Derailed Israeli-Turkish ties are unlikely to recover soon
Once close allies, Israel and Turkiye now clash over Palestine and Syria, with mistrust and competing interests driving a deepening regional rivalry.
In a nutshell
- Despite a shared history, Israeli-Turkish relations have succumbed to rivalry
- Ties have worsened due to the Gaza War and differing interests in Syria
- Future prospects will require careful handling by both parties
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Two of the most consequential terrorist attacks of the modern era, al-Qaeda’s targeting of the United States on September 11, 2001 and Hamas’s assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, set in motion strikingly similar trajectories. In both cases, an initial wave of global sympathy eventually gave way to mounting criticism, as the U.S. and Israel expanded their respective retaliations into military campaigns widely perceived as disproportionate and dismissive of international law.
For the U.S., this overreach was epitomized by the 2003 invasion of Iraq under false pretenses, which continues to taint its regional and global reputation. For Israel, its prolonged campaign in Gaza, marked by extensive civilian harm, targeting of civilian infrastructure and punitive restrictions on humanitarian aid – actions that experts say have triggered famine – together with renewed settlement activity in the West Bank, is weakening its international support and deepening its isolation. The repercussions are likely to be widespread and long-lasting, including when it comes to Israel’s already fragile relationship with Turkiye.
The Palestinian issue has been a fault line in Israeli-Turkish relations, which are now complicated by diverging interests in post-Assad Syria and the reordering of the Middle East. Today, these ties have evolved into a competitive rivalry, with no easy recovery in sight and have emerged as one of the defining elements of an already turbulent regional landscape.
From allies to adversaries
The current acrimony between Ankara and Jerusalem was not always the norm. For centuries, Jews fleeing persecution in Europe found refuge in the Ottoman Empire. That history of coexistence carried over into the modern era when, in 1949, the Republic of Turkey became the first Muslim-majority nation to recognize the state of Israel.
Indeed, Turkiye is Israel’s “oldest friend in the neighborhood” and at the height of their engagement in the 1990s, the two countries forged a mutually beneficial partnership that expanded beyond diplomacy into military, defense and intelligence cooperation. Yet, the Palestinian issue remained the relationship’s Achilles heel, ultimately leading to its decline.
Not long ago, the depth of mutual trust empowered Turkiye to act as a mediator between Israel and Syria, helping facilitate discussions about potential land-swap scenarios involving the Golan Heights. That effort abruptly ended in late 2008 when Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Turkiye’s then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (later elected president in 2014), who had just hosted his Israeli counterpart Ehud Olmert in Ankara, was given no advance warning of the impending campaign and saw the move as a “stab in the back.” The episode marked the beginning of a sustained decline in ties and tensions quickly escalated.
Prime Minister Erdogan stormed out of a 2009 Davos panel discussion with Israeli President Shimon Peres, sharply condemning Israel’s actions. The following year, Israeli forces killed nine Turkish activists during a raid on the Mavi Marmara flotilla, attempting to break the Gaza blockade.
Despite attempts at rapprochement, including a September 2023 meeting between President Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in New York, both governments continue to uphold their respective narratives, trade blame for the rupture and pursue regional strategies that often put them at cross-purposes. Ambassadors have been recalled, reducing diplomatic representation to a minimum. Meanwhile, Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Netanyahu, both seasoned politicians, have adeptly exploited the bilateral rift for domestic political gain.
The gradual downturn is the product of actions on both sides. After the 2010-2012 Arab Spring, Ankara sought to expand its regional influence by embracing emerging Islamist movements. In the Palestinian context, this meant abandoning its traditionally balanced stance in favor of cultivating closer ties with Hamas, a shift driven less by the Turkish public’s broad sympathy for the Palestinian cause than by the ideological leanings of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). This placed Turkiye on a collision course with Israel.
Meanwhile, Israel has contributed to the bilateral alienation by aligning itself with Turkiye’s regional rivals. Notably, it strengthened its political ties with Cyprus and Greece, developing frameworks on energy projects and gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. These efforts extended to other areas, including defense and diplomatic cooperation. Israel also began to leverage its influence in Washington to complicate Ankara’s defense procurement ambitions and lobby against the sale of advanced American weapons systems.
As Israel’s regional aggression intensifies and its ongoing conflict in Gaza shows no signs of resolution, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced Turkiye’s decision to sever economic and trade relations with it in August.
Reassessing Israeli-Turkish ties and navigating Syria
By abandoning the cooperative approach of the 1990s, Israel and Turkiye have effectively institutionalized mistrust, laying the groundwork for the competitive dynamic that now defines their relationship. Nowhere is this battle for control more evident than in Syria.
Ankara favors a centralized, unitary state where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), are integrated into the central government. This is especially significant for Ankara since the PKK has declared its readiness to disband, which Turkish officials say would require all its affiliates, including the SDF, to do the same – an outcome that has so far remained elusive. Turkish support for building Syria’s institutional capacity, including through military and defense cooperation, can be viewed in this light as a core element of a strategy designed to empower the central government.
Israel, by contrast, envisions a weaker, decentralized Syria in which it can build ties with minority groups within the country’s fragmented social fabric. This would serve three objectives at once: expand Israel’s influence, create a counterweight to the al-Sharaa government (which is comprised of elements Israel distrusts) and blunt Turkiye’s leverage. To this end, while firmly backing the Druze community in southern Syria near the strategic Golan Heights, Israel has also been courting the SDF in the north – viewing them as a “natural ally,” a move that has drawn Ankara’s ire.
