen − and muddling through. This path avoids burning bridges and allows cooperation when mutually beneficial. Compared to progress in Turkey’s negotiations with the EU, which would involve greater convergences and hence boost synergy and action, this is a less ideal, yet manageable scenario.
The EU and Turkey will continue to cooperate with a transactional mindset in selected areas and possibly even deepen their institutional engagement in a limited fashion should political circumstances avail, but progress will remain limited and short of truly bringing Turkey closer to the ultimate goal of membership in the EU. Overall, though less ideal, this is the more plausible scenario in the short to medium term.
Unlikely: Turkey resumes active accession path and EU states cooperate
A mutually beneficial but unlikely scenario would be for Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU to be rekindled and advanced alongside improvements in Turkey’s domestic governance standards and its ability to meet the necessary membership criteria across the board.
Such a trajectory, which would re-institutionalize and deepen the engagement between Turkey and the EU, would serve both sides’ interests and potentially prepare Turkey for accession to the bloc. This would resolve many of the challenges that currently exist in enlisting Turkey’s support for bolstering Europe’s strategic autonomy and facilitating greater synergy between NATO and the EU, making this scenario even more appealing.
Of course, precursors to all of these developments would have to include progress on the Cyprus dispute, the resolution of Turkey’s long-standing problems with Greece, as well as the acquiescence of naysayers to Turkey’s EU membership, mostly notably, but not limited to, France and Germany. The tall order of these preconditions makes this scenario unlikely.
Most unlikely: Outright termination of Turkey’s EU bid
A possible but low-probability scenario would involve the termination of Turkey’s EU accession process entirely. Irrespective of how such a decision could originate, it would represent a significant deviation from the cumbersome yet critically important shared aspiration between the EU and Turkey to gravitate toward one another. The ensuing level of bitterness, especially on the Turkish side, would exceed what was seen after Brexit and have lingering, long-term negative effects on EU-Turkey relations.
It is also considered a low probability scenario for two main reasons. First, despite all its frustrations, political and economic considerations have traditionally incentivized Turkish governments to at least rhetorically stay the course on EU accession. Also, the majority of Turks still support the idea, making any decision to the contrary problematic.
Hence, though not impossible, it is hard to imagine Turkey taking such a drastic step. Likewise, the EU would have many political, economic and security considerations to factor in before moving in this direction, which would also require a consensus decision by the European Council. A major disruption would be needed for the Council to come to this point. As these individual developments are themselves unlikely, this is an unlikely scenario.
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