Turkiye’s middle power aspirations
Emerging global fragmentation enables middle powers to navigate alliances and assert greater independence.
In a nutshell
- A fragmented global order is expanding the role of middle powers
- Turkiye’s ties to the West do not preclude strategic autonomy
- Middle power ambitions are found across Turkiye’s political spectrum
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The United States and China, in their attempt to consolidate global influence into a sort of major-power duopoly, are creating space for middle powers to exert greater influence. This has brought many mid-sized countries to the center of strategic debate on the concept of “middle powers” and the growing impact of so-called “swing states” in shaping geopolitical outcomes in an increasingly multipolar world.
There is no official definition of middle powers, and it is not solely their global rankings – population, economic strength or military prowess – that matter. Equally important are their ambitions and abilities to translate relatively limited, yet meaningful capabilities into influence. In much of the recent debate, such countries are discussed less as a fixed category and more as a pattern of behavior, characterized by fluid coalitions with varying abilities to leverage resources and shape outcomes. They often do so through selective engagement and issue-based partnerships, which can lead to non-linear policy choices.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, in January 2026, said that middle powers view the world as it is, not as they wish it to be: They create different coalitions for different issues and they work with partners who share enough common ground to act together. Among such actors is Turkiye.
Ankara’s worldview
Turkiye’s ambitions, strategic choices and particular constraints make it a revealing case of middle-power behavior. It is often framed as an actor exercising greater agency by prioritizing its interests, occasionally at the expense of traditional alignments, including those associated with its membership in the Western security architecture embodied in NATO.
Turkiye’s attempt to join the Sino-Russo-led BRICS grouping and its express interest in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization speak to such an outlook, particularly given its place in leading Western political, economic, financial and security institutions – key enablers of its advancement and deterrence. It constitutes a striking example of a country, in this case a NATO ally, testing the outer limits of strategic flexibility, while striving to maintain longstanding ties it considers essential for its national interests.
Turkiye’s hedging has created tensions with its allies, who have at times questioned Ankara’s commitment to its treaty obligations. Turkish officials largely dismiss these concerns as unfair and, in any case, show little regard for such external perceptions. The occasional course corrections and rhetorical adjustments Ankara makes have not amounted to a reversal of its expanding middle-power reflexes.
Turkiye’s behavior reflects an effort to maximize autonomy and pursue new opportunities without forfeiting the benefits it accrues from its existing ties.
When examined in its entirety, Turkiye’s behavior reflects an effort to maximize autonomy and pursue new opportunities without forfeiting the benefits it accrues from its existing ties. Focusing solely on one side of this balancing act risks missing the bigger, more complex picture. No doubt, contradictions are inherent in this posture, which can perhaps be described as multi-alignment.
Ankara’s pursuit of collaborative opportunities with Russia and China, or its broader global engagement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, are therefore not alternatives to its traditional trajectory, but rather complementary efforts. Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said as much when he rejected allegations of an “axis shift” in the country’s trajectory and stressed that Turkiye will deepen its ties with the East while cooperating with the West.
The country’s effort to expand its global role as a middle power is shaped by its broader interests and decades-long ties to the West. The enduring benefits of its NATO membership is a case in point. It was NATO assets that neutralized repeated ballistic missile threats from Iran while the never-operationalized Russian S-400 missile defense system remained under wraps.
The nuances of Turkiye’s strategy
From a strictly Western-centric perspective, multi-alignment may seem contradictory and practically unfeasible, especially at a time when many European actors consider Russia a primary security threat, view the rise of China with great suspicion and show an increasing tendency toward insular solutions for self-preservation. Yet, the tectonic shifts and resulting divisions that accompany disruptive dynamics are where Turkiye’s government sees the opportunities, particularly in maintaining functional relations across camps.
Illustrating this approach, Ankara stands up for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and undersigns NATO declarations that characterize Russia as a primary security threat, while treading carefully to sustain political, economic and energy ties with Moscow. Leveraging good relations with all sides is the ultimate calculation. The problem is that even Turkiye’s best efforts cannot always please everyone nor preclude perceptions of opportunistic behavior driven more by self-interest than by principles.
The broader emergence of middle powers must be understood against the backdrop of a changing international landscape, and Turkiye’s behavior cannot be divorced from these systemic shifts. The constraints of the Cold War, marked by strict alignments, and the ensuing unipolar era of American predominance are behind us. The form and speed with which the U.S. is redefining its global role are striking, as is Washington’s unforgiving prioritization of national interests.
Meanwhile, China continues its global rise, and Russia, though in decline, remains a force to be reckoned with, especially as it wages war in Europe. Demographic, economic and political trends indicate an overall diffusion of power worldwide, signaling a transition toward new and still unsettled patterns of state behavior. As belief in global institutions and in any notion of a mutually accepted rules-based order erodes, self-help instincts among state actors are on the rise, echoing the argument that the jungle is growing back. Perhaps no other country experiences the effects of this reality as acutely as Turkiye, which is geographically adjacent to the epicenter of multiple ongoing conflicts and is now feeling the effects of a historic reordering of the Middle East.
What drives Turkish decision-making
Turkiye’s trajectory as a middle power is, in many respects, a function of this broader context. But it is also driven by interrelated, Turkiye-specific dynamics that combine domestic political evolution with external change.
The first of these is associated with the long-standing aspirations of the country’s governing elite to redefine Turkiye’s place in the international system. When it assumed power over 23 years ago, Mr. Erdogan’s conservative-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP) appeared committed to reinforcing Turkiye’s Western orientation, particularly through European Union membership – garnering widespread domestic approval along the way.