The zero-sum logic is clear. An Israeli government-commissioned panel has even warned of Turkiye’s rising sway in Syria and urged preparations for a potential conflict. Similar concerns are mirrored on the Turkish side, casting Israel’s regional ambitions in the same light. In this way, mutual suspicion has become dangerously self-reinforcing, pushing the rivalry into imagined, far-fetched scenarios and making it increasingly crucial to “discern what is real.”
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Regional realignment
The widening rift between Israel and Turkiye comes at a time when regional alignments in the Middle East are undergoing significant changes. Two dynamics stand out: the end of the Assad era in Syria, which many see as creating space for Turkiye to expand its influence; and Israel’s heightened military assertiveness since October 7, 2023, which has reinforced perceptions of its deterrence. The convergence of these trends, against the backdrop of unprecedented mistrust between Ankara and Jerusalem, creates an especially volatile mix.
By effectively weakening its enemies, from Hamas in Gaza to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, and ultimately delivering a decisive blow to Iran with American support, Israel has transformed the regional security calculus. However, the broader implications of its actions are far more ambiguous.
Israel’s unchecked military assertiveness in Gaza and beyond, fueled by a growing sense of impunity, has raised alarm not only in Turkiye but also in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. It has heightened concerns over Jerusalem’s hegemonic impulses. In early September, Israel conducted a targeted airstrike on a Hamas leadership compound located in Doha, the capital of Qatar. This attack was part of a broader campaign of Israeli strikes that reached beyond its immediate borders.
Meanwhile, public anger over Gaza has reinforced the Palestinian issue as a central constraint on Arab engagement with Israel. This backlash looms large over the Abraham Accords and the broader goal of normalization with Israel, presenting a challenge to U.S. President Donald Trump’s aspirations to expand the list of participants, particularly to include Azerbaijan, Turkiye’s closest partner and ally.
Ironically, Israel’s actions have unwittingly created an environment of growing convergence between Turkiye and the Arab world, providing Ankara an additional opportunity to break out of its self-imposed isolation following the Arab Spring. This alignment is visible in Syria, where Turkiye and several Arab countries are working to support the new regime, as well as in their joint backing of the Palestinians and a renewed push for a two-state solution, which Israel categorically rejects despite growing international support.
Scenarios
The glory days of Israeli-Turkish relations in the 1990s are long gone. Much has changed since then, leaving a relationship filled with deep mistrust and intensifying competition. The weight of the Palestinian issue will remain constant, at least until a credible two-state solution is achieved.
Yet, Israel and Turkiye are no strangers to one another. They share the institutional memory of mutually rewarding periods of cooperation and have learned how to manage, if not resolve, their differences. This pragmatism was evident in the deconfliction mechanism they negotiated for military operations in Syria, facilitated by Azerbaijan. Against this backdrop, three scenarios stand out for the future trajectory of Israeli-Turkish relations.
Unlikely: Breakthrough and a revival of the 1990s spirit of cooperation
The most optimistic scenario envisions a reset in relations, marked by a warming of ties and renewed cooperation. This remains improbable since the conditions for such a shift do not exist today. Israel’s trajectory in Gaza and its deep suspicion of the current Turkish government on the one hand, combined with strong Turkish support for the Palestinians and grave concerns over Israel’s regional ambitions on the other, leave little room for rapprochement. Only a series of major positive disruptions could change this calculus, and none are foreseeable at the moment.
Unlikely: Hot conflict
This is the darkest scenario. While unlikely, it should be taken seriously and, in any case, avoided at all costs.
Turkiye is not interested in a conflict with Israel. Its strategy focuses on deterring and containing Israel, not on armed confrontation. At a time when Ankara is focused on repairing ties with Washington, rebuilding relations with its Arab partners and stabilizing its economy, provoking a clash with Israel would go against its interests.
Instead, Turkiye is likely to pursue two parallel paths. First, convincing Washington of its readiness and ability to play a constructive role in its region and beyond. Second, capitalizing on growing Arab unease with Israel’s actions to strengthen its own partnerships as a counterweight.
Israel does not seek conflict with Turkiye either. Despite its military strength, Israel faces strain on multiple fronts, including international isolation, serious manpower issues in its military operations and rising anti-war sentiments. Its priorities are to uphold its red lines in Syria and manage its rivalry with Turkiye without sparking uncontrolled escalation.
Finally, Washington can always be expected to act as a buffer against the risk of direct confrontation between its closest ally in the Middle East and a leading NATO member.
Most likely: Managed rivalry with diplomatic maneuvering and heated rhetoric
The most plausible scenario is one of managed rivalry, well short of outright conflict. Both Ankara and Jerusalem will take the necessary precautions to prevent a clash, relying on silent diplomacy and intelligence backchannels when necessary. Nevertheless, they will compete fiercely in arenas like Syria and engage in heated rhetorical and diplomatic exchanges.
The core issues dividing them, from the Palestinian question to their competition for broader influence in Syria and beyond, will remain challenging, ensuring that negative dynamics will continue to weigh heavily on the relationship. What can be expected from this scenario is a pattern of sustained maneuvering and sharp rhetoric, contained by pragmatic efforts to avoid any uncontrolled escalation.
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