Yet it also harbored persistent skepticism toward a predominantly Western-centric conception of Turkiye’s role. Instead, it favored recalibration, seeking to diversify Turkiye’s room for maneuver across regions and partnerships, while expanding its capacity to move simultaneously across multiple tracks.
As the EU accession process stalled amid European hesitations and Ankara’s fading commitment, coupled with increasingly fraught relations over accumulated disagreements between Turkiye and its Western allies, the Turkish government’s search for new foreign policy horizons and partnerships intensified. This occurred as public sentiment toward the West soured, informed by grievances over perceived Western insensitivities to Turkiye’s longstanding fight against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism, restrictions in defense cooperation with Ankara and the EU’s restrictive Schengen visa practices. Initial Western reticence against Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Gaza and beyond further reinforced these views, compounding negative perceptions.
This heightened sense of frustration created an environment more conducive to the Turkish government’s preferred, more flexible foreign policy outlook and increased its domestic political utility in galvanizing public support. The strengthening traction of the ruling AKP’s foreign policy orientation did not entail a wider embrace of the deeply religious and conservative undertones that define this political movement, but it did involve a cross-cutting acceptance of the need to advance Turkish interests through greater strategic autonomy.
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Turkiye’s burgeoning defense industry and the government’s associated techno-nationalist narrative have been both a byproduct and an enabler of this belief. Together, they have acted as a powerful accelerant, at times boosting overconfidence in Turkiye’s capacity to act independently and nurturing a stronger willingness to project power and pursue more assertive regional and extra-regional engagement.
This vision began to eclipse the appeal of a seemingly conformist, Western-centric foreign policy that many came to believe offered Ankara nothing but a peripheral role in an unwelcoming Western setting. Moreover, the growing difficulty of conceptualizing the West as a coherent whole – especially amid rising transatlantic tensions, concerns over the future of NATO and deepening divisions within Europe – is a challenge. It reinforces belief in the need for a new direction premised squarely on Turkish interests rather than what came to be perceived as aloof collective interests within Western alliances.
In this reading, Ankara’s approach in some ways mirrors a broader shift toward interest-driven statecraft, exemplified by Washington’s own “America first” framing.
A developing view across Turkiye’s political spectrum
Perhaps most importantly, this shift in Turkiye is no longer confined to the governing party and its supporters but has come to shape the parameters of foreign policy debate across the political spectrum. As a result, a foreign policy premised on automatic or unconditional alignment with the West – even with NATO allies – is no longer a viable policy option in Turkiye, regardless of who governs. In the words of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Turkish foreign policy cannot run on autopilot with NATO and the West at its center as it did before.
This dynamic is also relevant to the government’s main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). While remaining firmly committed to the republic’s founding Western orientation, the CHP also advocates a multidimensional foreign policy that reflects both contemporary geopolitical realities and historical precedents from earlier republican efforts to navigate between great powers. In its latest party program, the CHP underscores the importance of NATO membership and the aspiration to join the EU – areas where the current government also signals commitment, albeit with diminished credibility – while emphasizing the need to broaden Turkiye’s engagement.
These themes are evident in the thinking of the CHP’s presidential candidate, the currently imprisoned mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, who speaks of Turkiye’s “dual identity” as a country institutionally embedded in the West, yet deeply familiar with other political, cultural and economic global spaces. While embracing the idea of strategic autonomy, he places particular emphasis on domestic foundations, arguing that resilience is integral to any such ambition and that this begins at home through strong democratic practices.
Taken together, these positions suggest that a potential change of government would likely recalibrate Turkiye’s foreign policy emphasis, placing greater weight on democratic standards and predictability, without, however, abandoning the country’s middle-power reflexes or its pursuit of strategic flexibility.
Scenarios
Unlikely: Significant recalibration toward strict alignment with the West
In a low-probability scenario, Turkiye would significantly reduce its autonomous actions and discipline its global engagement in favor of strict alignment with its Western allies and partners.
While a convergence of security challenges and economic shocks could encourage Turkiye to gravitate closer toward its Western allies and partners, two factors – one domestic and the other international – make it unlikely that any such recalibration would amount to a complete reversal of its middle-power ambitions.
First, there is domestic consensus on the need for, and belief in, Turkiye’s realistic prospects for successfully pursuing a more autonomous, self-interest-driven and flexible approach to its global engagement. The current government has picked up on this sentiment, nurtured it and turned it into political capital. Notwithstanding differences in priorities, tone and framing, the main opposition acknowledges this domestic aspiration and sees continuity in this trend, given global developments. Turkiye’s middle-power ambitions cutting across ideological divides suggests that this drive will be sustained.
Second, a wholesale return to the policies of the early 2000s remains unlikely also because of structural changes in the international system, including the emergence of new actors and opportunities, alongside deepening doubts about Western cohesion, transatlantic relations and Turkiye’s EU accession prospects. The current global disruption entails fragmentation, and Ankara’s response is to seize the moment to expand its ties and influence, without being constrained by its traditional foreign policy framework.
Likely: Continuity through ongoing recalibration and adjustments
In this more likely scenario, Turkiye operates as a middle power pursuing strategic autonomy. Rather than abandoning these reflexes at any moment, it seeks to discipline and narrow its ambitions where necessary, possibly also due to recognition of the limits of its own capacity or the value of collective action with Western actors. Emerging security considerations in a highly volatile and competitive international landscape are strong drivers in this case. What shifts is not the underlying direction, but the tone, actions and instruments. Strategic autonomy remains a core objective.
In an CHP-led government, this direction of travel remains, but involves much clearer signaling and coherence, reinforced institutional discipline and a renewed effort to ensure greater complementarity and harmony with Western partners. NATO membership and engagement with the EU continues to anchor Turkiye’s security and economic outlook, even as Ankara sustains a broader reach among regions and global power centers.
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